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Abstract 
 
Taking as a starting point the assumption that justice is the first virtue of the family, my 
main aim in this dissertation is to offer an account of what justice requires of parents. 
Grappling with this issue, however, sheds some light on related questions that are wider 
in scope: How should we think about justice in general? What is the distinctive value of 
the family? What would a society of just families look like? In answering these 
questions, the following thesis is advanced: Demands of justice are best understood 
contextually. They arise from the characteristics of the specific relationship in the 
context within which they are meant to apply. An account of justice in the family should 
thus appeal to the parent–child relationship itself. This is an intimate fiduciary 
relationship that normally constitutes the primary site of upbringing. Yet what makes it 
distinctively valuable is its element of identity, i.e., a sense of interconnectedness and 
continuity generated through the transmission of beliefs, practices and more 
idiosyncratic attributes from parent to child. Corresponding to this understanding of the 
parent–child relationship, justice requires parents to provide their children with the 
conditions to achieve a set of functionings up to the level that allows them to lead a 
decent life in terms of the parents’ social and cultural context. As this account of justice 
in the family is not strictly political, it gives rise to a complex interplay along the axis of 
citizens–parents–children, displaying formulae of both integration and separation of 
family and state. A society of perfectly just families might not be perfectly just as a 
whole. Yet it may be interpreted as particularly liberal; characterized by multiplication 
and separation of authorities, reflecting rather than resolving the tensions between the 
individual and society and between different individuals and groups within society.  
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And it is a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of 
just and unjust, and the like, and the association of living beings who have this 
sense makes a family and a state. 
(Aristotle)
1
 
 
  
                                                 
1
 Aristotle, The Politics, ed. Stephen Everson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 13. 
9 
Introduction 
Justice, Children and Family 
 
In the little world in which children have their existence whosoever brings them 
up, there is nothing so finely perceived and so finely felt as injustice. 
(Charles Dickens)
1
 
 
It has been twenty-five years since Susan Okin raised the challenge of gender against 
theories of justice. She argued that since theories of justice are centrally concerned with 
which “initial or acquired characteristics or positions … legitimize differential treatment 
of persons by social institutions,” and with the effect that beginnings should have on 
outcomes, theorists cannot allow themselves to ignore “the division of humanity into 
two sexes” and, in particular, the sexual division of labour within the family.
2
 Yet the 
aforementioned issues also highlight another division as having crucial relevance: 
namely, that between adults and children and, in particular, the relations between 
parents and children in the family. Children are treated differently from adults and they 
are treated differently by different adults, most notably by their parents. Moreover, 
questions regarding the parent–child relationship obviously have direct bearings on how 
beginnings affect outcomes.  
Nonetheless, theories of justice often approach the parent–child relationship with 
considerable ambivalence. Families are conceived as standing in the way of justice – as 
an obstacle for achieving it or as one of the boundaries of its domain. But at the same 
time theorists often turn to situations in family life to illustrate certain intuitions 
regarding issues of justice, and thus implicitly demonstrate the relevance of justice to 
the internal life of families.  
                                                 
1
 Charles Dickens, Great Expectations (London: Penguin, 2003), 63. 
2
 Susan Moller Okin, “Justice and Gender,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 16 (1987): 42-72, at 42. This 
challenge was further pursued and developed in her Justice, Gender, and the Family (New York: Basic 
Books, 1989). 
10 
Those who conceive the family as in some way obstructing justice, portray families 
as forming a private sphere governed by natural sentiments of kinship and love. 
Accordingly, the internal life of families need not be scrutinized from the perspective of 
justice since one assumes each member is motivated by altruistic feelings of care 
towards the others.
3
  Moreover, maintaining the characteristic nature of the family does 
not seem to go hand in hand with a full implementation of the principles of justice at the 
social and political levels. For example, allowing parents to confer advantage on their 
children as a way of expressing their love would violate the principle of fair equality of 
opportunity, according to which all children should enjoy an equal start in life, 
regardless of their family background.
4
 In response we can settle for less than full 
implementation of the principles of fairness and equality to allow room for parental 
partiality. Or, we can opt for narrowing the scope of influence parents have on their 
children’s life prospects, in order to promote social justice. Either way, when looking 
through this lens, families and justice seem to pull in opposite directions.
5
 
But the family is also in itself a distributive sphere which profoundly affects its 
members’ lives. Families not only share love and kinship but are also required to share 
money, assets, opportunities, time, attention, and so on. It seems plausible to hold then 
that as the goods to be distributed are limited, and competing demands arise for their 
use, justice is also relevant to the internal life of the family. Accordingly, examples of 
family life are often invoked in debates over justice. The examples usually aim at 
illustrating certain principles at the micro level of the family, en route to adopting them 
at the macro level of politics. Families are portrayed there as small-scale states where 
parents (paralleling a government) apply principles of justice in ruling over their children 
(the citizens). Thus, Thomas Nagel famously argues for the value of equality by 
                                                 
3
 See, for example, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1999), 111. 
4
 See, most notably, James S. Fishkin, Justice, Equal Opportunity, and the Family (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1983). 
5
 For attempts to resolve this tension between social justice and the family, see Colin M. Macleod, “Liberal 
Equality and the Affective Family,” in David Archard and Colin M. Macleod (eds.), The Moral and Political 
Status of Children (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, “Legitimate 
Parental Partiality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 (2009): 43-80.  
11 
considering the dilemma of parents wondering whether to move to the city to provide 
better medical treatment for their handicapped child, or to move to the suburbs where 
their healthy child could flourish.
6
 What this construction overlooks, however, is that in 
real-life families parents are not mere arbitrators between their children’s interests, nor 
a neutral mechanism for allocating resources. They have interests of their own, some of 
which are interests qua parents and many others that are unrelated to their children. 
Inasmuch as these are not entirely congruent with the children’s interests, principles of 
justice may also hold between parents and children.  
My main aim in this dissertation is to offer an account of what justice requires of 
parents, as I believe justice is a fundamental virtue of parenting. Admittedly, however, 
justice is not usually the first thing that comes to our mind when we think of parenting 
and the link between justice and the parent–child relationship may still seem quite weak 
at this point. In the rest of this Introduction I elaborate the case for the relevance of 
justice to the parent–child relationship (Section 1); make some terminological points 
(Section 2); and provide an outline of the thesis (Section 3). 
 
 
1. What’s justice got to do with it? 
 
One major source of scepticism about the relevance of justice to the parent–child 
relationship is the sentimentalist view of the family: Since the family is a sphere of love, 
it is not (primarily) a sphere of justice; the love that exists between parents and children 
makes issues of justice between them redundant. There are two ways to respond to this 
scepticism. The first is to undermine the view of the family as a sphere of love and 
                                                 
6
 Thomas Nagel, “Equality,” in his Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 123-4; 
and also Derek Parfit, “Equality and Priority,” Ratio 10 (1997): 202-21, which builds on Nagel’s case. 
Similarly-structured dilemmas are found in Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic 
Books, 1974), 167n; Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 18-19; Ronald 
Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2000), 12-13. 
12 
thereby reaffirm its status as a sphere of justice; the second is to dispute the either/or 
relation between justice and love.  
The first line of response is forcefully expressed by Martha Nussbaum:  
Love and care do exist in families. So too do domestic violence, marital rape, child 
sexual abuse, undernutrition of girls, unequal health care, unequal educational 
opportunities, and countless more intangible violations of dignity and equal 
personhood… Family, then, can mean love; it can also mean neglect, abuse, and 
degradation.
7
 
This holds true for a strikingly large number of families. For example, a UK-wide study of 
child maltreatment found that, during their childhood, one in four (24.5%) 18–24 year 
olds had one or more experiences of physical violence, sexual or emotional abuse, or 
neglect by a parent or guardian. One in seven (14.5%) had experienced severe 
maltreatment by a parent or guardian.
8
 In the US more than four children a day die from 
abuse and neglect; 80% of these fatalities are caused by parents.
9
 Children are the most 
vulnerable members of society in general, but they are specifically and especially 
vulnerable to their parents’ conduct. It is therefore critical that we become more aware 
of the facts concerning the real-life experiences of children in their families if we are to 
protect the vulnerable in society; challenging the sentimentalist view of the family is an 
important step in that direction.  
Notice however that as it stands this line of argument might give the impression 
that justice is only relevant to dysfunctional families and thereby imply that the family is 
a sphere of love rather than justice when all goes well. But we can go beyond this and 
deepen the relevance of justice to the parent–child relationship by questioning the 
                                                 
7
 Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 243-4. See also Sara Ruddick, “Injustice in Families: Assault and 
Domination,” in Virginia Held (ed.), Justice and Care: Essential Readings in Feminist Ethics (Boulder: 
Westview, 1995), which construes the relevance of justice to family life through the wrongs of family 
assault and domination. 
8
 Lorraine Radford et al., Child Abuse and Neglect in the UK Today (London: National Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Children, 2011), 40-1. 
9
 US Department of Health and Human Services, Child Maltreatment 2010, 58-60 (www.acf.hhs.gov/ 
programs/cb/pubs/cm10/index.htm). 
13 
either/or relation between justice and love. It is wrong to think that the relevance of 
justice indicates – or necessitates – a shortage of love. Where competing demands arise 
out of different loving relationships, as is often the case in families, love alone does not 
tell us how we should respond. As Henry Sidgwick claims,   
…when we come to compare the obligations arising out of different affectionate 
relations, and to consider the right allotment of love and kind services, the notion 
of justice becomes applicable. In order to arrange this allotment properly we have 
to inquire what is just.
10
 
Thus, a parent might be concerned about justice because of her love for her children 
and her desire to respond adequately to their competing needs. But within a single 
loving relationship, too, a parent may still be concerned with justice in wanting to 
ensure his child is being provided with at least what justice requires. We tend to assume 
that if parents love their children they will go far beyond the demands of justice for 
them, but many parents may struggle to meet even those demands and the fact that 
they manage, with great effort, to do so may be a sign of their love. 
Most importantly, however, love does not make justice redundant since the 
former leaves undetermined the obligations parents have to their children. Parental 
love (rather than duty) may serve as the motivation to meet those obligations and go 
beyond them, but it is justice which determines their content and thus sets standards 
for parenting.
11
  
It is easy to say broadly that [a parent] ought to promote his children’s happiness 
by all means in his power: and no doubt it is natural for a good parent to find his 
own best happiness in his children’s… still it seems unreasonable that he should 
                                                 
10
 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, seventh edition (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), 268. See also 
Rawls, Theory, 166: “Now love clearly has among its main elements the desire to advance the other 
person’s good as this person’s rational self-love would require… The difficulty is that the love of several 
persons is thrown into confusion once the claims of these persons conflict… It is quite pointless to say that 
one is to judge the situation as benevolence dictates. This assumes that we are wrongly swayed by self-
concern. Our problem lies elsewhere. Benevolence is at sea as long as its many loves are in opposition in 
the persons of its many objects.” 
11
 The distinction between motivation and standard is taken from the discussion of justice and love in Will 
Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 122-5.  
14 
purchase a small increase of their happiness by a great sacrifice of his own: and 
moreover there are other worthy and noble ends which may (and do) come into 
competition with this… yet what clear and accepted principle can be stated for 
determining the true mean?
12
 
It is not enough simply to expect parents to do their best for their children. As Sidgwick 
suggests, ‘doing their best’ may at times be too demanding. At other times, however, it 
might not be enough, still falling short of the required standards. We may also ask how 
parents should advance their children’s good. There are many ways in which parents can 
benefit their children; yet we may not want to lose sight of some specific provisions they 
are required to make for them. More fundamentally, there is the matter of how the 
children’s good should be determined. As Rawls points out, “love and benevolence are 
second-order notions: they seek to further the good of beloved individuals that is 
already given.”
13
 Is an account of the children’s good to be given by reference to their 
parents’ beliefs, cultural and social norms, or perhaps some universal standards? And 
finally there is the issue of what to do if parents do not meet their obligations to their 
children. Does it call for state action and if so, of what sort? As much as the relevance of 
justice does not indicate shortage of love, assuming that parents love their children does 
not make these issues redundant. Hence we may enquire into these matters while 
granting that many parents love their children dearly. An account of parental justice is 
not an assault on parental love. 
Further explanation is in order as to why this requires an account of justice. Here 
we may follow the strategy of pointing out “overlapping characteristics that allow us to 
classify activities that [are] different in many other respects under the same heading.”
14
 
In this manner, different judgments and principles are characteristically associated with 
distributive justice when they are concerned with assigning rights and duties and 
allocating goods and burdens non-arbitrarily. Or, in Rawls’s terms, “the concept of 
justice, applied to an institution, means… that the institution makes no arbitrary 
                                                 
12
 Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, 249. 
13
 Rawls, Theory, 167. 
14
 David Miller, “Two Ways to Think About Justice,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 1 (2002): 5-28, at 19. 
15 
distinctions between persons in assigning basic rights and duties, and that its rules 
establish a proper balance between competing claims.”
15
 Accordingly, this dissertation 
offers an interpretation of what this implies for the family as the primary site of 
upbringing; or, in other words, an account of justice elaborating the standards for 
determining the rights and duties of parents with respect to their children and the 
proper balance between their competing claims.
16
 
The account offered in this essay also shares Rawls’s view of the primacy of justice 
as a virtue of social institutions: 
Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought. A 
theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; 
likewise laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be 
reformed or abolished if they are unjust… The only thing that permits us to 
acquiesce in an erroneous theory is the lack of a better one; analogously, an 
injustice is tolerable only when it is necessary to avoid an even greater injustice. 
Being first virtues of human activities, truth and justice are uncompromising.
17
 
Susan Okin has carried this claim further and argued that “it is essential that [affection, 
generosity or other virtues morally superior to justice], within the family as well as in 
society at large, be underwritten by a foundation of justice.”
18
 Justice is primary “even in 
social groupings in which aims are largely common and affection frequently prevails,” in 
the sense that it is the most fundamental moral virtue.
19
 This seems to hold true 
specifically with respect to the parent–child relationship within the family.
20
 For 
instance, in cases where parents are loving but neglectful we do not normally think that 
the love of the parents may serve as a sufficient reason for allowing child neglect to 
                                                 
15
 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, paperback edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 14n. 
16
 This echoes Rawls’s distinction between concept and conceptions of justice; the latter include, besides 
the meaning of the term, the principles and criteria required to apply it. See ibid., and Theory, 5, 8-9. 
Notice however that at the outset it is an open question whether justice in the family requires the 
development of a separate conception of justice specific for this subject matter or, alternatively, may 
draw upon a wider conception.   
17
 Rawls, Theory, 3-4. 
18
 Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family, 29. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 For why justice is primary in the parent–child relationship, see the discussion of the parallel case 
argument in Chapter 2, Section 4. 
16 
continue. Paraphrasing Rawls we can claim that parenting, no matter how loving, must 
be reformed or abolished if it is unjust.
21
 Accordingly, an account of what justice 
requires of parents also marks the scope of legitimate parenting – one not calling for 
reform or abolishment. To be sure, within the scope of legitimate parenting there might 
still be instances of morally dubious conduct such as lying or promise-breaking. The 
concern in this dissertation, however, is with standards for assessing parenting as a 
whole. 
Notwithstanding the above remarks, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. Our 
normative expectations from parents are to some extent conflicting and uncertain and I 
believe that applying theories of justice to the case of parenthood will prove 
constructive in ordering and explaining them. I also believe it will shed some new light 
on the theories discussed and thereby further our understanding of justice.   
 
 
2. Some points about terminology 
 
Before turning to the thesis itself, some terminological matters need to be addressed. 
First, by ‘parents’ I refer to those adults who have a certain kind of interpersonal 
relationship with a child – that which involves the activity of parenting. I shall provide an 
account of what exactly this amounts to in due course but for now suffice it to say that 
the relationship has to do with the upbringing of that child. This interpersonal 
relationship can be distinguished from biological and legal notions of parenthood.
22
 The 
adults who actually parent the child may not be the ones who caused the child to come 
into existence (the biological parents) or the ones who are formally recognized by the 
law as the child’s parents (the legal parents). Although I will have something to say 
about the significance of biological parenthood and about state action in relation to 
                                                 
21
 As I argue in Chapter 5 this claim is addressed, first and foremost, to the parents themselves, not to the 
state. 
22
 My distinction here is similar to that in David Archard, “What’s Blood Got to Do With It? The 
Significance of Natural Parenthood,” Res Publica 1 (1995): 91-106, at 92-3. 
17 
parenting, my primary concern is not with biological or legal parenthood as such. It is 
rather with the parenting relationship and with what justice requires of those who 
parent. In what follows, ‘parent’ may thus refer to a biological grandparent, a legal 
parent’s cohabiting partner or any other non-biological and/or non-legal parent. 
The terms ‘parent–child relationship’ and ‘family’ are used quite interchangeably 
throughout the thesis. But I wish to remain agnostic as to whether the notion of ‘family’ 
may also be applicable to some associations of adults without children (e.g. cohabiting 
couples) and if so, by virtue of which of their characteristics. Issues concerning family 
relations between adults are simply bracketed, including those related to parenting 
(most notably the distribution of its burdens between the parents). This is not to suggest 
that these issues are of less importance. Quite on the contrary, they are too important 
to be addressed secondarily in a thesis whose particular contribution lies elsewhere.
23
 
Moreover, ‘family’ often stands for a particular family structure – one that consists 
of a married heterosexual couple and their biological children. Yet this is only one 
among a wide variety of existing and possible structures. None of what is argued for in 
the thesis is inconsistent with structures other than the heterosexual-biological one, 
such as adoptive parent–child relationships, families established by gay people, single-
parent families, or families with more than two adults. This does not mean, however, 
that the label ‘family’ can be attached to every possible child-raising structure. If 
children cannot experience the distinctive features of the parent–child relationship with 
too many adults around – a claim that is not argued for in the thesis but which I believe 
to be true – then this restricts, albeit in a somewhat indeterminate way, the number of 
potential parents each child can have. 
Acknowledging the diversity in family structures leads me to refrain from 
systematically employing gendered language. I talk about ‘parents’ and ‘children’ in the 
                                                 
23
 There is, of course, a vast feminist literature dealing with these issues, which includes Carole Pateman, 
The Sexual Contract (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988); Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family; Eva Feder 
Kittay, Love’s Labor: Essays on Women, Equality and Dependency (New York: Routledge, 1999); Martha C. 
Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), and Women and Human 
Development. 
18 
plural, but also about individual parents and children; about mothers as well as fathers, 
their sons and daughters. Some might interpret this as adopting “false gender 
neutrality” which ignores the fact “that the sexes have had very different histories, very 
different assigned social roles and ‘natures’ and very different degrees of access to 
power and opportunity.”
24
 This is certainly not my intention; it is rather to suggest that 
what justice requires of parents applies also to non-traditional family structures and that 
within the more traditional structures the obligations are of fathers to no less an extent 
than they are of mothers.
25
 Where gender issues are directly discussed, I do employ 
gendered language to reflect the facts of the matter. 
 
 
3. The thesis 
 
The work’s starting assumption is the claim that justice is the first virtue of the family. 
Hence the title, echoing Susan Okin's Justice, Gender, and the Family where this claim 
was most forcefully defended. Given this assumption, the primary question addressed in 
this work is the following: What does justice require of parents? What do parents owe 
their children as a matter of justice? Through grappling with this issue, however, the 
work sheds some light on related questions that are wider in scope: How should we 
think about justice in general? What is the distinctive value of families? What would a 
society of just families look like? The thesis advanced as an answer to these questions is 
the following. 
Demands of justice are best understood contextually. They stem from the 
characteristics of the specific mode of relationship in the context in which they are 
meant to apply. This implies that an account of what parents owe their children as a 
                                                 
24
 Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family, 10. 
25
 It is interesting to note that some aspects of Okin’s critique of the heterosexual-biological family seem 
to affirm it. See Will Kymlicka, “Rethinking the Family,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 20 (1991): 77-97; 
Joshua Cohen, “Okin on Justice, Gender, and the Family,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1992): 263-
86, at 280-1. 
19 
matter of justice should appeal to the parent–child relationship itself. The relationship is 
an intimate fiduciary relationship which normally constitutes the primary site of 
upbringing. Yet what makes it distinctive and distinctively valuable is its element of 
identity, that is, a sense of interconnectedness and continuity generated through the 
transmission of beliefs, practices and more idiosyncratic features from parent to child. 
Corresponding to this understanding of the parent–child relationship, what justice 
requires is best understood as follows. Parents are required to provide their children 
with the conditions to achieve a set of functionings up to the level that allows them to 
lead a decent life in terms of the parents’ social and cultural context. The principle of 
family justice thus formulated gives rise to a complex interplay along the axis of 
citizens–parents–children, displaying formulae of both integration and separation of 
family and state. A society of perfectly just families might not be perfectly just as a 
whole. Yet it may be interpreted as particularly liberal; characterized by a multiplication 
and separation of authorities, reflecting rather than resolving the tensions between the 
individual and society and between different individuals and groups within society.  
To make it more explicit, the account offered here is at odds with two prevalent 
approaches to issues of justice concerning the family. In contrast to a child-centred 
approach, the account is not recipient-based. It rejects the idea of starting with a notion 
of the rights or entitlements children have independently of their relationship with their 
parents, and offers instead a relational account of justice. What justice requires is to be 
captured not through the characteristics of children or, more generally, human beings as 
such, but through the characteristics of the relationship in which they find themselves. 
My account of justice in the family is relational but not political and in this it contrasts 
with the other predominant approach holding justice to be a value which is essentially 
political. To be sure, the family is part of the basic institutional structure of society and 
children are future citizens. However, since the parent–child relationship itself is not 
strictly political, justice in the family is not to be captured in political terms. Here is also 
where my fundamental disagreement with Okin lies. While conceding that the family 
sphere is not identical with ‘the political,’ she holds that we have good enough reasons 
20 
to treat it as political. My account of justice in the family rejects this view and thus 
departs from Okin’s ‘comprehensive’ liberalism. 
The argument for this thesis is presented in five chapters. It begins by evaluating 
the two prevalent approaches mentioned above, not only to expose their flaws but also 
to identify the insights that the account to be articulated should take on board. Chapter 
1 scrutinizes the child-centred approach according to which we need to start from 
children’s abstract entitlements and account for what justice requires of parents in 
these terms. The conclusion drawn is that this approach is correct in emphasizing the 
separateness of persons and in holding the family sphere to be only partially private. 
Nonetheless, the approach fails to provide a complete account of justice in the family by 
not taking the parent–child relationship and its social context seriously enough, morally 
speaking.  
Following from this, Chapter 2 examines, through the prism of John Rawls’s 
theory, the bearings that a political conception of justice may have on our question. It 
concludes that attempts – the most notable among which is Okin’s – to account for 
justice in the family exclusively in political terms are unsuccessful. Those arguments, 
however, prove to be helpful in setting the path for further enquiry. The chapter 
suggests that before formulating an account of justice we need to articulate the 
distinctive features of the context to which it is meant to apply. It also lays the ground 
for the complex interplay between family and state pursued in the last stage of the 
argument. 
Critically engaging with these two approaches leads to the contextualist approach 
from within which subsequent chapters develop the positive account of justice in the 
family. Chapter 3 argues for a certain interpretation of the parent–child relationship, 
according to which it is an intimate fiduciary relationship distinctively characterized by a 
sense of interconnectedness and continuity between the identities of parent and child. 
Chapter 4 builds on this interpretation to argue for a sufficiency principle of justice 
applying to the parent–child context. It draws on the capability approach to suggest 
‘conditions for functioning’ as the appropriate metric and defends a threshold 
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dependent on the parents’ social context which is meant to exhaust what justice 
requires of parents. An appendix to Chapter 4 supplements the argument by addressing 
the case of unfavourable natural circumstances and showing why the principle does not 
entail that every fall below the threshold is an injustice. 
Chapter 5 examines the implications this principle has on the interplay between 
family and polity and develops the idea that the family as a site of upbringing contains 
formulae of both integration with and separation from the state. In light of this the 
chapter elucidates the circumstances in which a conflict between the perspectives of 
family and polity is likely to arise, leading inevitably to some compromise of justice. 
After addressing the bearings social injustice may have on family justice, the chapter 
ends with a discussion of the policy implications that flow from this account.  
The thesis concludes by trying to deepen the link between the family as the 
primary site of upbringing and my account of justice in the family by reflecting on 
models of upbringing alternative to the family. It ends with the suggestion that there is 
something particularly liberal in the family model of upbringing and its relation to the 
polity.
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Chapter 1 
In the Child’s Best Interest? 
 
We are born weak, we need strength; we are born totally unprovided, we need 
aid; we are born stupid, we need judgment. 
Prior to the calling of his parents is nature’s call to human life... We must, then, 
generalize our views and consider in our pupil abstract man, man exposed to all 
the accidents of human life. 
(Jean-Jacques Rousseau)
1
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
One may argue from the outset that asking, specifically, what justice requires of parents, 
mistakes the solution for the problem: it takes the parent–child relationship as given 
and then explores the obligations attached to it. This is wrong – so the argument goes – 
because the obligations parents have to their children are not basic: they can be further 
explained in terms of obligations independent of that relationship. In other words, the 
special obligations of parents are not genuinely special because they can be shown to 
derive from general moral considerations.
2
 This is the reductionist view of parental 
obligations.
3
 This chapter is concerned with a version (or group of versions) of this view, 
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which underlies quite a prevalent approach – in theory and practice – to issues of justice 
concerning the family. This view holds that since children are separate human beings 
with an independent moral standing that underlies a set of moral entitlements they 
have, at the basic moral level we need to ask what children are entitled to, abstracted 
from their actual special relationships and attachments. What justice requires of parents 
can, in turn, be explained in terms of those independent entitlements. Thus, the claims 
of children are prior to the parents’ obligations or, in a familiar legal jargon, the parent–
child relationship is to serve the child’s best interest. Call this the child-centred approach 
to justice in the family or, in short, the child-centred approach.  
My main aim in this chapter is to demonstrate the serious limitations of the child-
centred approach in offering a complete account of what justice requires of parents. 
This is intended to provide a stimulus to probe beyond child-centred considerations and 
take the child’s relational context
4
 more seriously, morally speaking. Yet I do not deny 
that child-centred considerations play a crucial role in such an account. Nor do I take my 
case against the child-centred approach to be conclusive against the reductionist view. It 
leaves open the possibility that at the most basic level there are some general moral 
considerations that account for the obligations of justice that parents have to their 
children. 
The argument of the chapter is as follows. In the subsequent section I sketch the 
basic child-centred picture that follows from Locke. In Section 3 I reject two objections 
against it, namely that it wrongly emphasizes the separateness of persons and opens the 
way for violating the privacy of the family. I then highlight more fundamental problems 
with the approach in Sections 4-6: It has difficulty explaining why the primary 
responsibility to meet children’s independent justice claims falls to their parents; it does 
not provide us with an adequate set of parents’ obligations; and it presupposes the 
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parent–child relationship rather than abstracting from it, as it aims to do. Section 7 
concludes the chapter. 
 
 
2. The Lockean picture 
 
John Locke – who may be regarded as the forefather of the child-centred approach – 
offers us the following picture. As it happens, human beings are born with dramatically 
underdeveloped physical and mental capacities, “weak and helpless, without knowledge 
or understanding.”
5
 Because of this, children cannot take care of themselves and so they 
require someone else to “preserve, nourish, and educate” them. It is from the “defects 
of this imperfect state”
6
 of childhood that parents’ duties emerge and, in turn, it is the 
discharge of these duties by the parents that is the source of their authority over their 
children.  
[T]his power so little belongs to the father by any peculiar right of nature, but only 
as he is guardian of his children, that when he quits his care of them, he loses his 
power over them, which goes along with their nourishment and education to 
which it is inseparably annexed and it belongs as much to the foster-father of an 
exposed child as to the natural father of another.
7
 
For Locke, parents are guardians and as in other guardianships it is the principal’s, i.e. 
the child’s, interests that matter. The guardianship is instrumental to furthering the 
principal’s interests while the guardian’s own interests play no justificatory role. It lasts 
as long as it serves the principal’s interest and ceases when this is no longer the case. 
Parents, Locke tells us, are “instruments in [God’s] great design of continuing the race of 
                                                 
5
 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), 305. 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Ibid., 310. 
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mankind” and it is as such that they are under “an obligation to nourish, preserve and 
bring up their off-spring.”
8
 
This child-centred theme of parents-as-fiduciaries (-guardians, -trustees, or             
-stewards) is dominant in contemporary philosophical discussions of the parent–child 
relationship.
9
 Brennan and Noggle, for example, write that  
Parents’ complex moral status involves two main factors. The most important is 
the rights of the children themselves, together with the fact that children are 
typically incapable of fully exercising and protecting these rights. Children need 
help in asserting their rights and it is the role of the parent-as-steward to give 
them this help. A second factor from which the moral status of parents derives is 
the needs of the child... Because children are not yet mature, they often do not 
possess the capabilities necessary to effectively satisfy all their own needs. The 
role of the parent is to both see that these needs are met, and to help the child 
develop the capabilities for satisfying her own needs in the future.
10
 
The main difference between this account and Locke’s is that children are here 
described as having a set of moral rights that parents have a general duty to respect (by 
not violating them) and a special duty to protect (by preventing others from violating 
them). The set includes the rights children have “simply in virtue of being persons,” such 
as the rights to life and freedom from deliberate harm.
11
 An additional factor is the 
child’s needs, which we already saw in Locke, and which include needs such as 
nourishment, education and special care. We may also frame these needs in terms of 
rights, thereby declaring that children have a right to education or a right to be cared 
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for.
12
 Thus we could say that parents are those who have the primary responsibility to 
meet their children’s rights whether through protection (with respect to the former 
type) or provision (with respect to the latter). What the language of rights stresses is the 
independent status of the children’s (relevant) moral claims. They are entitled to certain 
protections and provisions no matter what their particular attachments and affiliations 
happen to be, and we can figure out these entitlements by looking at the characteristics 
of children as children, namely as immature human beings. In what follows I do not deny 
that children have some such entitlements in the abstract. Yet I contend that the 
parent–child relationship and the obligations of justice attached to it are not entirely 
derived from child-centred considerations such as these. Moreover, the parent–child 
relationship is indispensable for arriving at a full-blown account of children’s 
entitlements.  
 
 
3. Two objections rejected 
 
Before taking issue with the child-centred approach, I wish to reject two objections 
against it that I find unwarranted. I would like to suggest further that these objections 
point to important elements that we should try to preserve even if we decide to discard 
the proposed child-centred framework as a whole.  
 
A. Separateness of persons 
 
The first objection states that talking about children’s rights or entitlements and 
stressing more generally their moral separateness from their parents undermines the 
significance of the family as an intimate sphere. Instead of a sharing of selves and 
identification with each other, rights-talk delineates boundaries between family 
members and alienates them from each other. It keeps children and parents apart 
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rather than bringing them together. Michael Sandel makes this point vividly when he 
asks us to imagine a family in which justice wins primacy over intimacy: 
[O]ne day the harmonious family comes to be wrought with dissension. Interests 
grow divergent and the circumstances of justice grow more acute. The affection 
and spontaneity of previous days give way to demands for fairness and the 
observance of rights. And let us further imagine that the old generosity is replaced 
by a judicious temper of unexceptionable integrity and that the new moral 
necessities are met with a full measure of justice, such that no injustice prevails. 
Parents and children reflectively equilibriate, dutifully if sullenly abide by the… 
principles of justice… Now what are we to make of this?
13
 
Abiding by principles of justice here seems to reflect a moral decay rather than an 
improvement. The virtuous family is not one in which the principles of justice are strictly 
implemented but one in which there is no need for them in the first place. Where there 
is harmony of interests and no conflict arises, the question of how to adjudicate 
between members is out of place. Thus, what we should really be aiming at is 
transcending the circumstances of justice altogether. 
One way of responding to this objection, as we saw in the Introduction, is to argue 
that it overly idealizes the picture of the family. The family is indeed the site of harmony, 
love and altruism but it is also (and quite often) the site of limited resources, distributive 
claims and conflict. Further, we might question whether harmonizing the family is 
achieved only at the cost of ignoring or marginalizing some of the family members’ 
legitimate claims; whether altruism and sacrifice are expected only from some and not 
reciprocated in turn.
14
 Although I am sympathetic to this line of argument it hinges on 
empirical claims. It does not deny the possibility of families being harmonious and 
altruistic, nor do I think it should.
15
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As far as children are concerned, however, adopting the perspective of altruism 
also becomes philosophically problematic. The altruist puts others’ interests before his 
own. But what is admirable in this is the altruist's moral choice to sacrifice his interests 
(or, less heroically, to put them on hold) to further the interests of others. It would be 
much less admirable – and at the extreme, morally repugnant – if someone else decided 
for him to sacrifice his interests to benefit others. Young children are not capable of 
exercising choice in the relevant sense, and this tells against their ability to act as true 
altruists. They lack “the fully developed capacity for the kind of moral agency that allows 
adults to interact with other moral agents on equal terms”
16
 and turns (some kind of) 
sacrifice into altruism. Parents can act altruistically and sacrifice (some of) their 
interests, desires and preferences for the sake of their children. But when applied to 
children, ‘expecting altruism’ becomes a license for parents to sacrifice their children’s 
interests. If we think that it is not morally permissible for parents to sacrifice their 
children’s interests in the same way they can sacrifice their own, then it seems to 
support the view that at some fundamental level children are morally separate from 
their parents and enjoy an independent moral standing.  
Ferdinand Schoeman worries that emphasizing the separateness of children, at 
least in the case of infants, would also be counterproductive from a child-centred 
perspective. Such emphasis “may obscure the real point of moral criticism intended in 
the case of parent–infant relationships.” This, Schoeman suggests, concerns parents 
“not furnishing the love, attention, and security we think it every parent’s duty to 
provide.”
17
 What children really need, especially in the early stages of their lives, is for 
their parents to form secure and loving intimate relationships with them; but adopting 
the language of rights, so the claim goes, will only encourage parents to take a step back 
from this. Now this may be true in cases identified as neglect, particularly emotional 
neglect. But the point does not hold in cases of abuse which, surely, give rise to moral 
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concern and criticism to no less extent than neglect does. In cases such as physical, 
sexual and emotional abuse it is the lack of moral boundaries that is extremely 
problematic, not the existence thereof. In relation to this point it is important to keep in 
mind that the separateness concerned is of the children’s moral standing, not their 
material or emotional status: The endorsement of the separateness of children with 
respect to the former does not necessarily entail the same with respect to the latter. 
Indeed one may cogently say that it is the separateness of children as moral beings that 
makes it impermissible for parents to sacrifice their interest in having bonds of 
attachment. 
I therefore reject this particular critique not because it is wrong in claiming that 
the child-centred approach emphasizes the children's moral separateness from their 
parents but because the child-centred approach is right in doing so. Parents do not have 
authority over their children as they have over themselves. There are limits to what they 
are morally permitted to do to their children and this reveals, in turn, that children’s 
moral standing is separate from their parents’. Even if, eventually, we do not account for 
justice in the family in terms of children’s abstract entitlements, the separateness of 
persons is an important insight that should be reflected in our account as well. 
 
B. Violation of privacy 
 
A different concern is that adopting rights-talk with respect to children invites public 
scrutiny as to whether parents are respecting those rights. It adopts a “legalistic” 
terminology of “explicit rules of duty and entitlement” and thus focuses on “overt, 
clearly definable acts.”
18
 It encourages the precise articulation of the content of parental 
duties and introduces the prospects of state intervention in cases where those duties 
are not precisely discharged. By opening up the parent–child relationship to a third-
party – namely, the state – it undermines the sense of security that is crucial for 
maintaining the intimate and spontaneous nature of the family. The state requires 
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parents “to think of themselves as primarily serving public ends and as having public 
duties.” It also encourages children (or people acting on their behalf) to make claims 
against parents. This intrusion thereby violates the privacy and autonomy of the family 
and “beclouds the integrity of the trust and devotion that can arise between people.”
19
 
One thing that is not clear here is the too-close connection between moral rights 
and their institutionalization in enforceable positive rights. The implicit assumption 
seems to be that the point in offering a rights-based account is to enable its 
incorporation as it is into the legal code. This explains the claims that a rights-based 
“moral strategy”
20
 has to comply with legalistic standards, and implies excessive state 
intervention. But why should it be so? How is it different from accounts couched in 
children’s needs or parents’ duties? One may suggest that entitlements- or rights-based 
accounts not only shift the focus from the provider to the recipient – this holds also for 
needs-based accounts – but also portray the recipient as claimant, and that portrayal 
might undermine the provider’s discretion. The right-holder can make a claim against 
the duty-bearer but then it is no longer a unidirectional process. It opens the door for 
disagreements which may, in turn, call for arbitration. This seems true as far as it goes. 
Children can legitimately claim from and against parents as often happens; 
disagreements do arise between them and arbitration might be required. But there is no 
reason to assume that, for the most part, this should be brought into court. Parent and 
child (or another person claiming on behalf of the child) can try to talk their 
disagreements through. If this does not work out a third-party may be introduced, but 
this need not be the state; the third-party could be the other parent, a close relative or 
family friend. Articulating what children can morally claim from their parents neither 
means they can claim it all in court, nor that this is always how it should be. 
In the following sections I will argue that the child-centred approach cannot fully 
account for parental obligations independently of the children’s actual relationship with 
their parents. But this is not to say that some claims made by children cannot extend 
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beyond the parent–child relationship. Not every claim that children may have from or 
make against their parents is a private family matter. Schoeman recognizes this as he 
rejects the notion of absolute privacy.
21
 Privacy and autonomy are matters of degree. 
Thus, on the other side of the coin from acknowledging that the family is a somewhat 
private sphere is that it is also somewhat public or, putting it a bit differently, that some 
of what is going on there is also the concern of people outside the family.
22
 Setting the 
violation of privacy objection aside I now move to more difficult issues the child-centred 
approach has to face.  
 
 
4. Assignment problem: Why parents? 
 
Returning to the Lockean picture sketched above we can observe that as it stands it 
lacks a crucial explanatory component. It argues for a set of universal entitlements 
children have in virtue of certain of their characteristics, and then depicts parents as the 
(primary) bearers of the duty to meet those entitlements. But immediately the question 
arises: Why is it an obligation of parents?
23
 As Onora O’Neill puts it, “a consideration of 
needs and interests cannot show who (if anyone) has the obligation to meet the claims 
of a particular child.”
24
 We, therefore, need to seek an account linking particular 
providers – parents, in our case – to particular children. 
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A. Vulnerability? 
 
One such an account is Robert Goodin’s vulnerability model of special responsibilities.
25
 
It seems particularly relevant to the issue at hand as it takes as its starting point the 
intuition that parents owe something special to their children.
26
 The vulnerability model 
holds that “your special responsibilities derive from the fact that other people are 
dependent upon you and are particularly vulnerable to your actions and choices.”
27
 
With respect to children, Goodin argues that they find themselves especially vulnerable 
to their parents, and this translates into special responsibilities parents have towards 
their children. This is meant to encompass the initial parental responsibilities prior to 
any socially allocated ones. 
The special needs of the infants are determined by nature. How they are met is 
ordinarily determined by society… Suppose, however, that a given society makes 
no allocation of child-care responsibilities whatsoever; it would be wrong to say 
that no one has responsibility for child care. Rather, parents have primary 
responsibility to care for their children, or to arrange for someone else to do so, 
until society makes other arrangements… This is merely because – given their 
crucial causal contribution to producing this vulnerable child, and in the absence 
of any further social signposts – parents are the obvious candidates to bear such 
responsibilities. Obviousness comes to have moral significance, in turn, by virtue 
of the reactions of other people. The nearest person is obliged to rescue the 
drowning swimmer, for example, because other people will regard him as the 
obvious person to do so and will wait for him to act. Similarly, in the absence of 
any specific social mandate, a child’s natural parents will be regarded as the 
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obvious bearers of child-care responsibilities vis-à-vis that child, which in practice 
makes the child most vulnerable to its natural parents.
28
 
Several different considerations seem to be at work here. To begin with, parents 
are taken to be the “obvious” candidates for child-care. But what makes one an obvious 
candidate? Two different considerations are offered: causal responsibility and physical 
proximity. Biological parents played a crucial role in bringing the child into existence 
(and thus gave rise to the issue of child-care in the first place), and at least the mother is 
physically present when the child is born. But it is not clear what moral significance we 
should ascribe to these facts. Causal responsibility usually loses (a great deal of) its 
moral significance if it is not accompanied by some element of intention or negligence. 
(Think of a traumatized woman carrying to term a child conceived through rape.) 
Physical proximity can have some moral significance but provides far less guidance when 
it involves more than one candidate (think of the midwife present at birth, or the 
medical staff involved in a Caesarean section), or in cases that are not strict 
emergencies. The drowning swimmer analogy may work only for the here and now. 
After that, physical proximity leaves the special responsibilities towards children 
undetermined due to the trivial fact that people, including children, are mobile.  
It is important to note, however, that no matter what the criterion for obviousness 
is, Goodin acknowledges that it becomes morally significant only by virtue of other 
people’s reactions. It happens to be the case that a child’s biological parents are 
regarded by others as the obvious bearers of child-care responsibilities towards their 
child, and this reaction from others is what makes the child most vulnerable to its 
biological parents. So it seems that the ultimate consideration for biological parents 
having special responsibility towards their own children is that other people assume 
they will take care of them. In other words, biological parents are the “obvious 
candidates” from a social perspective. However, this consideration cannot work here. 
The original question was whose responsibility it is to take care of children where 
society does not make any allocation of such responsibilities. The answer pointed 
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towards biological parents and the argument given was that society (“other people”) 
regarded them as the obvious candidates. But this only indicates that that society did in 
fact have child-care responsibilities allocated, albeit implicitly. Absent further argument, 
treating biological parents as the obvious duty-bearers is nothing but a social convention 
of allocating child-care responsibilities.  
Going back to physical proximity, where all other things being equal, it may play 
quite a substantial role in the way special responsibilities are morally distributed. “‘Help 
the person standing next to you’ makes sense when, as far as we know, each is equally 
in need of help, and each equally able to provide it.”
29
 But all other things are rarely 
equal when it comes to the ability of adults to provide for children’s needs. Then, “it 
would seem odd to put the well off in charge of the well off and the badly off in charge 
of the badly off.”
30
 Where other people are more able than the biological parents to 
provide for the children’s needs, the children become more vulnerable to those others’ 
actions and choices, and this in turn has the implication that those others have (the 
strongest) special responsibilities towards them, not the biological parents.
31
 
Goodin anticipates this objection yet insists that “the task falls to the parents in 
the absence of alternative arrangements made either by themselves or by their 
society.”
32
 The reason he provides in support of this claim relates to the children’s 
nonmaterial vulnerabilities. “Getting money from strangers is not the same as getting it 
from parents, because in the latter case money betokens something even more valuable 
– love.”
33
 However this cannot work either, unless we assume that biological parents are 
especially capable of loving their children.
34
 If we want to avoid this blanket assumption, 
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35 
as I think we should, then the vulnerability model simply tells us to look for the person 
who is most able to provide for a particular child’s needs – both material and 
nonmaterial.
35
 Although the vulnerability model starts from the intuition “that we owe 
something special to our children,”
36
 it results in undermining that very intuition. 
Ultimately, a rich and affectionate neighbour may find himself on a par with the parent 
of a newborn child.  
 
B. Assigned responsibility? 
 
However, we may concede that parents do not have special responsibilities towards 
their own children to begin with, but that society has good reasons for assigning primary 
child-care responsibilities to the former vis-à-vis the latter.
37
 Consider the following 
argument with respect to the human right of children to be loved:
38
 
As the right of children to be loved is a human right, on certain understandings of 
human rights, this means that all able human beings in appropriate circumstances 
have a duty to promote every child’s being loved, even when the biological parents 
are available. At the same time… biological parents should typically be the primary 
dutybearers for the following reason: Usually, when there is a general duty that 
everyone has, but where it would be impractical if everyone in fact tries to fulfil 
that duty at the same time, a primary dutybearer is assigned using such criteria as 
responsibility, proximity, ability and motivation.
39
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We start from the general claims that children have against all of humanity. But 
demanding all of humanity to simultaneously discharge the corresponding general 
duties towards all children will be counterproductive, especially when it comes to 
children’s nonmaterial needs. We therefore decide to assign particular agents vis-à-vis 
particular children with the primary responsibility to discharge humanity’s general 
duties towards all children. Using various criteria we come to establish the rule that 
biological parents are the primary duty-bearers. Thus, parents’ special duties towards 
their children are, to borrow from Goodin, “merely distributed general duties,” the 
result of a useful social convention.
40
  
Let us examine the reasoning by which the general duty of humanity is translated 
into a special duty of the parent. According to Liao, biological parents are good 
candidates for being assigned the primary responsibility because at least three of the 
aforementioned criteria – responsibility, proximity and motivation – usually pertain to 
them. Liao acknowledges that “one cannot say, as a general rule, that biological parents 
also have the ability” to discharge the duty, but he immediately adds that “there is 
always the possibility that biological parents can be assisted in this matter.”
41
 I have 
already questioned the relevance of the causal responsibility and proximity criteria with 
respect to the vulnerability model. We may also suggest that since we are now 
considering a collective action problem these considerations are even less relevant. 
Society can easily mobilize people and make the proximity criterion redundant. And the 
initial responsibility of biological parents seems less important when prospective 
                                                 
40
 Robert E. Goodin “What Is So Special About Our Fellow Countrymen?” Ethics 98 (1988): 663-86, at 678. 
Cf. Philip Pettit and Robert Goodin, “The Possibility of Special Duties,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 
(1986): 651-76, which characterizes special duties as “relativised and independent moral demands,” 
where “independent” stands for “not engaging the agent just because of his being bound by some other 
duty whose fulfilment requires that it be honoured” (ibid., 656). There is a tension between this and the 
view of special duties being distributed general duties, the former being fundamentally instrumental in 
the realization of the latter. Reconciliation seems to be offered through the distinction between ‘first 
order’ special duties, viewed primarily from the perspective of the relevant agent, and the ‘meta-duty’ to 
optimally allocate responsibilities among agents so that the production of desirable outcomes is 
maximized (ibid., 673-4). From a morally fundamental point of view – captured by this meta-duty – ‘first 
order’ special duties are hence distributed general duties. The argument that follows is not meant as a 
critique of this general model but of a child-centred version thereof. 
41
 Liao, “The Right of Children,” 432. 
37 
adoptive parents are introduced into the picture. If others are willing to assume 
responsibility for children, why should society insist that biological parents keep bearing 
responsibility?  
But putting these doubts aside, we should keep in mind the context within which 
this argument is examined. We are here questioning whether a child-centred approach 
is a promising route to account for what justice requires of parents. So even if we grant 
that children have some general claims against humanity, when we attempt to explain 
why it is that parents have the primary responsibility for meeting these claims it must be 
through child-centred considerations. Proximity and responsibility might play some role 
in non-child-centred considerations, such as efficiency and the burdens that third-party 
persons can legitimately be expected to shoulder. However, these considerations 
cannot be invoked within the framework of the child-centred approach.
42
 
We are therefore left with two considerations: ability and motivation. As Liao 
recognizes, it is quite often the case that the issue of ability points to people other than 
the children’s biological parents. So even if we grant that parents are typically motivated 
to meet children’s claims, the combination of the two factors leaves the assignment of 
responsibility open. Moreover, the assumption that parents are typically motivated to 
provide for their children does not preclude the possibility that others will also be 
motivated to provide for them. Surely there are some cases where other adults are 
highly motivated (e.g. when they cannot have children of their own) while the biological 
parents are not very much so. But even in cases where the parents’ motivation is 
stronger, at some point the better ability of others to provide for the children will 
outweigh the motivation factor (as long as those who are better able are not entirely 
unmotivated). In the end, whether the combination of these two considerations points 
to the biological parents or to other adults is very much a contingent matter.
43
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But perhaps we should take this conclusion as a normative directive. Instead of 
accounting for the special responsibilities biological parents have, perhaps the argument 
is indicating who the custodial parents should be. The thought is this: Starting again with 
the general duties everyone has towards a specific child, when faced with the practical 
necessity of assigning a primary duty-bearer we are led by child-centred considerations 
of ability and motivation to the most promising candidate. That candidate should be the 
one to whom primary child-care responsibility is assigned and this may or may not 
converge with biological parenthood.  
 
C. The redistribution objection 
 
In the following section I question the plausibility of thinking about the special duties of 
custodial parents as deriving their entire content from the antecedent general duties we 
all have towards all children. But before addressing that issue I want to stress a 
particular difficulty with the normative child-centred version of the assigned 
responsibility account. 
The fact of the matter is that most children already come attached to particular 
adults who assumed parental responsibility over them. (These adults need not be the 
biological parents of their children. They may, for example, assume parental 
responsibility through adoption or surrogacy arrangements.) Now what should happen if 
it turns out that the de-facto parents are facing difficulties in discharging their duties 
towards their children? We may suggest that since the special duties of parents are 
fundamentally general duties we all have towards their children, we still retain 
associative duties “to help alleviate the burdens on the primary dutybearers.”
44
 
Discharging the associative duties may take various forms either direct or indirect (e.g. 
by voting for relevant policies or through redistributive schemes). This I think seems 
quite plausible with respect to at least some of the parents’ duties.  
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But a different strategy is also available. If there happen to be other candidates for 
parenting who score higher than the de-facto parents in the combined scale of ability 
and motivation, we can simply reassign the primary responsibility to those other 
candidates. Why should we bother assisting struggling parents while there are other 
candidates at hand willing to step into their shoes? The assigned responsibility account 
is at best agnostic about the two alternatives. The moral concern is to provide for the 
child’s needs whereas the question of who provides for these needs becomes a practical 
matter only. From a child-centred perspective the alternatives seem to be on a par.  
Yet most people, I believe, will find it counterintuitive. Liao seems to share this 
intuition as he does not even mention the redistribution strategy. He goes on to discuss 
at some length several policy implications that follow from children’s human right to be 
loved, but throughout his discussion there is a strong inclination to leave children where 
we find them, at least when they already have a placement.
45
 We are asked to promote 
parenting education schemes and generous welfare policies to assist parents, but taking 
children away from them is never considered. This becomes even more obvious in his 
discussion of some innovative programmes concerning children without placement. We 
are told about a US government initiative that aims to assist children orphaned as a 
result of HIV/AIDS in Africa by supporting a Nairobi hospice which brings together “750 
children who have lost their parents and 250 elders who have lost their children” to 
create a village offering “what every child needs most – love.”
46
 Indeed this seems an 
admirable project. But the parents of those children had probably been struggling to 
meet their needs for quite some time before they died. Facing the alternative 
redistribution strategy, should we have “waited” for the children to become orphaned? 
And wouldn’t the children have been better off had the hospice been located in America 
rather than in Africa?  
Or consider Liao’s call for rethinking the single-family adoption scheme and 
exploring the possibility of co-adoption by individuals from different families. This, he 
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says, “could be especially attractive to those who are qualified to adopt a child but who 
may not have the time and resources to do so, because the time and cost required to 
raise an adopted child would be shared.”
47
 This looks quite plausible as far as it goes. 
But, again, why should we limit this suggestion only to adoption schemes? Shouldn’t we 
allow the rich to co-parent the children of the poor? And if that is the case why stop at 
co-parenting and not allow the rich to have full custody?  
Earlier I stated that if we follow the assigned responsibility account the 
redistribution strategy seems to be on a par with the alternative of assisting de-facto 
parents. But now we can appreciate that in some circumstances it is committed to 
favouring the former. Where the burdens parents are facing result from deep 
sociological and economic structures, assisting them is likely to imply and necessitate 
far-reaching institutional changes. Even if these changes have prospects of success it will 
take years for them to bear fruit. This might be too late for the children struggling 
currently. Should children therefore be redistributed across society from the poor to the 
rich? Should we go even further and redistribute children across the globe from 
developing to developed countries? The assigned responsibility account seems to tell us 
that it is our duty to do so. If parental responsibility is an assigned responsibility, why 
not reassign it? 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to see how one could resist this conclusion while 
holding fast to the child-centred approach that abstracts the child’s moral claims from 
his initial relationships and affiliations. Let me quickly point out why some common 
responses will not do the work here. First, one may suggest that we should not 
redistribute the children away from their current care-takers because of the importance 
of continuity of care for children’s emotional well-being and development.
48
 This is 
indeed an important consideration but one that can be factored into the decision of 
                                                 
47
 Ibid., 439. 
48
 On the importance of continuity of care, see Anne Alstott, No Exit: What Parents Owe Their Children 
and What Society Owes Parents (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), especially Chapter 1. Liao hints 
at this line of argument by saying that continuity of caretaker is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition 
for children’s being loved (“The Rights of Children,” 436). 
41 
whether a child will be better off with the candidate alternatives. Introducing this 
consideration will probably move the tipping point farther down the line, but it is 
unlikely to make it disappear. Moreover, acknowledging that the adjustment to a new 
placement is a difficult and painful process might in fact justify acting rather quickly, 
redistributing the child at an earlier stage or even at birth before the child develops 
strong bonds of attachment to the parent.  
A different response might be that taking the child away from his current social 
and cultural context could damage his sense of identity. However this again seems to be 
of less significance if redistribution takes place closer to birth,
49
 and in any case does not 
tell against redistribution within the same social and cultural context.  
The last response I wish to reject here concerns the transaction costs involved in 
such mass redistribution of children across the globe. One may be willing to accept the 
theoretical conclusion yet insist that the enormous transaction costs involved cancel out 
any real-world implications of such a concession. In other words, we need not worry too 
much about this potential strategy because it is, in fact, impractical. However, there are 
two points to be made here. First, it is not at all clear that the institutional reforms 
required for assisting currently struggling parents in both developed and developing 
countries are more practical or less costly than the redistribution strategy. But more 
importantly, this consideration may only have relevance at the level of policy. It still 
allows for the conclusion that struggling parents are morally required to give away their 
children to the benevolent rich if they show up on their doorstep ready to assume 
primary responsibility over the children.
50
 
I think many will agree that this conclusion is quite troubling and this tells in the 
direction of allowing some non-child-centred considerations to come into play. In liberal 
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theory, however, the parent–child relationship is often portrayed from a child-centred 
perspective, even though the implications of holding fast to that perspective are rarely 
acknowledged. Indeed, as far as I am aware, Peter Vallentyne is the only philosopher 
ready to bite the redistribution bullet. According to his view, “if the interests of the child 
would be better served by some other interested party having the childrearing rights, 
then the procreators do not have childrearing rights,” and “[t]hose for whom possession 
of childrearing rights would best promote the child’s interests have the moral power to 
obtain those rights.”
51
 He is aware of the objection that this view does not give 
adequate weight to the “very profound interest” many people have in childrearing but 
argues from the outset that “[n]o one thinks that anyone who wants to raise a given 
child has a right to do so.”
52
 This is surely right, as (most obviously) in cases of abusive 
parents. Moving to his positive defence of the child’s-best-interest condition he argues: 
Those who have a deep interest in raising some particular child therefore have a 
strong incentive for ensuring that they meet this condition. Of course, this will not 
always be possible. When it is not, there is a conflict between the prospective 
parent’s interests and the child’s interests. Given that the child has independent 
moral standing, and the rights at issue are rights to control access to the child, it is 
quite plausible that the child’s interests take priority over the potential custodial 
parent’s interests.
53
 
I accept Vallentyne’s point that children have independent moral standing and I agree it 
is plausible that the child’s interests take priority over the interests of the potential 
parents. But Vallentyne’s idea of always granting absolute priority to the child’s 
interests does not necessarily follow from this. Let me explain. The child’s independent 
moral standing surely implies that the interests of the child should be taken into 
account. But when they conflict with someone else’s interests the child’s independent 
moral standing implies that they need to be balanced against the other’s interests, not 
that the former automatically overrides the latter. One way of balancing them – a 
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subject to be developed in chapters 3 to 5 – is to view children’s interests as having 
priority, perhaps absolute priority, as long as they fall below a certain threshold of 
obligation in meeting their interests, but to allow for the parents’ interests to have 
more, perhaps crucial, weight above that threshold. This, of course, goes beyond the 
child-centred approach but it does seem compatible with accepting that children have 
an independent moral standing. 
 
 
5. Correlation problem: Good parents, bad parents? 
 
Even if we bite the redistribution bullet the resultant account is still problematic, as it 
runs the risk of providing too narrow as well as too wide a set of parental obligations. To 
recap, the child-centred approach starts by asking what children can morally claim as 
distinct from the special relationships they actually have, and then tries to link it to the 
duties of specific others – most notably their parents. The previous section questioned 
the identity of those primary duty-bearers; whether this approach succeeds in 
translating our general duties towards children into their actual parents’ special duties. 
In this section, however, I question whether the set of claims children can make in the 
abstract correlates with the set of obligations parents, whoever they may be, have 
towards them. I advance the claim that the resulting account is too narrow to correlate 
with the set of obligations identifying good (-enough) parents. At the end of the section I 
also point out why the account may be too broad to correlate with the set identifying 
(definitely) bad parents. 
The child-centred approach suggests that the obligations of justice that parents 
have to their children fundamentally derive from the claims the latter have upon all of 
humanity. But one may counter that we normally expect a great deal more from parents 
as regards their children than we expect from humanity with respect to all children. 
Taking the obligations of parents as correlative of children’s general claims upon 
humanity thus provides us with a very narrow set of obligations which seems far from 
44 
complete. This point is elaborated by Onora O’Neill through the distinction, in Kantian 
terms, between perfect and imperfect obligations.
54
 Obligations are perfect when they 
fully specify “not merely who is bound by the obligation but to whom the obligation is 
owed.”
55
 They are general (or universal in O’Neill’s terminology) if we have them with 
respect to all others, and special if we have them only with respect to specified others. 
By contrast, imperfect obligations are ones we have neither to all nor to specified others 
but to unspecified others. According to O’Neill, what is of importance in this distinction 
for our case is that while perfect obligations have corresponding claim-rights on the 
recipient side, imperfect obligations do not have such rights. “[S]o long as the recipients 
of the obligation are neither all others nor specified others, there are no right holders, 
and nobody can either claim or waive performance of any right.”
56
 Thus, if we start by 
asking what children in the abstract can claim from all of humanity or, in other words, 
what children’s general rights are, we will have the set of general perfect obligations as 
our answer but will lose sight of the set of imperfect obligations. And this has crucial 
implications for children’s lives since they are “particularly vulnerable to unkindness, to 
lack of involvement, cheerfulness or good feeling,”
57
 all of which are addressed through 
the latter set. 
For instance, think of the moral obligations not to abuse or neglect children. Not 
abusing children is an obligation that may plausibly be said to hold independently of any 
institutional framework or special relationship we may find ourselves sharing with 
specific children. We thus seem to have a general perfect obligation not to abuse 
children, that is, an obligation with respect to all children. Accordingly, every child has a 
claim-right against us not to be abused. We will lack even the opportunity to violate this 
claim-right of the vast majority of children as we will never have any contact with them. 
By contrast, not all children may have a claim-right against us not be neglected. Imagine 
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you received a letter from a child whom you had never met and have no relation to 
complaining about your neglect of him. Your response to the letter would probably be 
some mixture of amazement and bewilderment: “But I don’t know him! I’ve never even 
heard of him... How can he accuse me of neglect?!” To be sure, the child might have 
justified claims against you. Perhaps he is in dire need and you have surplus resources to 
provide some relief. (‘HELP ME!’ is not likely to generate a similarly bewildered 
response.) But one claim he cannot have is that you are neglecting him. This is because 
claims of neglect must presuppose some institutional framework or interpersonal 
relationship, shared by the neglecting and neglected parties. This does not mean, 
according to O’Neill, that you and the rest of us have no fundamental
58
 obligation not to 
be neglectful of children. This obligation may bind all (human) moral agents. However, 
since it is an imperfect obligation it has no correlative fundamental right. There are no 
allocated right-holders before imperfect obligations are institutionalized and thus, as 
long as “we consider them in the abstract, nothing can be said from the perspective of 
recipience.”  
For O’Neill this entails a shift from the perspective of recipience to that of action; 
from the perspective of the claimant to that of the contributor; in short, from rights to 
obligations. Let us examine how her obligation-oriented constructivist approach might 
help us in tackling the issue in question.  
The basis of the universalizing construction is rejection of action which reflects 
principles that cannot be universally acted on by a plurality of distinct rational 
beings. Human beings are, however, not merely distinct rational beings: they are 
also vulnerable and needy beings in the sense that their rationality and their 
mutual independence – the very basis of their agency – is incomplete, mutually 
vulnerable and socially produced… A plurality of distinct rational beings who are 
also needy cannot therefore universally act on principles of mutual indifference… 
However, it is impossible to help all others in all ways or to develop all talents or 
even some talents in all others. Hence obligations to help and to develop others’ 
capacities must be imperfect obligations… The construction of imperfect 
obligations commits rational and needy beings only to avoiding principled refusal 
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to help and principled neglect to develop human potentialities. The specific acts 
required by these commitments will vary in different lives. Those who live or work 
with children are likely to find that they must take an active part both in their care 
and in their education if inaction is not to amount to principled refusal of those 
commitments.
59
 
Despite the abstract point of view on which the construction of obligations is based, it 
retains sensitivity to context and circumstance. O’Neill’s construction aims at 
formulating a universal set of obligations but she is well aware of the need to refer to 
concrete social contexts with their actual practices and institutional arrangements, as 
well as to individuals’ interpersonal relationships, before we can ascertain the exact 
implications of this set of obligations for our actions.
60
 This is quite different from 
outlining a complete account of children’s entitlements in the abstract. As we saw with 
respect to neglect, that risks leaving crucial parts out of the moral picture. By contrast, 
the construction of obligations allows for the possibility of some imperfect moral 
requirements; imperfect as long as they are considered from the abstract point of view. 
It tells us we need some more details about people’s contexts, institutions and 
relationships, values and beliefs – in short, their concrete lives – before we can fully 
determine what they owe and can demand morally. 
This goes some way in underlining the ways in which what is morally required of 
us depends on actual circumstances. Yet, as it stands here, O’Neill’s account still retains 
a certain ambiguity with respect to the precise relation between imperfect obligations 
and special relationships. At times, it seems that special relationships are established in 
order to discharge imperfect obligations. As O’Neill repeatedly observes, we cannot 
discharge those obligations towards all people. Special relationships, therefore, match 
specific agents with specific recipients.
61
 But this understanding comes very close to the 
assigned responsibility account discussed above. One thing that supports this reading of 
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O’Neill is her grouping of parents together with teachers and social workers.
62
 In the 
latter cases we first have quite a concrete grasp of the goods or services that ought to 
be provided, be they education or welfare, and then special relationships are 
established whereby provision of these goods and services is made. It is in order to 
discharge what is to a large extent an already determinate content of the obligation to 
provide education that we establish specific teacher–student relationships. Although 
the obligation is only an imperfect one before the special relationship is in place – we do 
not know with respect to whom we ought to discharge it – it is the content of the 
obligation which explains the nature of the special relationship.  (I am first a lifeguard, 
teacher or social worker and only then am I your lifeguard, her teacher, his social 
worker.)  
However, the relation between fundamentally imperfect obligations and special 
relationships may run deeper. Consider, for example, the obligation to give particular 
attention. It may take many forms, such as attending a friend’s birthday or visiting a 
family member in hospital. Now this obligation is surely not a general perfect obligation 
but it seems neither to be an imperfect obligation of the provision-of-goods-or-services 
kind. If you had no impending birthday celebrations or sick relatives, you would not be 
morally required to pursue this obligation with respect to strangers. This point can be 
nicely illustrated with a scenario, offered by Michael Stocker, of us being hospitalized 
and receiving a visit from Smith whose relation to us is unclear: 
You are very bored and restless and at loose ends when Smith comes in once 
again. You are now convinced more than ever that he is a fine fellow and a real 
friend – taking so much time to cheer you up, travelling all the way across town, 
and so on. You are so effusive with your praise and thanks that he protests that he 
always tries to do what he thinks is his duty, what he thinks will be best. You at 
first think he is engaging in a polite form of self-deprecation, relieving the moral 
burden. But the more you two speak, the more clear it becomes that he was 
telling the literal truth: that it is not essentially because of you that he came to see 
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you, not because you are friends, but... simply because he knows of no one more 
in need of cheering up and no one easier to cheer up.
63
 
The feeling that something has gone wrong here seems to do with the detachment of 
the obligation from the special relationship in which it is normally embedded. In this 
case, the imperfect obligation to give particular attention is quite different from the 
imperfect obligations to rescue or to provide education or welfare and their translation 
into special obligations of lifeguards, teachers and social workers. These imperfect 
obligations could also be discharged by people “coming from nowhere” – passers-by, 
substitute teachers, Good Samaritans. But Stocker’s scenario shows that it is not the 
case with all imperfect obligations (or with all instantiations of discharging imperfect 
obligations), some of which are more deeply attached to particular special relationships 
already in place. There is a sense in which the content of the obligation is explained by 
the nature of the special relationship. (It is not the case that I am first a parent or friend 
and only then his parent or her friend.
64
) 
O’Neill seems to acknowledge this in a later discussion where she introduces a 
further category of special imperfect obligations. 
[G]ood parents will take it that they owe their children certain sorts of love, 
attention and support which they do not owe to all, which are quite specific to the 
relationship to the child, but to which their children have no right. Certain sorts of 
fun, warmth and encouragement might come under this heading: these are special 
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imperfect obligations that parents see as part of what is required of good 
parents.
65
 
Taking this point seriously implies that as long as we retain an abstract point of view we 
cannot tell the exact set of parental obligations, since certain fundamentally imperfect 
obligations are more specific to the parent–child relationship than others and we cannot 
know which obligations those are before considering the nature of that relationship. As 
O’Neill writes, parents “who meet only their perfect obligations would fail as parents... 
They would not merely fail to be saintly or heroic parents... They would fail in much that 
we take to be straightforwardly obligatory for parents.”
66
 The outcome of this discussion 
is that this remains true even after general imperfect obligations are added to the 
picture. This may still fall short of the complete set of obligations as the latter may also 
include some ‘special imperfect obligations.’ When abstracting from the special 
relationship already in place, whether we focus on what children are entitled to or on 
what adults in general owe them, we run the risk of coming up with too narrow a set of 
parental obligations.  
To conclude this section I want to briefly mention and reject an alternative 
suggestion according to which child-centred approaches are not meant to provide us 
with the complete set of obligations of parents but the necessary (even if not sufficient) 
conditions without which they cannot be considered good parents. In response to 
O’Neill’s critique of rights-based approaches, Harry Brighouse claims that “It is not that 
one could be a good parent while only observing the child’s rights; but that one can be a 
good parent without doing everything that will be good for them, and cannot be a good 
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parent without doing those things to which they have a right.”
67
 In other words, rights-
based approaches cannot tell us who the good parents are but they can point towards 
those who are unquestionably bad, namely those who do not meet their children’s 
general rights. However, this claim fails to give adequate moral weight to unfavourable 
circumstances that parents and their children may be facing. If families find themselves 
in a war zone, the fact that parents do not provide their children with shelter and 
adequate nutrition, to which they may have a general right, does not necessarily make 
them bad parents. More details are required before we could make this judgment (Did 
they have an opportunity to escape the war? Were there alternative caring 
arrangements available? and so on). Brighouse might be right if we view parents only as 
providers of goods and services; that is, if we choose to follow the child-centred 
assigned responsibility model. But if we realize that we have good reasons not to 
abstract children from their relationship with their parents then we also need to take 
into account the circumstances parents and children might find themselves facing 
together.  
 We can therefore conclude that the child-centred approach fails to provide us 
with an adequate account of what justice requires of parents. As the complete set of 
parental obligations it might prove too narrow while as the absolutely minimal set it 
might prove too wide. The extent to which parents meet their children’s abstract 
entitlements neither seems to correlate with them being good parents, nor with them 
being bad ones.   
 
 
6. Context-dependency: Whose context? 
 
Against the conclusion of the previous section some might wish to argue that while it 
may be the case that some of the parents’ obligations are specific to their relationship 
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with their children, this is not so with respect to the narrower set of obligations that are 
a matter of justice. One reply would be to show that some such specific obligations (e.g. 
giving particular attention) plausibly fall within the purview of a principle of justice 
formulated in more general terms. This, however, must wait for my positive account and 
defence of such a principle in Chapter 4. Here I wish to pursue a different strategy and 
argue for the indispensability of the parent–child relationship also with respect to rights 
to goods and services that children are normally thought to have irrespective of that 
relationship. 
Rights-talk often distinguishes between two different kinds of rights: liberty and 
welfare. Liberty rights concern the non-interference of others with one’s life. For 
example, my rights to life and bodily integrity entail that it is not morally permissible for 
others to kill or abuse me, physically or sexually. If children have any rights at all,
68
 they 
surely have some such rights (notwithstanding the argument that children do not have 
all the liberty rights adults have). But advocates of children's rights rarely stop there. 
Children, we are often told, also have welfare rights, that is, rights to be provided with 
certain goods and services promoting their welfare. Indeed, children cannot survive and 
develop without some ‘interference’ of adults in their lives. It is not controversial to 
therefore claim that children have (welfare) rights to shelter, adequate nutrition, 
healthcare and education. However, rights to goods and services (unlike liberty rights) 
cannot be accounted for in the abstract but depend on one’s social context.
69
   
The context-dependence of welfare rights has two main aspects. The previous 
section touched on the need for some institutional scheme (e.g. healthcare or education 
system) through which the relevant goods and services are to be delivered. “[I]t will be 
impossible to state who ought to do the providing or delivering, and who can be called 
                                                 
68
 For the view that they don’t, see Jan Narveson, The Libertarian Idea (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1988), Chapter 19; Hillel Steiner, An Essay on Rights (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 245-6. For some 
potential replies, see David Archard, “Children’s Rights,” in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, Summer 2011 edition (http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/rights-children), 
Section 1.  
69
 This distinction corresponds to that of O’Neill’s, discussed above, between general imperfect and 
perfect obligations. 
52 
to account when deliveries are botched, or nothing is delivered, unless there are 
established institutions and well-defined special relationships.”
70
 But perhaps more 
fundamentally, recourse to a specific social context is also required in order to state fully 
what ought to be provided or delivered.  
Compare the right not to be tortured with the right to education. A right not be 
tortured may be pretty well defined across different social contexts, and fully met, at 
least theoretically, absent an institutional framework. The case of a right to education is 
very different. We cannot tell whether or not the abstract right to education has been 
met if we do not know the child’s social context. This is because without reference to a 
specific social context it is not clear what the content of adequate education should 
include. The full specification of what a right to education implies has to rely on the 
actual characteristics of a given society – its geographical conditions, economic 
development, shared beliefs and practices, and so on.  
Welfare rights thus require reference to a given social context before being fully 
specified and implemented. But whose social context are we talking about? With 
respect to adults the answer is quite straightforward. When we examine whether or not 
an adult’s welfare right has been met we refer to that adult’s social context which is 
determined, in turn, by the adult’s membership in a specific society. With children, the 
case is different. Their social context is normally determined by the location of their 
upbringing. However, this is not a place they choose for themselves but one that others, 
namely their parents, choose for them. Children’s social context may change if, for 
example, their parents decide to migrate or if the children are adopted overseas. But in 
all cases, whether the social context changes or remains constant, it is the parents’ 
identity and actions that determine it. So it is the given parent–child relationship that 
determines the child’s social context which the full specification and implementation of 
his (welfare) rights must presuppose. Thus the relation between children’s rights and 
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the parent–child relationship is quite the reverse from what the child-centred picture 
has initially suggested. 
If this argument is sound, we can now see that the idea of a strictly child-centred 
assignment of parental responsibility is not only counterintuitive but also incoherent. 
According to that idea, we abstract children from their actual relationships, ask who can 
best meet their interests, and assign parental responsibility accordingly. But in order to 
answer that question we need to refer to the child’s social context which is determined 
by an already given parent–child relationship. In other words, assigning parental 
responsibilities in view of the child’s rights must presuppose the very same assignment 
of responsibilities it aims at determining. To be sure, this in itself does not tell against 
reassigning parental responsibility. Nonetheless I think it highlights the limits of the 
child-centred approach and of abstraction more generally.  
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
It is commonsensical to think about what justice requires of parents in terms of the 
entitlements or rights of their children. Parents, it is often said, are there to serve their 
children’s interests. Pursuing this line of thought does offer some important insights. It 
is the fact that human beings are born incapable of meeting their immediate and 
developmental interests which initially opens the way for the parent–child relationship 
to be established. If we were entering the world as Adam did – “his body and mind in 
full possession... capable from the first instance of his being to provide for his own 
support and preservation”
71
 – we would not come to have parent–child relationships.  
Meeting the interests of children thus lies at the heart of our understanding of the 
parent–child relationship. Moreover, the interests of children are distinct from their 
parents’ and meeting them is not a strictly private family matter.  
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However, I argue that the entitlements children may have, abstracted from their 
relationship with their parents, cannot fully account for the obligations of parents. Even 
if we could agree upon a plausible set of children's abstract entitlements, it would 
remain unclear why parents should be the ones primarily responsible for meeting them. 
Suggesting in response that those who can best meet those entitlements should 
become the parents would risk committing ourselves to mass redistribution of children. 
Still, a set of children's abstract entitlements cannot seem to escape either generating 
an implausibly narrow set of parental obligations, or presupposing a concrete social 
context and a given parent–child relationship. These shortcomings of the child-centred 
approach recommend taking the child’s relational context more seriously and pave the 
way for introducing some non-child-centred considerations in formulating our account 
of justice in the family.  
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Chapter 2 
Is the Personal Political?  
 
For a start, then, it seems, we must supervise our storytellers. When they tell a 
good story, we must decide in favour of it; and when they tell a bad one, we must 
decide against it. We shall persuade nurses and mothers to tell children the 
approved stories, and tell them that shaping children's minds with stories is far 
more important than trying to shape their bodies with their hands. We must reject 
most of the stories they tell at the moment.  
(Plato)
1
  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter stressed the significance of the relational context to the issue of 
justice in the family. Following this, I will now explore the bearings that political justice
2
 
may have on the issue.  
The starting point for adopting such a perspective is the straightforward 
observation that the family is a major social institution. As such, it falls within the 
purview of a political conception of justice, the subject of which is the basic institutional 
structure of society. Can such a conception therefore account for what justice requires 
of parents? John Rawls’s theory of justice offers us an opportunity to examine this 
question in depth.
3
 It proves to be fruitful ground not only because of its own merits as 
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a highly complex theory formulated specifically for the basic structure of society, but 
also due to its being the focus of feminist critiques – most notably Susan Okin’s – which 
seek to develop and directly apply Rawls’s theory to issues of justice concerning the 
family. The thesis advanced in this chapter is that the attempts to account for what 
justice requires of parents exclusively in terms of a political conception of justice are 
unsuccessful. Nonetheless, an examination of these attempts points the way for further 
enquiry into justice in the family and its relation to the broader setting of political 
justice. 
The argument of this chapter proceeds as follows. I start with a presentation of 
Rawls’s own treatment of the family within his theory of justice. This account, as we 
shall see, is quite puzzling. There is an obvious tension between Rawls’s inclusion of the 
family in the basic structure of society, and his prescription that the principles of 
political justice should be applied to the family in a way not different to associations that 
are not part of this structure. To alleviate this tension the third section of the chapter 
introduces the distinction between justice of the family and justice in the family. This 
gives rise to two different views on the relation between political justice and justice in 
the family. The first – the constraints view – suggests that justice in the family is 
encapsulated within the constraints political justice imposes on the internal life of 
families. I find this view problematic and point out the need for a conception of family 
justice addressing the internal life of families directly. This leads to considering the 
mirror view, according to which the principles of family justice should mirror those of 
political justice. In Section 4 I examine three arguments for holding such a view. 
Although I ultimately reject them and thus lay down the grounds for keeping the 
personal and political domains distinct from each other, those arguments allow us to 
note the potential of a local conception of family justice to accommodate much of the 
feminist critique made under the slogan “the personal is political.” Section 5 concludes 
by setting the agenda for further enquiry. 
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2. Rawls’s puzzling account 
 
Rawls famously argued that the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of 
society, by which he meant “the way in which the major social institutions fit together 
into one system, and how they assign fundamental rights and duties and shape the 
division of advantages that arises through social cooperation.”
4
 From the very start 
Rawls held the family to be one such major social institution and therefore a part of the 
basic structure of society to which the principles of justice apply.
5
 This seems 
straightforward in light of the reason Rawls provides for viewing the basic structure as 
the primary site of justice, namely that its effects are “so profound and pervasive, and 
present from birth.”
6
 At least with respect to children, the family surely has profound 
and pervasive effects that are indeed present from birth. Thus we have a good-enough 
reason for including the family on the list of major social institutions that together form 
the basic structure of society. 
In later writings, however, Rawls has elaborated on a deeper rationale, which was 
only implicit at first, for including the family as part of the basic structure of society. Not 
only does the family happen to have profound effects on people’s lives; it is an integral 
and necessary component of the very idea of a system of social cooperation over time 
underlying our understanding of what political society is. As Rawls explains, 
The family is part of the basic structure, since one of its main roles is to be the 
basis of the orderly production and reproduction of society and its culture from 
one generation to the next… Thus reproductive labour is socially necessary labour. 
Accepting this, a central role of the family is to arrange in a reasonable and 
effective way the raising of and caring for children, ensuring their moral 
development and education into the wider culture. Citizens must have a sense of 
justice and the political virtues that support political and social institutions. The 
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family must ensure the nurturing and development of such citizens in appropriate 
number to maintain an enduring society.
7
 
So it is the family as a site of childrearing – and especially of moral development – that is 
part of the basic structure.
8
 Since the basic structure “lies entirely within the domain of 
the political”
9
 to which Rawls’s conception of justice is to apply, it is only natural to 
expect that issues of justice concerning childrearing could be addressed by reference to 
this conception. Yet this is precisely what Rawls seems to reject in his last and most 
elaborate writings on the family.
10
 But before presenting Rawls’s later formulation it is 
important to note a certain shift that has occurred over the years in his picture of the 
family, which rules out a potential explanation for that rejection. 
Rawls’s initial portrayal of the family was to a large extent an idealized one. In A 
Theory of Justice the family is taken to display altruistic feelings, fraternity and love 
among its members, especially between parents and children. We are assumed to be 
more reluctant to take great risks for our descendants than for ourselves.
11
 We are told 
that the family, “in its ideal conception and often in practice,” is where fraternity is 
displayed by its members not wishing to gain, “unless they can do so in ways that 
further the interests of the rest.”
12
 And “we may suppose” that parents love their 
children and that the latter in turn come to love and trust their parents,
13
 an assumption 
that is crucial to Rawls’s account of children’s moral development, and specifically to its 
first stage: the morality of authority. All this might create the impression that family-
related issues of justice are far from urgent, and this was perhaps Rawls’s initial 
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intuition: That in the presence of altruism, love and care, figuring out what the 
principles of justice require with respect to family life is redundant.
14
 
However, in Political Liberalism the portrayal of the family is already much more 
ambivalent. Although the familial is distinguished from the political domain by being 
affectional,
15
 the text does acknowledge the existence of “problems of gender and the 
family” (if only by way of mentioning them not being discussed in Theory and Political 
Liberalism
16
) as well as the fact that members of families do need protection from other 
family members – “wives from their husbands, children from their parents.”
17
 By the 
time his last writings on the family were published Rawls had endorsed at least some of 
the feminist criticisms and related policy proposals, most notably those of Susan Okin in 
her Justice, Gender, and the Family. The potential risk of children being abused or 
neglected by parents was also recognized as well as other injustices that “bear harshly” 
on children.
18
 So, in contrast to his early view, Rawls in his later writings does not 
assume that the family is just because it is regulated by altruism and love. 
I have already mentioned Rawls’s rejection of the idea that his political principles 
of justice should govern parent–child relationships. “These principles,” he says, “do not 
inform us how to raise our children, and we are not required to treat our children in 
accordance with political principles.”
19
 Instead we are offered an analogy between the 
family and other associations to explain how these principles apply to the former: 
The principles of justice are to apply directly to [the basic] structure, but are not to 
apply directly to the internal life of the many associations within it, the family 
among them… Much the same question arises in regard to all associations, 
whether they be churches or universities, professional or scientific associations, 
business firms or labor unions. The family is not peculiar in this respect. 
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Political principles do not apply directly to [the family’s] internal life, but they do 
impose essential constraints on the family as an institution and so guarantee the 
basic rights and liberties and the freedom and opportunities of all its members. 
This they do… by specifying the basic rights of equal citizens who are members of 
families. The family as part of the basic structure cannot violate these freedoms.
20
  
Just as the difference principle does not order a church’s hierarchy of offices, neither 
does it determine the treatment of children by their parents.
21
 It is not for the principles 
of political justice to determine the ways associations are internally organized. Yet 
members of associations are also citizens and as such they enjoy basic rights – 
determined by the principles of political justice – wherever they go. Thus, churches 
cannot burn heretics, universities cannot discriminate between students based on the 
colour of their skin, and parents cannot abuse children. The principles of justice serving 
as constraints on the internal life of associations prevent this from happening. Rawls 
seems to think this is enough to meet the feminist critique of the family and to achieve a 
viable liberal account of equal justice for women and for children as future citizens.
22
  
However, this account of how the principles of justice apply to the family as 
constraints, and the analogy with other associations, displays an obvious tension with 
Rawls’s other claim that the family is part of the basic structure. On the one hand the 
principles of justice do apply directly to the basic structure, one aspect of which is 
childrearing in families. On the other hand, we are told, the internal life of families 
including childrearing is only indirectly constrained by these principles of justice.
23
 
Furthermore, the analogy with other associations, according to which the relation 
between the principles of justice and the internal life of the family is not a peculiar one, 
does not seem to square with the fact that, while the family, according to Rawls, is part 
of the basic structure, universities and churches are not. In the absence of further 
justification, it seems that the family should be peculiar compared to churches and 
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universities. Otherwise, what other meaning can its inclusion in the basic structure 
have?  
The tension in Rawls’s account can be reconstructed as follows: 
(I) The principles of political justice apply directly to the basic structure of society. 
(II) Either the family is part of the basic structure or it is not part of the basic 
structure. 
(III) If it is, then principles of political justice should apply directly to the family (as part 
of the basic structure). 
(IV) If it is not, then principles of justice should apply to the family in the same way 
they apply to other associations, i.e. only indirectly as constraints. 
(V) The family is part of the basic structure. 
(VI) Principles of political justice should apply directly to the family (from 1, 3, 5); 
However, Rawls holds that 
(VII) The principles of political justice only serve as constraints on its internal life. 
This has led Susan Okin to declare that there is no way of reconciling Rawls’s two 
positions as stated in (V) and (VII).
24
 I want to suggest that despite the obvious tension 
between its components, Okin was too quick in dismissing this account. In what follows I 
try to make sense of it and examine its implications for justice between parents and 
children. 
 
 
3. Justice of the family and justice in the family 
 
The key distinctions for ameliorating the potential conflict in Rawls’s account are, I 
argue, that between justice of the family and justice in the family, and that between 
political justice and family (or, more generally, local) justice. The latter distinction is 
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relevant to the discussion of justice in the family so I start with the former to clarify its 
meaning.  
According to Véronique Munoz-Dardé’s interpretation, which I follow here, the 
issue of justice in the family concerns the “division of labour and, more generally, the 
application of principles of rights and justice within this institution,” while justice of the 
family deals with “the question of whether the family should exist from the point of 
view of justice, and which form, or forms, if any, it would take.”
25
 
If Rawls’s political conception of justice applies directly to the basic structure, i.e. 
to the way in which the major social institutions fit together into one system, and if the 
family is one such major social institution, then this conception does apply directly to 
the issue of how the family fits in this system of social cooperation. This is the issue of 
justice of the family. When Rawls says that the principles of justice apply to the basic 
structure, he emphasizes that it is to the major social institutions “taken together as one 
scheme.”
26
 This scheme as a whole is supposed to fulfil the principles of justice and 
therefore it is in light of these principles that we are to choose among “various social 
arrangements.”
27
 The family is one such social arrangement which, from the perspective 
of political justice, aims at the upbringing and, more specifically, the moral development 
of future citizens. But this is only one possible arrangement; others may also be 
considered for this purpose, depending on their prospective ability to dovetail with the 
other major social institutions into one scheme that as a whole is meant to fulfil the 
principles of political justice. Rawls had acknowledged this possibility in Theory although 
he never explored it further.
28
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The inclusion of this issue within the scope of political justice makes clear that the 
family is not a brute fact of nature, and acknowledges the important feminist claim that 
the state is present in the family from the start by defining which forms of upbringing 
are allowed, and which structures are recognized as families.
29
 It also distinguishes 
between the family as part of the basic structure, as distinct from associations such as 
universities and churches which are not part of this framework. There can therefore be 
no issue of the justice of churches or universities as they operate within the framework 
of major social institutions, while the existence of the family as part of this framework is 
a matter to which a political conception of justice applies. I will not pursue this theme 
any further since my main concern here is with what happens within families.
30
 
This brings us to the different issue of justice in the family, i.e. the application of 
principles of justice between family members. Okin thought the inclusion of the family 
as part of the basic structure tells us that its internal life should be ordered according to 
the principles of political justice: 
These principles are intended to apply to the basic structure of society... 
Whenever the basic institutions have within them differences in authority, in 
responsibility, or in the distribution of resources such as wealth or leisure, the 
second principle requires that these differences must be to the greatest benefit of 
the least advantaged...
31
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But once we distinguish between the issues of justice of and in the family and 
recognize that the inclusion of the family in the basic structure refers to the application 
of political principles to the justice of the family, we have no reason to assume that the 
same principles also apply to justice in the family. To be sure, one may argue that if the 
political conception of justice applies to the basic structure then its principles should 
also apply to the internal life of families. Yet this is very different from saying that the 
inclusion of the family in the basic structure means that the political conception of 
justice applies to the internal life of families. I will return to the examination of possible 
arguments of this sort in Section 4, but first we need to consider a different way of 
tackling the issue of justice in the family. 
Recall that Rawls said that the principles of political justice apply indirectly, as 
constraints, to the internal life of families. They protect the basic claims of citizens 
wherever they are, and thus constrain the internal life of the associations of which the 
citizens are members. In this respect, Rawls thought, the family is not peculiar – citizens 
are to be protected in their family as much as they are in their church or university. 
Now, one might think this concludes the issue of justice in the family, as Munoz-Dardé 
suggests: 
Let us assume for the sake of simplicity that we have no argument with Rawls’ 
principles of justice, and that we are only worried about their capacity to address 
injustices within the family. It would then be enough to be able to show that these 
principles apply within the family (that is, that in matters of justice members of 
families are treated in exactly the same way as members of any other small group 
or association)… This is particularly relevant to envisaging the distribution of the 
burdens of care towards dependent members of families… Because rights apply to 
all family members in the very same manner as they apply to members of 
churches, of universities and of any other association, work within the family is 
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submitted to no more and no fewer legal constraints than in any other free 
association.
32
 
Call this the constraints view of justice in the family. Contrary to this view I want to 
argue that regarding the family in the way we regard other associations is not enough to 
fully address the issue of justice in the family. 
First, and most importantly for our concerns, the constraints view leaves largely 
undetermined the obligations of justice that parents have to their children. It may be 
sufficient to specify the demands of political justice that apply, inter alia, between 
parents and children; thus ‘honour killings’ of daughters by their fathers are prohibited 
since they violate the basic rights of daughters as citizens (whatever else they violate). 
But this view does not provide us with an account of justice which tells us what parents 
are required to distribute to their children and how. Nor could it account for parental 
conduct that does not necessarily violate the basic rights of children as citizens but is, 
nonetheless, conduct which we would intuitively consider to be unjust. For example, not 
allowing enough opportunities for play may be a case of neglect and as such an injustice 
even if it does not violate the citizenship rights of the child. Not meeting some necessary 
requirement for securing the child’s affiliation with his minority cultural group may be 
another example. To sum up this point, the constraints view does not tell us what the 
specific demands of justice in childrearing are.
 
 
In light of this problem we can turn to the second distinction mentioned at the 
beginning of this section, that between conceptions of political and family justice. A 
political conception of justice offers principles that apply to the basic structure and from 
the perspective of which the justice of the family is examined. Those principles also 
impose constraints on the internal life of families and in this respect the political 
conception also has some bearings on justice in the family. However, for Rawls it does 
not follow that justice in the family is therefore determined, for the most part, by that 
political conception:  
                                                 
32
 Munoz-Dardé, “Rawls, Justice in the Family and Justice of the Family,” 348-9. 
66 
Here those [political] principles are out of place. Surely parents must follow 
some conception of justice (or fairness) and due respect with regard to their 
children, but, within certain limits, this is not for political principles to 
prescribe.
33
 
This is made clear in Rawls’s distinction between political and local justice. The 
institutions of the basic structure and the associations within it “are each governed by 
distinct principles in view of their different aims and purposes and their peculiar nature 
and special requirements.” These are principles of local justice “to be followed directly 
by associations and institutions within the basic structure.”
34
 The suitable principles of 
local justice are constrained but not determined uniquely by the principles of political 
justice. So if we are interested in what justice specifically requires of parents we need to 
look for the relevant conception of local justice, that is, family justice. The constraints 
view of justice in the family falls short of providing the required conception of family 
justice. 
Furthermore, the relation offered by the constraints view between the political 
framework and what happens in families seems problematic. The cornerstone of this 
view is the analogy between families and other associations which, from the perspective 
of political justice, can be considered voluntary. As long as the interests that members 
of associations have as citizens are protected by legal constraints and fair background 
conditions, the authority of associations over their members can be taken as freely 
accepted and in this sense voluntary.
35
 Since the membership in associations such as 
churches and universities is a voluntary matter the way their internal life is ordered – 
e.g. the hierarchy of offices and the division of labour among their members – falls 
within the scope of the basic liberties of citizens and is of no further concern from a 
political point of view. One may argue along these lines that insofar as the rights of 
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women as citizens are protected, their membership in families displaying gender-based 
inequalities is also a voluntary matter and therefore of no concern to political justice.
36
 
This is a deeply contentious line of argument but we can note from the outset that, 
whatever its merits, it is not applicable to the status of children in the family. There is no 
way in which a case parallel to the voluntary membership in churches and universities 
can be made with respect to the membership of children in their families. As Martha 
Nussbaum pointed out, children are practically hostages to their families, surely in the 
earliest stages in life. Children’s treatment by their parents has profound effects on their 
lives and their parents’ authority over them cannot be said to be freely accepted.
37
 
A different but related problem is that, contrary to what happens in voluntary 
associations, there is a direct political interest in what happens in families. As has 
already been observed, there is no such issue of justice of the church or justice of the 
university and this allows the state to remain relatively uninterested in justice in the 
church or in the university (as long as it falls within the constraints imposed by political 
justice). But this is not the case with respect to the family. The issue of the upbringing 
and moral development of future citizens was recognized as a matter of political justice 
from the start and therefore raised the question of the justice of the family. And 
although this left the justice in the family to be mainly determined by a conception of 
family justice, the political interest in childrearing remains. There is a political interest to 
ensure justice in the family as the site where future citizens are reared and develop their 
moral capacities. An analogous political interest in the justice in the church or university 
does not exist.
38
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The first and most significant problem with the constraints view was that it leaves 
the issue of justice in the family largely undetermined. We saw that this calls for a 
conception of family justice to address what justice specifically requires of parents. A 
different problem with the constraints view was the relation it offers between political 
justice and justice in the family, based on the analogy between families and voluntary 
associations. The revealed disanalogies concerning membership in voluntary 
associations and children’s membership in families suggest that, from the political 
perspective, justice in the family is of deeper concern than is suggested by the 
constraints view.
39
 This may lead to a consideration of the enforcement of justice in the 
family, once we have a conception of family justice at hand. 
 
 
4. “The personal is political”: Three arguments  
 
The distinction between political justice and family justice tells us that the two 
conceptions are different in scope: while the focus of political justice is the basic 
structure as a unified institutional scheme, it is for a conception of family justice to 
regulate the internal life of families. But this distinction does not tell us what the 
substantive content of the two conceptions is; neither does it assert that their content is 
necessarily different. This leaves open the possibility of another relation between 
political justice and justice in the family according to which the latter needs to mirror 
the former. Call this the mirror view of justice in the family. In this section I examine 
three arguments for adopting this view, all of which can be regarded as variants of ‘the 
personal is political’ slogan. None of them claim the more private domain is identical 
with the political one. But they aim to provide reasons why there should be no 
substantive distinction content-wise between the political conception of justice and the 
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more private one of family justice. The first two suggest that the personal is political 
because of the former’s effects on the latter, whereas the third implies that the 
personal is political in virtue of sharing the same relevant features. 
 
A. The ‘school of justice’ argument 
 
The first argument builds on the role the family plays in children’s moral development 
and specifically in their acquiring a sense of justice. This role, let us recall, is a major 
factor in considering the justice of the family, how it fits together with the other social 
institutions in implementing the principles of political justice. From here the argument 
proceeds in two steps: first, that in order to realize the justice of the family we must 
ensure that justice in the family obtains and, second, that for children to acquire the 
required sense of justice, families must mirror the conception of justice that regulates 
the larger society. The two steps are observed in the following text from Okin: 
[Step 1:] families must be just because of the vast influence that they have on the 
moral development of children. The family is the primary institution of formative 
moral development. [Step 2:] And the structure and practices of the family must 
parallel those of the larger society if the sense of justice is to be fostered and 
maintained.
40
 
We may begin by questioning the first clause. Is it indeed the case that families must be 
just for children to develop moral personhood? Surely families might be unjust to such 
an extreme that the neglect or abuse of children jeopardizes their very physical, mental, 
emotional and moral capacities. This I take to be indisputable. But what about 
‘moderately’ unjust families? To support her claim that unjust families “are not suitable 
training grounds for just citizens,” Okin, in a later work, cites two empirical studies.
41
 
Commenting on the first study, which found that unequal divisions of labour are 
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reproduced and even exacerbated from one family generation to the next, Okin 
rhetorically asks whether gendered families are a good place to become just or, 
alternatively, “a place where people absorb the message that they have different 
entitlements and responsibilities, based on a morally irrelevant contingency – their 
sex?”
42
 However, the evidence cited from the second study replaces the rhetorical 
question with a real one. As part of examining women’s and girl’s perceptions of sex-
inequality in traditional hierarchical families, it was found that almost 80 per cent of the 
responding women and girls thought it unfair for a husband to dictate his wife’s 
choices.
43
 Okin does not seem to be aware that this evidence undermines her case. It 
shows, in fact, that despite their gendered familial environment, the women and girls 
who were interviewed for that study did not “absorb the message” of different 
entitlements. Quite the contrary, they were able to recognize the unfairness of the 
power relations in their own families, and they could not have done this without having 
a sense of justice.
44
 One might go even further and suggest not only that unjust families 
do not hinder the development of a sense of justice but that they have the potential to 
foster it by making the reality of injustice clear and present.
45
 And still, although it might 
be true in some particular cases, it seems far-fetched to generalize this last point. Even if 
true, it would be absurd to opt for de facto injustice to promote a (mere) sense of 
justice.  
Okin’s claim that the development of a sense of justice requires there to be justice 
in the family seems somewhat overstated but plausible. It is probably not the case that 
justice in their family is a necessary precondition for children to develop moral 
personhood. But if, for instance, Rawls’s understanding of moral psychology is valid and 
children’s initial stages of moral development depend on their attachment to parental 
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figures from whom they take example and receive guidance,
46
 then parental conduct 
probably does affect the prospects of children acquiring a sense of justice. If we are 
interested in citizens having a sense of justice, it seems we should not remain 
uninterested in justice in families. 
While the first step in the ‘school of justice’ argument is plausible, the second 
seems unwarranted. As far as I am aware, in none of her writings does Okin provide any 
reasoning to support her move from the first step of the argument to the second. She 
focuses her efforts on establishing the claim made in step one, that families need to be 
internally just for children to develop a sense of justice; but once this is ascertained she 
automatically concludes that families need to be internally ordered and regulated by the 
same political principles applying to the larger society.
47
 When she asks why political 
theorists “seem so queasy about the idea that families should be internally arranged in 
accordance with principles of justice,” Rawls is immediately referred to as saying that 
“his principles of justice are political ones and therefore not applicable to the internal 
life of families.”
48
 But the view that it is not for political principles of justice to order the 
internal life of families does not entail that families are beyond the reach of justice.
49
 It 
only tells us, as we have already seen, that we need to look for a different conception of 
justice to apply to the internal life of families. The school of justice argument works only 
if we operate under the assumption that there is only one conception of justice, the 
principles of which apply everywhere.
50
 If this is the case then once we affirm the need 
for the family to be internally just (in order to cultivate a sense of justice in children), we 
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also commit ourselves to applying the same principles of justice both to the family and 
wider society. However, if we allow for different conceptions of justice to apply to 
different institutions, associations and relationships, then in order for families to be 
internally just they need to accord with a conception of family justice. And we have no 
reason to assume in advance that this will not be enough for children to start developing 
a sense of justice.
51
 Once we distinguish between conceptions of political and family 
justice, a justification for step two in the argument is found wanting. We can accept the 
first step calling for justice in the family without implying that this has to mirror political 
justice. 
 
B. The argument from congruence 
 
The school of justice argument does not lend support to the mirror view itself. A 
justification for why a family conception of justice needs to mirror the political 
conception is still required. Such a justification might be offered by the argument from 
congruence to which I now turn. According to this argument a conceptual split between 
the political and non-political domains of a person’s life is practically dubious.
52
 While 
we can perhaps distinguish between the two domains, incongruence between the two is 
not sustainable in practice. This is because persons cannot have a split sense of self. If 
persons operate in their daily non-political lives in a way that assumes a particular 
conception of the person they cannot just put it aside when they enter the political 
domain which, in turn, assumes a different conception. The non-political domain, which 
for most citizens is much larger in scope and intensity, is bound to shape their sense of 
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self to such an extent that it will affect their political self-image. Moreover, the 
unsustainability of this split will also have profound effects on how persons are treated 
by others:  
It is exceedingly difficult to see how one could both hold and practice (in one’s 
personal, familial, and associational life) the belief that women or blacks, say, are 
naturally inferior without its seriously affecting one’s capacity to relate (politically) 
to such people as citizens “free and equal” with oneself.
53
 
Thus, if we want people to be able to think of themselves, act and treat others in the 
political domain as free and equal citizens, it requires us also to regulate the (most 
influential) non-political spheres of their lives in a way congruent to the political order. 
Otherwise we would end up with either ‘schizophrenic’ citizens or, more likely, with no 
political justice.
54
 
What should we make of this argument? We can begin by pointing out that the 
conclusion of the argument does not seem to square with the broader Rawlsian 
framework. Okin thought that the logical conclusion of consistently applying Rawls’s 
original position was liberalized families. Including gender in the personal characteristics 
of which the parties are ignorant calls for reform of society’s gendered structure and 
specifically in traditional family roles.
55
 In response, some have argued that the parties 
have an interest in protecting their basic liberties and, following that, will allow for non-
liberal families to exist in society, being free to practise their religion.
56
 Whatever the 
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case, it is important to note that if Okin’s argument from congruence is right then it 
seems to present a much graver dilemma to Rawls than to Okin. If the parties in the 
original position do opt for liberalized families then it is difficult to see how, in the 
second stage of Rawls’s argument, when we are to examine the stability of the 
conception of justice that has been arrived at, this decision could enjoy an overlapping 
consensus of the reasonable comprehensive doctrines present in society. However, if 
the parties in the original position do not opt for liberalized families then Rawls faces a 
different challenge to stability as, following Okin’s argument, in the absence of a liberal 
non-political domain the political conception of the person as free and equal citizen is 
unsustainable. 
So a Rawlsian approach does not in itself solve the issue we face here. We need to 
judge the argument from congruence on its own merits. To do this we should pay 
attention to the sort of examples given by Okin in support of her argument. One such 
example is that of a religion that, based on a God-given hierarchy of the sexes, treats 
women as not very different from slaves. Another example concerns a religious group 
promulgating the metaphysical view that women have the souls of pigs.
57
 These 
examples illustrate a deep and clear conflict between the political conception of the 
person as free and equal citizen and the non-political conception of the female person 
as less than fully human. Now, it makes sense to claim, as does Okin, that if people are 
socialized from their very early childhood in a way that stands in such stark conflict with 
the role they are expected to assume as citizens, then one of these positions will have to 
be let go. We may also concede that it is more likely to be that of citizenship. The non-
political domain is more extensive and intensive in one’s life than the political, and it is 
likely to shape one’s sense of self to a much greater extent.  
Okin is therefore right to point out that the distinction between the political and 
the non-political does not give the latter carte blanche. It is not the case that the 
establishment of a political conception of justice means that in the non-political 
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anything goes. However we should keep in mind that here we are not interested in the 
potential conflict between the political and the non-political as such, but in the 
narrower issue of the potential conflict or incongruence between political and non-
political conceptions of justice. And although we are yet to argue for a specific 
conception of family justice it is already possible to claim that it is very unlikely to be 
anything like the doctrines that Okin contrasts with the political conception of justice. 
Any conception of justice will probably rule out practices that humiliate persons, 
damage their self-respect and degrade them to subhuman levels. How can a conception 
of family justice consider some of the family members to have the moral status of pigs? 
Doesn’t that very conception immediately mutate into something other than one 
referring to a (human) family? The same seems to hold for conceptions that treat 
women in a way that echoes Aristotle’s account of natural slaves. If a conception of 
family justice is most likely to consider all members of the family as fully (or potentially 
fully) human, we need not worry about facing a conflict between the political and family 
conceptions of justice as deep and clear as the ones appearing in Okin’s examples. Yet 
even if such extreme cases of conflict are ruled out in advance, what about moderate 
cases of incongruence? Is a ‘split’ between moderately incongruent conceptions of 
justice, applying to different domains, also unsustainable? 
Okin doubts whether “real human beings” can follow this “conceptual splitting” 
and think of themselves in this way.
58
 She seems to assume that a coherent and 
continuous sense of self is required across the different spheres of one’s life. If that is 
indeed the case then incongruence between non-political and political conceptions 
cannot be maintained and we therefore have a reason to move towards the mirror view 
of justice in the family. However, our everyday experience provides quite a lot of 
evidence to the contrary. As we move across different spheres of our lives we assume 
different roles, and our responsibilities and entitlements with regard to each often do 
not mirror the others. We do not have any reason to assume that if someone thinks 
highly of herself as an academic, she will also view herself as deserving more than an 
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equal citizenship. And we may doubt whether overseas students think of themselves as 
less than equal students merely due to the fact they are not citizens in their country of 
residence. People also convert to different religions without this affecting their 
citizenship status,
59
 as often as others renounce their citizenship to acquire a different 
one while remaining faithful to their religious beliefs. All this suggests that our everyday 
experience is often much more fragmented than Okin assumes it to be,
60
 and this, in 
turn, allows for the possibility that moderate incongruence is sustainable. 
This is related to an important, yet often overlooked distinction made by Rawls 
between fully comprehensive and partially comprehensive moral conceptions. While a 
comprehensive moral conception accounts for what is of value in spheres of life that 
extend beyond the political domain, it is only a fully comprehensive conception which 
“covers all recognized values and virtues within one rather precisely articulated system.” 
A partially comprehensive conception, on the other hand, “comprises a number of, but 
by no means all, non-political values and virtues and is rather loosely articulated.”
61
 
While Okin questions the prospects of stability where fully comprehensive doctrines 
held by citizens are incongruent with the political conception of justice,
62
 Rawls assumes 
that most people hold only partially comprehensive doctrines: 
Most people’s religious, philosophical and moral doctrines are not seen by them 
as fully general and comprehensive; generality and comprehensiveness admit of 
degree, and so does the extent to which a view is articulated and systematic. 
There is lots of slippage, so to speak, many ways for the political conception to 
cohere loosely with a (partially) comprehensive view, and many ways within the 
limits of a political conception to allow for the pursuit of different (partially) 
comprehensive doctrines. This suggests that many if not most citizens come to 
affirm the principles of justice incorporated into their constitution and political 
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practice without seeing any particular connection, one way or the other, between 
it and their other views.
63
 
Rawls says that “much depended on the fact” that “usually we do not have anything like 
a fully comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral view.”
64
 It is this fact that 
accounts to a large extent for how an eventual development of overlapping consensus is 
possible. This is so because most citizens need not square their political conception of 
justice with a fully systematized and articulated doctrine that consistently applies to 
every other sphere of their life. If, on the contrary, their “comprehensive doctrine” is 
quite patchy – holding loosely together the different moral conceptions of different 
spheres of life – then the risk of not being able to hold one conception that is 
incongruent with some others is much lower.
65
 
From a feminist perspective Okin may be right in focusing on fully comprehensive 
doctrines. If women are being considered and treated as unequal to men across many 
spheres of their lives – family, workplace, church, media, and so on – then gender, by 
virtue of being so systematic, even if not explicitly articulated, is very much like a fully 
comprehensive doctrine. In this case the argument from congruence also seems right. It 
would be very hard, if not impossible, to maintain a split between a narrow political 
conception of the person as equal and an almost all-encompassing incongruent 
conception of the female person as unequal. But such a situation is also likely to be 
unjust.  
So the argument from congruence is likely to work with respect to the family in 
one of the following circumstances: there is (I) a deep and clear conflict between the 
political conception of justice and the conception regulating the internal life of the 
family; or (II) an incongruence between the political conception of justice and a different 
conception which quite consistently regulates most of the other spheres of citizens’ 
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lives, including the family sphere.
66
 It is not the conceptual ‘split’ as such that is causing 
the trouble but its depth or breadth. A potential conflict between political and family 
conceptions of justice although possible is likely to be limited in both of these aspects, 
and incongruence in such a case does not seem that unusual or necessarily un-
sustainable. 
 
C. A parallel case argument 
 
I have so far considered and rejected two arguments for the mirror view of justice in the 
family. Both of them held the personal (the family) to be political because of the effects 
the former has on the political domain. I now turn to a different possible interpretation 
of ‘the personal is political’ slogan according to which the personal shares the same key 
features of the political, and thus whatever moral principles apply to the political 
domain by virtue of having those features also apply to the familial sphere. Perhaps the 
most elaborate argument along these lines is found in Matthew Clayton’s Justice and 
Legitimacy in Upbringing.
67
 
Clayton begins by pointing out the key features by virtue of which the basic 
structure of society is taken to be the primary site of political justice. Those features are 
the involuntariness of the institutions of the basic structure – people do not enter or 
leave it voluntarily – and the significant effect they have on people’s life prospects and 
self-understanding. “It is fitting for institutions having those properties,” says Clayton, 
“to be subject to evaluation from the point of view of justice and legitimacy.”
68
 This 
interpretation of the site of political justice serves in Clayton as a preliminary case for 
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including parental conduct within its scope. “Since families have a profound effect on 
the values that a child acquires and the life chances she enjoys, the conduct of parents is 
evaluable from the point of view of justice.”
69
 Later on Clayton builds on this to 
elaborate a “parallel case argument,” specifically with respect to the application of a 
political conception of legitimacy to parental conduct. There he adds coercion as a third 
key feature of the political domain – it is coercive due to the sanctions it imposes on 
citizens to back up its power.
70
 This leads to the following statement of the argument. 
…the relationship between parent and child shares the three salient features of 
the political domain. It is a non-voluntary coercive relationship that has profound 
effects on the child’s life prospects and her self-conception… If the parallels 
between the political and parental case are sound, the conclusion can be drawn 
that parental conduct, as well as political conduct, should be in accordance with 
the ideal of liberal legitimacy. That is, parents should exercise their authority in 
accordance with public reason, in a way that is capable of acceptance by free and 
equal persons.
71
 
Now the analogy between the parent–child relationship and the political domain is by 
no means a perfect one. The authority of parents over children is normally only 
temporal, while the authority of the state over its citizens is life-long (unless they 
emigrate, but even then they do so only to replace the authority of one state with 
another). Moreover, the ways parents can coerce their children are often constrained by 
the coercive power of a higher and more powerful authority (i.e. the state), while this 
does not usually hold true for state coercion.
72
 One may also question whether the 
significant effects of parent–child relationships are as pervasive as the effects of 
society’s basic structure on people’s lives.
73
 Finally, parent–child relationships display 
additional features – such as the often-present affection between parents and children 
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– not present in the political domain, which may make concerns about justice and 
legitimacy less urgent.
74
 Nonetheless I think Clayton is right to argue that we should not 
overstate these differences and overlook the normative significance of the similarities of 
the familial and political domains. I share his view that the similarities to a certain extent 
do highlight the relevance of issues of justice (and legitimacy) in the parent–child 
relationship. However, we should note that the conclusion Clayton draws from these 
similarities goes much further. For him the fact that the parent–child relationship shares 
with the political domain the features of involuntariness, profound effects and coercion 
tells in favour of the application of the same moral principle, namely the principle of 
liberal legitimacy. Parental conduct ought to be constrained by the same standards of 
reasoning and justification by which political conduct is constrained. Both should 
conform to public reason; they “must proceed in a manner that is acceptable to free and 
equal persons,” and therefore “should be capable of justification by reference to anti-
perfectionist ideals, i.e. ideals that do not appeal to the whole truth about ethics or 
religion.”
75
 This is the far-reaching conclusion I now turn to consider – and reject. 
First, it is important to note that although Clayton’s preliminary argument is for 
the inclusion of parental conduct within the purview of political justice and legitimacy, 
his elaborated parallel case argument concerns only legitimacy. Nowhere does he state 
that Rawls’s two principles of justice are to regulate the internal life of families 
(although neither does he deny it). Now, in Rawls’s political liberalism justice and 
legitimacy are complexly interwoven and yet distinct moral concepts. A political order 
can be perfectly legitimate while being only imperfectly just.
76
 Perhaps Clayton could 
disentangle justice and legitimacy in such a way as to make his argument applicable to 
legitimacy but not to justice. Still, justice and legitimacy are so closely related in Rawls 
that I highly doubt whether this would be possible. The principles of justice and the 
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guidelines of inquiry of public reason are, so to speak, two sides of the same coin – a 
liberal political conception of justice. This conception introduces guidelines for public 
inquiry as complementary to the principles of justice, to allow citizens to decide 
whether the principles properly apply and which laws and policies best satisfy them.
77
 
Moreover, it is not only the ‘how’ of public reason that is given by a political conception 
of justice but also the ‘what’ that qualifies as public reason – “to engage in public reason 
is to appeal to one of these political conceptions [of justice] – to their ideals and 
principles, standards and values.”
78
 Thus, stating that public reason should constrain 
parental conduct actually implies that parental conduct should be capable of being 
justified in terms of a political conception of justice. But perhaps most importantly,
79
 
Rawls says that the principle of legitimacy has the same justificatory basis as that of the 
principles of political justice: 
In justice as fairness, and I think in many other liberal views, the guidelines of 
inquiry of public reason, as well as its principles of legitimacy, have the same basis 
as the substantive principles of justice. This means in justice as fairness that the 
parties in the original position, in adopting principles of justice for the basic 
structure, must also adopt guidelines and criteria of public reason for applying 
those norms. The argument for those guidelines, and for the principle of 
legitimacy, is much the same as, and strong as, the argument for the principles of 
justice themselves… In justice as fairness, then, the guidelines of public reason and 
the principles of justice… are companion parts of one agreement.
80
 
The multifaceted relation between justice and legitimacy makes evident why Clayton’s 
parallel case argument concerning legitimacy is also highly significant to our concern 
with the relation between a political conception of justice and justice in the family. We 
have no reason to assume that the argument could not be applied to justice as well. In 
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what follows, therefore, I focus on rejecting the applicability of the argument to a 
political conception of justice, before returning to the issue of public reason to 
demonstrate how it relates to my rejection of a justice-focused argument. 
Clayton points out three key features of the basic structure and observes that they 
are also salient to the parent–child relationship. If we accept this, as I think we should, 
then the parent–child relationship is also a primary subject of justice. But this is as far as 
the parallel case argument can take us. The three key features shared by the political 
and familial domains cannot, and are not meant to, tell us what the content of the 
relevant conception of justice is. While they may account for our concern with social 
justice and, as the argument suggests, also with family justice, something else is 
required to elaborate the conception(s) of justice suitable for these contexts – this being 
a “fundamental organizing idea” of the context within which a conception of justice is 
meant to apply. In Rawls’s case the concern is with a conception of social justice and 
thus the fundamental organizing idea required is that of society. His own conception of 
social justice, justice as fairness, takes as its starting point the idea of society as “a fair 
system of cooperation over time, from one generation to the next.”
81
 Together with the 
idea of citizens – those engaged in cooperation – as free and equal persons, the “first 
fundamental question about political justice” is formulated as follows: “what is the most 
appropriate conception of justice for specifying the fair terms of social cooperation 
between citizens regarded as free and equal, and as fully cooperating members of 
society over a complete life, from one generation to the next?”
82
 The political 
conception of justice as fairness offers itself as an answer to this particular question and 
it is in light of this question that its principles are articulated and argued for. They are to 
specify the fair terms of social cooperation between free and equal citizens: 
We must keep in mind that we are trying to show how the idea of society as a fair 
system of cooperation can be unfolded, so as to find principles specifying the basic 
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rights and liberties and the forms of equality most appropriate to those 
cooperating, once they are regarded as citizens, as free and equal persons.
83
 
If this interpretation is sound then it also clarifies why Rawls limits the application of this 
particular conception “solely to the basic structure of society” as this structure is the 
“unified scheme of social cooperation.”
84
 It is because we formulate the conception of 
political justice from the specifics of the political relationship of democratic citizenship 
that it applies to the site of this relationship, the basic structure of society.
85
 The 
principles of justice, tailored to this context, are considered by Rawls to be the most 
appropriate, but there is no reason to assume they would work in contexts other than 
the original one. Rawls readily acknowledges that “[i]n many if not most cases these 
principles give unreasonable directives.”
86
 
So in order to make a case for applying the political conception of justice to the 
parent–child relationship it is not enough to point out the three parallel features – 
involuntariness, profound effects and coercion – giving rise to concerns of justice. For 
the parallel case argument to work, the contextual circumstances to which one wants to 
apply a conception of justice must sufficiently parallel the original circumstances the 
conception is taken from. Although we have not yet offered an account of the parent–
child relationship, a brief glance at the way Rawls characterizes the democratic 
citizenship relationship is enough to give rise to scepticism about the prospects of 
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reapplying the political conception to the familial domain.
87
 Is it plausible to characterize 
the parent–child relationship as a “fair system of cooperation between free and equal 
members”? I think not. Although cooperation does take place in families it seems to be 
quite a marginal fact in characterizing the parent–child relationship. More importantly, 
parental power, in contrast with democratic political power, is not the power of free and 
equal members as a collective body.
88
 In actuality it seems to be quite the opposite – 
that it is only because children are not yet equal to, and as free as, their parents that we 
allow the latter to exercise involuntary coercive power over the former.
89
 In any case, 
parental power is surely not equally shared by family members – adults and children 
alike – as a collective body. This is not to say that the political and parent–child 
relationships cannot parallel each other.
90
 My claim is that we have strong reasons to 
question the applicability of a democratic citizenship conception of justice to the 
context of the parent–child relationship. 
But perhaps this is too hasty. Since the family is part of the basic structure of 
society, as we have already affirmed, it is to satisfy (together with the other institutions 
of the basic structure) the principles of political justice. This implies, one may suggest, 
that parents are to direct their conduct so that they do their bit in satisfying these 
principles. We thus return to the original issue of public reason. If the judiciary should 
reason according to a political conception of justice, why should parents be any 
different? After all, the family is part of the basic structure as much as the legal system 
is. Yet there is a crucial difference here. The judicial system operates entirely within the 
political domain. It displays no other relationship than that between citizens (and, 
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deriving from it, that between them and their collective government). This is not the 
case in the parent–child relationship. There is a political dimension to what happens in 
families, and parental conduct does have bearings on political justice. Nonetheless, 
parents are not merely government officials in the way justices are. This is one thing 
that differentiates the family as a site of (to some extent) private, rather than collective, 
upbringing.
91
 Of course, parents are also citizens and so the considerations that apply to 
all citizens apply also to them, but being a parent is different to being a public-appointed 
guardian for an orphan.
92
 How exactly it is different is yet to be explored. For now, the 
intuitive contrast between familial and collective upbringing seems enough to establish 
the need for such an exploration. This also accords with what I take the following 
passage of Rawls to suggest. 
It is the distinct purposes and roles of the parts of the social structure and how 
they fit together, that explains there being different principles for distinct kinds of 
subjects. Indeed, it seems natural to suppose that the distinctive character and 
autonomy of the various elements of society requires that, within some sphere, 
they act from their own principles designed to fit their peculiar nature.
93
 
Grappling with Clayton’s parallel case argument points towards an articulation of the 
distinctive character of the parent–child relationship, and a formulation of a conception 
of justice to fit its peculiar nature. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter examined, through the prism of Rawls’s theory of justice, the bearings a 
political conception of justice may have on justice between parents and children. I 
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began with articulating the tension present in Rawls’s account of justice and the family, 
between his inclusion of the family as part of the basic structure and his prescription to 
treat it as no different from associations not included in that structure. Following the 
distinction between the issues of justice of and in the family I argued that the inclusion 
of the family as part of the basic structure is relevant mainly to the former. I then 
examined two potential ways of accounting for justice in the family through a political 
conception of justice.  
The constraints view asserts that justice in the family is addressed through the 
constraints that the political conception of justice imposes on the internal life of 
families. This view draws on Rawls’s own suggestion to treat the family in this respect as 
any other association, but goes further in maintaining that all issues of justice in the 
family are thus addressed. This I found to be problematic as it leaves what justice 
requires of parents largely undetermined and overlooks the relevant dimensions in 
which the family is disanalogous to other associations. The result of the discussion was 
to call for a local conception of family justice to determine what justice requires of 
parents. 
The second way of trying to address justice in the family through political justice 
aims at filling precisely this gap. The mirror view in its various arguments holds that, 
content-wise, family justice should mirror political justice. Although I eventually rejected 
this view, exploring the arguments in its favour helped to set the course for further 
inquiry. The examination of the parallel case argument indicated that before 
formulating a conception of justice we need to articulate the distinctive features of the 
specific context to which it is meant to apply. The school of justice argument pointed 
out one interest from the perspective of citizenship in observing justice in the family, 
namely to cultivate a sense of justice in children. Together with the disanalogies 
between membership in associations and children’s membership in families, this has 
suggested a preliminary case for (some measure of) state enforcement of family justice. 
Yet the rejection of the argument from congruence implied that there might be some 
87 
incompatibility (or even conflict) between the demands of justice stemming from the 
contexts of family and citizenship. 
The following three chapters pursue these matters by developing a contextualist 
account of family justice. Chapter 3 offers a characterization of the parent–child context, 
in view of which a principle of family justice is formulated and defended in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 then returns to examine the different interplays between the demands of 
justice at the levels of family and polity. 
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Chapter 3 
The Parent–Child Relationship 
 
I went through an identity crisis. And our identity is where we come from and who 
we are… My wife and I are trying to break this cycle, trying hardest to break this 
cycle of shattered families. We’re going to make sure that we stick together and 
bring our children up so they know who they are, what they are and where they 
came from.  
(Aboriginal man adopted into a non-Aboriginal family)
1
  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Our critical engagement with the child-centred and political approaches recommends 
developing a contextualist account of justice in the family. Contextualists, according to 
David Miller,  
hold that it is the context of distribution itself that brings one or other principle of 
justice into play... What they have in common... is the idea that when we have to 
decide what justice requires, we do not automatically reach for the same principle 
or set of principles, but instead we interpret the context of decision in a certain 
way, and this tells us which principle to use.
2
  
We saw that the relational context should be taken into account in answering our 
question but also that the relevant context is not strictly political as political justice 
proved inadequate to capture the demands of justice in the parent–child relationship. 
This seems to correspond to Miller’s own contextualist view, which identifies the 
relevant contexts of distribution as the different relationships in which human beings 
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stand to each other, and suggests accordingly that “we can best understand which 
demands of justice someone can make of us by looking first at the particular nature of 
our relationship.”
3
 This first task is pursued in this chapter. 
The child-centred approach has brought forward the parents-as-fiduciaries view.
4
  
The fact that children’s human capacities are not yet developed opens the way for 
adults to assume the task of raising them. Drawing on the contrast with collective 
upbringing, we may also add that the family is a site in which the task of upbringing is 
taken on by specific adults in an intimate context.
5
 However, as I have already 
suggested, for the picture of the parent–child relationship to be complete we need to go 
beyond child-centred considerations. In most if not all societies parenting is usually 
undertaken by individuals voluntarily, and founding a family may even be considered a 
human right.
6
 Moreover, many parents who are not the best fiduciaries available to 
their children are nonetheless allowed to maintain this fiduciary relationship with them. 
Indeed, we found the idea of redistributing children away from their parents, in 
accordance with the children’s best interests, morally troubling. All this suggests that 
adults do have an interest of their own in starting families and establishing parent–child 
relationships and that this is not an interest which can be easily met by other types of 
interpersonal relationships. An account of what makes the parent–child relationship 
distinctively valuable for parents is called for. 
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In response to this theoretical gap it has recently been argued, most notably by 
Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, that the parental fiduciary role also explains the value 
of the family from a parent-centred perspective.   
[Parents] have a non-fiduciary interest in playing this fiduciary role. The role 
enables them to exercise and develop capacities the development and exercise of 
which are for many crucial to their living fully flourishing lives. Through exercising 
these capacities in the specific context of the intimately loving parent–child 
relationship, a parent comes to learn more about herself, she comes to develop as 
a person, and she derives satisfaction that otherwise would be unavailable.
7
 
Here the parent–child fiduciary relationship arises not only from the child’s interest but 
also from the parent’s interest in playing this fiduciary role. The latter interest is meant 
to provide a justification of the family, independent of child-centred or external 
considerations. “In order to provide this good for adults,” Brighouse and Swift maintain, 
“the institution for child rearing needs to be the family, or something that mimics the 
family very closely.”
8
 Thus we are offered a fiduciary-focused model of the parent–child 
relationship from a parent-centred perspective. 
What follows is an argument against this model, but let me first point out those of 
its aspects that I find attractive, especially in Brighouse and Swift’s elaborated version. 
This also serves to explain why I choose to develop my own interpretation of the 
parent–child relationship through a critique of this model. First, the focus is on the 
interest of parents yet the claim is not that it is the only interest that matters; rather, 
that it also matters in determining what is morally required of and permissible for 
parents to do for, to and with their children.
9
 Second, the relevant interest is one 
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parents have in the parent–child relationship itself, not one they have independently of 
it.
10
 So although I share William Galston’s view that parents have an interest in raising 
their children according to their deepest commitments I believe he is wrong to see that 
interest as part of the parents’ expressive liberty.
11
 Instead, I consider this interest to be 
essential for establishing a distinctively valuable interpersonal bond between parents 
and children. This leads to the third element in Brighouse and Swift’s account that I 
endorse, namely “that there is something distinctive about this kind of relationship and 
that for many people nothing will fully substitute.”
12
 So the parent–child relationship is 
not merely an intimate relationship additional to the ones adults have with other 
adults,
13
 nor is the interest in parenting a particular instantiation of the interest in the 
more specific intimate relationships adults have with dependent others.
14
 
From this point, my argument advances a twofold critique of the fiduciary-focused 
model. First, the model pays scant attention to a fundamental aspect of the parent–
child relationship, here termed the element of identity. This refers to a strong sense of 
interconnectedness and continuity between the parent’s and child’s identities that is 
established during childhood by a process of reproducing some of the parent’s 
characteristics in the child. In this respect, the argument finds Brighouse and Swift’s 
characterization of the parent–child relationship to be incomplete, and seeks to 
supplement it. Second, the model wrongly locates the distinctive value of the 
relationship for parents in the fiduciary role they play for their children. In this respect, 
                                                                                                                                                 
what is morally permissible for parents to do whereas parental obligations tell us what is morally required 
of them. But the two dimensions are interrelated. The permissible is conditional on meeting what is 
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the argument rejects the model’s parent-centred account and offers to relocate the 
distinctive value of the relationship in the element of identity.  
To further clarify the latter point, in criticizing the fiduciary-focused model I do not 
deny that the fiduciary role parents play in their children’s lives is of utmost value to 
children, nor that it may also be of value to the parents playing it. But this role, so I 
argue, does not underlie the distinctive value the relationship has for parents – that 
which is normally unavailable through other intimate relationships and which 
distinguishes its quality from them. As regards the element of identity, I maintain that it 
is of value also for children to experience. But again this is not where my main 
disagreement with the proponents of the fiduciary model lies. (As I mention below, they 
seem ready to acknowledge something like the element of identity as being valuable for 
children.) The disagreement is about what is distinctively valuable for parents to 
experience in the parent–child relationship, and may provide a justification of the family 
from a parent-centred perspective.   
The argument is presented as follows: the next section explores the way Brighouse 
and Swift characterize the peculiar nature of the parent–child relationship and sets the 
stage for my argument against the fiduciary-focused model. Section 3 then describes 
three problems arising from that model, which cannot be resolved within its proposed 
framework. Section 4 introduces the element of identity to supplement the account of 
the parent–child relationship and to challenge the view that it is the parental fiduciary 
role that underlies the distinctive value the relationship has for parents. It does so by 
showing that an account which locates the distinctive value of the parent–child 
relationship in its element of identity is not susceptible to the problems raised in the 
preceding section. Section 5 addresses two potential objections to my alternative 
account and Section 6 concludes by pointing out the prospective implications of the 
argument for justice in the family. 
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2. The Brighouse–Swift account 
 
Brighouse and Swift maintain that the intimate relationship between parents and 
children is not merely an additional intimate relationship to the ones adults usually have 
with other adults, but one of a different quality. This is owing to four specific features:               
(I) parents have power over children that is not reciprocated; (II) children do not have 
the power to exit the relationship; (III) the quality of intimacy is different as children 
love their parents in a spontaneous and unconditional way; and (IV) the moral quality is 
different as the parent has fiduciary responsibilities regarding the immediate well-being 
of the child and the development of his physical, cognitive, emotional and moral 
capabilities.
15
  
In fact, it is the fourth feature concerning the parents’ fiduciary role that bears 
most of the weight in Brighouse and Swift’s parent-centred argument. “[P]laying a 
fiduciary role is a key interest,” whereas “the other features of the relationship are 
significant for the importance of that interest,” and it is this interest in facing the 
“challenge of parenting” that grounds the parent–child relationship from a parent-
centred perspective.
16
 This is because the parental fiduciary role enables the 
development and exercise of certain capacities which, for many adults, are crucial to 
their living fully flourishing lives. Before focusing on the fiduciary element, we should 
first question the extent to which the other three features are exhibited throughout the 
childhood period and can be used to characterize the parent–child relationship in 
general. 
Let us start with the first feature of unequal power relations. This refers to the 
vulnerability of children and their complete dependence on their parents for their well-
being. One aspect of this is that parents have power of life or death over their children. 
This is true, but neither does the state leave the exercise of this power to the parents’ 
discretion, and so this aspect is less relevant here. The more important point for 
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Brighouse and Swift seems to be that parents have the power to make their children’s 
lives miserable or enjoyable and, in contrast with adult–adult relationships, this power 
cannot be reciprocated. However, although it may be true that infants and toddlers 
cannot (self-consciously) reciprocate their parents’ power to make them happy or 
unhappy, this is certainly not the case with older children. As many parents and children 
know very well, children, if not appeased, can make their parents’ lives quite 
uncomfortable to say the least, and parents may prefer bowing to their children’s 
wishes for peace’s sake rather than paying the price of fighting with them. This suggests 
that the parent–child relationship, in general, is, to some extent, reciprocal and 
therefore less unequal than what Brighouse and Swift seem to have in mind. 
Children's lack of power to exit the relationship also diminishes after early 
childhood. As far as their physical and cognitive capacities are concerned, children, say, 
older than six can survive outside such a relationship. Surely it is much better for 
children to enjoy a stable and healthy relationship with specific caretakers throughout 
childhood. Nonetheless, the fact that children have no resources whatsoever to exit is 
often a matter of state legislation or social convention rather than human ability.
17
 
Moreover, not having opportunities to exit is, to a large extent, the result of the state 
backing up and enforcing parental authority. Children do not have the means to exit 
because the state does not usually allow them to ‘divorce’ their parents and establish 
relationships with other caretakers or seek alternative living arrangements. Since one of 
Brighouse and Swift’s main aims is to provide a justification for parental authority they 
cannot take the implications of its enforcement by the state as a given.   
The third feature concerning the different quality of intimacy is again most 
prevalent in the early years of childhood, as Brighouse and Swift acknowledge. Yet even 
in early years it might not always be the case that the love one receives from one’s child 
is spontaneous and unconditional. In adoptive families, for example, it is not uncommon 
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for parents to have to work hard to gain the children’s love and trust.
18
 The claim about 
unconditional love is also dubious when we consider the very first stages of the 
biological parent–baby relationship. The love that parents receive from their baby 
seems quite conditional on them proving time after time to be the providers for the 
baby’s needs. 
We should also observe that the picture painted by Brighouse and Swift is of a 
somewhat idealized family. Family life, in general, does exhibit love, affection, pleasure, 
enjoyment and satisfaction – but also anxiety, anger, pain, envy, frustration and 
resentment. This being said, I do not deny the intimacy of the parent–child relationship. 
It is an intimate relationship because it is, to varying degrees, private, close and 
emotional.
19
 It takes place in a somewhat private domain where interactions between 
family members are not easily accessible to outsiders. This usually has a physical 
dimension: the household where the family members reside. Their relationships thus 
become more intense and close and that is one reason why family members are rarely 
emotionally indifferent towards one another. So even in a more realistic picture of 
family life, the parent–child relationship is still one of intimate character. 
The upshot of this discussion is that the Brighouse–Swift account of the parent–
child relationship is mostly relevant, as it stands, to the period of early childhood. If we 
want to go beyond that and characterize the parent–child relationship more generally 
then the picture we are offered is, essentially, one of an intimate fiduciary relationship.  
In what follows I challenge this picture to pave the way for supplementing it with 
another feature, the element of identity, and argue that it is this element, not the 
fiduciary role itself, which grounds the distinctive value the parent–child relationship 
has from a parent-centred perspective. 
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3. Three problems 
 
Let me first explain the nature of my challenge to the fiduciary-focused model. A 
philosophical model of the parent–child relationship is not simply a summary of all 
existing desires and preferences people have with respect to parenting. Surely it should 
not take on board certain attitudes that, although held by some, we find morally 
objectionable. Yet its purpose, at least in part, is to order and explain our widely shared 
pre-theoretical beliefs and attitudes toward the issue in question. This implies that 
those beliefs and attitudes are a legitimate component in formulating such a model. 
Some may eventually be placed in the periphery of the model, others in its core. A few 
might be abandoned altogether as they are found to be inconsistent with others or with 
the model as a whole. But our pre-theoretical beliefs and attitudes also remain relevant 
for assessing the model once it is formulated. We can therefore ask ourselves whether it 
does a good job in ordering and explaining them. The following three points take issue 
with aspects of the fiduciary-focused model and are intended to raise doubts about it, 
demonstrating how the alternative model outlined in this chapter does a better job in 
this respect. 
 
A. The biological connection 
 
The parent-centred justification of the family based on the interest in the parental 
fiduciary role cannot fully account for the significance many parents ascribe to parenting 
their biological children.
20
 This is because a biological connection does not normally 
affect a person’s prospects of realizing that interest, as Brighouse and Swift openly 
concede: 
We have shown why no one who will do an adequately good job of raising a child 
should be prevented from being a parent. But we have not shown that the child 
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they should be allowed to raise should be their own biological child. This is not 
because we believe that there is no weighty interest in raising one’s own biological 
child but because we do not have an argument establishing that there is such an 
interest… Furthermore, the interest we have described can, at least for many, be 
realized in a relationship with a child who is not biologically related to one. So, 
absent an argument that the interest in having a biological connection to the child 
one raises is very powerful indeed, we do not claim that the interest in being a 
parent impugns redistribution at birth.
21
  
The challenge is not just to argue for allowing adults to parent their biological children, 
but to argue this from a parent-centred perspective. Taking just one example, the 
consideration that allowing the state to redistribute children at birth would give it too 
much power,
22
 although true, does not do the work here. Notice, moreover, that there 
are, in fact, two issues to account for, as the interest in parenting one’s own biological 
child may refer either to the interest in having a biological child to parent or to the 
interest in keeping one’s already existing biological child. 
Anca Gheaus provides an argument for the latter interest, thereby supplementing 
the fiduciary-focused model to address the redistribution-at-birth scenario.
23
 She claims 
that for biological parents, the period of pregnancy involves all sorts of burdens, 
especially for mothers, which in turn form an incipient intimate relationship between 
the parents and their future baby. Therefore, redistributing babies away from their 
biological parents would be unfair to the latter, who incurred the costs of pregnancy, 
and would further destroy an already existing intimate relationship. Gheaus’s argument 
is convincing as presenting a case for allowing parents to keep their biological child after 
birth. Yet it does not explain (nor is it meant to) the more basic interest in parenting 
one’s biological child – having a biological child to parent. The argument only provides a 
justification for parenting one’s biological child if one already has a biological child. But 
it leaves unexplained why it is significant for many would-be parents to have biological 
children (even when this involves risks and difficulties), and provides no justification for 
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allowing them this in the first place. If anything, the argument from the costs of 
pregnancy provides parent-centred reasons for trying to avoid pregnancy and opting for 
adoptive over biological parenthood. Gheaus does not argue that pregnancy is an 
intrinsically desirable experience, and while biological parents and their baby already 
have an incipient intimate relationship at the time of birth, adoptive parents can 
presumably ‘catch up’ and establish an intimate relationship with their adopted babies 
later on. Thus, even if the fiduciary-focused model can be supplemented to impugn 
redistribution at birth, it still falls short of accounting for the more basic interest in 
having biological children to parent. 
 
B. Beyond the fiduciary phase 
 
The fiduciary-focused model also struggles to explain the parents’ interest in their adult 
children’s lives. If, as Brighouse and Swift argue, the main interest in parenting has to do 
with developing and exercising certain capacities through the parental fiduciary role, 
why is it that so many parents remain deeply involved in their children’s lives long after 
they ceased exercising those fiduciary-related capacities? Parents are often far from 
indifferent to their adult children’s lives, suggesting that their interest in the relationship 
extends beyond the fiduciary phase. 
Proponents of the model could point out in response that an integral part of the 
parental fiduciary role is to help the child become “an adult who is independent of her 
parents, capable of taking over responsibility for her own judgment and for her own 
welfare.”
24
 This forward-looking dimension may explain some of the parents’ 
involvement in their adult children’s lives. By observing and engaging with their adult 
children parents can obtain feedback on their past performance as fiduciaries and learn 
how they scored in the “challenge of parenting.” While this response concedes that 
parents have an interest in their adult children’s lives, it sees it as derivative of the 
fiduciary-based interest. However, it fails to explain why parents are often interested in 
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the actual way in which their adult children lead their lives. Many parents care not only 
about their children leading independent lives, but also about them adopting specific 
values, beliefs and practices.
25
 Moreover, for many parents the specific path their 
children follow may be much more important than the question of how they came to 
follow it, whether it was autonomously chosen or not. It is hard to see how the interest 
in the adult children’s life plan can be accommodated in this response.  
Yet, the interest of parents in their adult children’s lives is, perhaps, not one they 
have qua parents. If and when parents have such an interest it might be as people who 
share an intimate relationship with their children, which is now closer to the 
relationship that exists between friends.
26
 After all, one does not have to be a person’s 
parent to feel deeply involved in that person’s life; people are also sincerely engaged in 
what happens to their friends. Combining this point with the previous response we 
could construct a somewhat more complex view of the parent–child relationship 
whereby the primary interest adults have in parenting lies in their opportunity to act as 
fiduciaries for children, but as the children become adults and (if and when) the parents 
develop a friendship-like relationship with them, the parents have an interest as friends 
in their adult children’s lives. 
But this modified reply seems implausible in view of the differences between 
friendship and the relationship between parents and their adult children. Perhaps the 
first dissimilarity that comes to mind is that parents and their adult children cannot 
choose one another the way friends can. Since they are already present in each other’s 
lives, they cannot voluntarily enter the relationship the way friends can. Yet this in itself 
is not convincing. The mere fact that parent and adult child already stand in relation to 
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one another does not tell against their ability to voluntarily form a relationship or 
transform a currently existing one. Moreover, it is also true of many if not most 
friendships that they do not develop ex nihilo but build on an already existing 
relation(ship) that the persons have, say, as co-workers or neighbours.  
More important than the parent and adult child being already present in each 
other’s life is that their former parent–young child relationship is, in a way, still present 
and is very difficult, if at all possible, to set aside. As Joseph Kupfer puts it, “[w]e 
outgrow childhood, but not being someone’s child.”
27
 There are two crucial aspects to 
this. The first concerns the unequal standing of parent and child, which often shapes the 
relationship even after the child has become an adult.
28
 According to Laurence Thomas, 
this is why friendships are rarely formed between parents and children. When one party 
“feels entitled to make authoritative assessments of the other’s life or feels that she or 
he is owed deference… self-examination with another is more like having another sit in 
judgment upon one rather than the attainment of self-understanding that it is meant to 
be.”
29
 The second aspect is that parent and child lack the sort of mutual independence 
needed for friendship. “Part of the delight in a complete friendship turns upon the way 
two people discover and grow into each other’s lives,” Kupfer argues, “but parents and 
adult children cannot develop in quite this fresh way because their lives have been 
entwined since the child’s beginning. Neither one can really ‘discover’ an independently 
existing other... they don’t discover each other as beings with independent histories and 
different values to be learned.”
30
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Returning to the interest of parents in their adult children’s lives, we may observe 
that parents are sometimes concerned and engaged not for the sake of their children 
but for their own sake too. Now if a friend considers his own interests when he weighs 
up what we should or shouldn’t do, we see him as less of a friend.
31
 But we do not think 
the same of parents who want their adult children to adhere to certain values, traditions 
and practices not only because it is good for the children, but also – and independently 
from the previous consideration – because they are their own values, traditions and 
practices.
32
 The latter consideration does not usually exist between friends, and when it 
does it seems to undermine the quality of friendship. To be sure, friendships usually 
depend on some characteristics being shared by the parties and so they are likely to 
weaken or even come to an end if those characteristics are no longer shared. Thus, the 
interest of friends in continuing their relationship may imply an interest in continuing 
sharing those characteristics. Yet it would be odd if a friend insisted we should follow his 
own path in the name of our friendship. It would be odd precisely because it 
undermines those two aspects of equal standing and independence that we expect to 
find in friendships but not in the parent–adult child relationship. We may thus conclude 
that neither their fiduciary role nor a friendship-like relationship can explain the parents’ 
interest in their adult children’s lives. 
 
C. Fiduciary-related capacities 
 
The final problem I wish to examine concerns the distinctively high value that 
proponents of the model place on the parents’ fiduciary-related capacities. They state 
that, for many people, the realization of these capacities is “crucial to their living fully 
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flourishing lives,” and that parents’ fiduciary relationship with their children makes “a 
contribution to one’s flourishing of a different kind.”
33
 Yet the model fails to explain why 
realizing these capacities is crucial to human flourishing and how the contribution the 
parent–child relationship makes to one’s flourishing is of a different kind.  
Brighouse and Swift suggest that “through exercising these capacities a parent 
comes to learn more about herself” and “to develop as a person.”
34
 Yet this seems too 
weak to imply that they are crucial to human flourishing. We also learn about ourselves 
and develop as persons through realizing the capacities involved, for example, in writing 
a PhD thesis, yet contending that writing a PhD thesis is crucial to human flourishing is 
to exaggerate the importance of that particular experience. To be sure, realizing one’s 
fiduciary-related capacities may have significance in the context of a culture that 
strongly emphasizes individual self-fulfilment. But we may still doubt whether the 
striking importance ascribed to families across very different cultural contexts could be 
explained in these terms.
35
 
Perhaps Brighouse and Swift need not argue for the crucial importance of the 
parental fiduciary role to human flourishing as it may be sufficient only to show that this 
role contributes differently to one’s flourishing. However, this also becomes 
questionable once we observe that adults can exercise and develop fiduciary-related 
capacities through relationships with others who are not children and with children who 
are not their own. Recall that in Section 2 we discussed the different features that 
characterize, according to Brighouse and Swift, the parent–child relationship and 
distinguished between their relevance in early childhood and the stages that follow. 
With this distinction in mind, we might notice that adults can experience fiduciary 
relationships with non-children which are quite similar to those with older (not yet 
adult) children. Consider, for example, the fiduciary relationship one may develop with 
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elderly people suffering from cognitive or physical dysfunction. It is likely to exhibit 
unequal power relations with unequal (yet some) ability to reciprocate, and quite often 
elderly people would not have the resources or opportunities to exit the relationship. 
Also, the fiduciary relationship might take place in an already intimately loving context, 
such as between elderly parents and their adult children, or contribute to the 
development thereof. It is true that this adult–elderly relationship is not likely to 
generate spontaneous and unconditional love of the sort one may receive from one’s 
very young child. But we already saw that the prevalence of this feature in subsequent 
stages of childhood is also questionable. 
For Brighouse and Swift to maintain “that there is something distinctive” about 
the parent–child relationship “and that for many people nothing will fully substitute,”
36
 
the most promising line of argument seems to draw on the distinction between the 
child’s interests concerning her immediate well-being and those relating to her physical, 
cognitive, moral and emotional development.
37
 They could argue that the distinctive 
value the relationship has for parents relates to the child’s developmental interests and 
the parents’ responsibility to meet them. While intimate adult–elderly relationships may 
involve a fiduciary role in an intimate context, only children open up a fiduciary 
experience that involves caring for the principal’s developmental interests.  
This seems quite plausible as it stands. However, the problem in the argument 
arises once we observe that parents often share their fiduciary responsibilities with 
other non-parent adults,
38
 thereby opening the way for the latter to have the 
experiences Brighouse and Swift talk about with children who are not their own. Non-
parent caretakers such as nannies can have relationships with children which display, 
again especially in the early years, the same four features Brighouse and Swift use to 
characterize the parent–child fiduciary relationship. Children are extremely vulnerable 
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to their nannies’ treatment and cannot reciprocate the power nannies have over them. 
They also cannot exit this sort of relationship on their own. (It is true that parents can 
remove children from their nannies, but the state can also remove children from their 
parents.) Nannies can share the parents’ responsibility for both the immediate well-
being of children and their developmental interests and this is likely to involve, as in the 
parent–child relationship, “coercing the child to act against her will” and “manipulating 
her will so that it accords with her interests.”
39
 Finally, they may also receive love from 
the children in their care that is “spontaneous and unconditional and, in particular, 
outside the rational control” of the children.
40
 Thus, the satisfactions one derives, 
according to Brighouse and Swift, from the parental fiduciary role are also available, 
contrary to their claim, in relationships other than the parent–child one, especially 
between non-parent caretakers and the children in their care.  
To illustrate, the following paragraph from Brighouse and Swift describing those 
satisfactions could easily apply to the relationships nannies may experience with 
children. 
There is the enjoyment of the love (both the child’s for oneself and one’s own for 
the child) and the delight in the observations the child makes about the world: the 
pleasure (and sometimes dismay) of seeing the world from the child’s perspective; 
enjoyment of her satisfaction in her successes, and of being able to console her in 
her disappointments.
41
 
So even if we acknowledge that there is something distinctive in the fiduciary role adults 
play in the lives of children and that this something is particularly valuable for adults to 
experience, we still need to understand how the family type of relationship is different 
from the relationship that people with whom parents share their fiduciary 
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responsibilities may have with children. Otherwise, we would have to regard those 
others as additional or alternative parents to the children.
42
 
 
 
4. The missing piece: Identity 
 
Further to the points raised above, I would now like to introduce the element of identity 
as a fundamental and distinctive feature of the parent–child relationship and explain 
how it resolves these questions. Here the element of identity refers to the process in 
families whereby parents reproduce some of their characteristics in their children and 
thereby establish a powerful sense of interconnectedness and continuity between their 
own identity and their child’s. Through the intimate process of upbringing parents can 
bequeath their cultural, national and religious horizons to their children. Children 
acquire their parents’ language, they are raised according to their parents’ values and 
beliefs, and they follow their parents’ practices. Some of the parents’ more personal 
characteristics also pass on to their children, such as favourite dishes, leisure activities, 
hobbies, body language and outward ‘look’.
43
 The reproduction of those characteristics 
naturally creates a special bond between parents and children, a sense of identity 
interconnectedness. This should not be confused with two narrower contentions: it is 
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not only that parents and children share certain aspects of their identities such as 
religion or culture, or that parents largely shape different facets of their children’s 
identity. Rather, the claim about the sense of parent–child interconnectedness stresses 
that parents and children share certain features of their identities because the parent’s 
identity actually shapes the identity of the child (though it is not the only thing that 
does). 
Through its various facets, this process provides the child with a set of coordinates 
by which to begin orienting herself in a world of meanings. This is crucial to the child’s 
identity as the family incorporates elements of the child’s social and cultural milieu. At 
the same time, it also allows her to develop a sense of uniqueness through her 
connection to particular others. The naming of a child by its parents can be seen as a 
symbolic representation of the bridge the family offers between community and 
individuality. The name denotes the child’s singularity while often drawing on the 
parent’s culture and lineage. 
This process also reshapes the parents’ identity since by reproducing (some of) 
their characteristics in their children they come to view the latter as “part of a wider 
identity [they] have.”
44
 They observe themselves in their children and feel proud of their 
accomplishments and ashamed of their failures. And the fact that a child is a kind of 
continuity of her parent not only constitutes the child’s identity but is usually very 
important for the parent herself. It was Locke who went so far as to claim that the 
strong desire of “continuing themselves in their posterity” is second only to people’s 
desire for self-preservation.
45
 But even if we do not accept this strong claim, the 
observation still stands that families offer both adults and children the experience of a 
powerful sense of interconnectedness and continuity, a feeling that is rarely (if ever) 
provided by other forms of relationship. This in turn may explain why the parent–child 
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relationship makes a distinctive contribution to the flourishing of adults as well as 
children. 
But perhaps we can go deeper than that. To hazard a speculation, we can suggest 
that through the parent–child relationship adults might have some response to what 
Francis Schrag has described as “our consciousness of our own insignificance and 
mortality,” our “sense of solitariness.” We hope that in our intimate relationships “we 
will be able to transcend these limitations of the human condition.”
46
 And while Schrag 
is referring to intimate relationships in general, his claim is much stronger with respect 
to the particular intimate relationship between parents and children, in which personal 
characteristics are most typically reproduced and thus a sense of continuity is 
established.
47
 
Let us be clear regarding what the element of identity is not: it is not about 
children being mere extensions of their parents. In contrast to Charles Fried’s 
suggestion, even though parents generally play a key role in forming their child’s values 
and life plan, the parent–child relationship is not that of an “identity between chooser 
and chosen-for.”
48
 And unlike Aristotle’s analogy, the child does not belong to his 
parents in the same way “the owner regards his tooth or hair.”
49
 Children are separate 
human beings and as such enjoy an independent and intrinsic moral status. Therefore 
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the extent to which parents should be allowed to shape their children’s lives and the 
means they use to do this should be limited. This is also why the process of 
characteristics passing on to children has somewhat unpredictable and non-static results 
as children develop their own personalities.
50
 
Until now I have discussed the element of identity as a distinct feature of the 
parent–child relationship. I have yet to show, however, that it is a fundamental feature 
of the relationship which gives it value in its own right. From a child-centred perspective, 
the importance of this element has occasionally been acknowledged, especially for the 
child’s moral development.
51
 However, its significance from a parent-centred 
perspective is usually played down, sometimes even ignored completely. This is 
reflected in the view that “a good parent should be able to sustain a successful 
relationship without any particular shared interest or values.”
52
 A noteworthy 
concession is Brighouse and Swift’s later view that “without substantial opportunity to 
share himself intimately with his child in ways that reflect his own judgments about 
what is valuable, the parent is deprived of the ability to forge and maintain an intimate 
relationship.”
53
 Yet the element of identity is still considered neither fundamental nor 
intrinsically valuable. It is primarily as a contributor to forging and maintaining the 
intimate nature of the parent–child fiduciary relationship that Brighouse and Swift grant 
its value here. 
I disagree with this view and contend that the element of identity is a fundamental 
feature which underlies the distinctive value the relationship has from a parent-centred 
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perspective. Note that this counterclaim is not concerned with people’s motivation to 
have children and establish families. People want children for different reasons – as an 
expression of love for their partner, to better the world through adopting a 
disadvantaged child, to raise another pair of hands for the farm, and so forth. Neither 
does my counterclaim imply that the process of establishing the element of identity is 
necessarily intentional or self-conscious. This being said, it does take place in families 
and does account for their distinctive value. So, now let us return to my three issues 
with the fiduciary-focused model and show how the suggestion that identity accounts 
for the distinctive value of the parent–child relationship is able to resolve them. 
To recap, the first problem concerned the significance that many attach to 
biological parenthood. It was argued that the interest in playing a fiduciary role cannot 
explain the significance often ascribed to playing this role specifically for one’s biological 
children. But, if we recognize the element of identity as an independent interest then a 
plausible explanation emerges. The biological connection when present serves as an 
initial layer of interconnectedness and continuity between parent and child: for the child 
the parent represents a biological source; for the parent the child represents biological 
continuity.
54
 This is a significant and normally helpful starting point in establishing the 
element of identity between parent and child.
55
 Let me be clear, it is neither strictly 
necessary, as successful cases of adoptive families prove, nor by itself does it determine 
the quality of the relationship, which is what ultimately matters. Yet still, it is conducive 
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to experiencing the distinctive quality of that relationship, i.e. the sense of 
interconnectedness and continuity between parent and child.
56
  
The second problem raised the point that parents often continue to be involved in 
their children’s lives after their fiduciary role is over, and deeply care whether their 
adult children choose to follow their personal core values, beliefs, and practices. Now, if 
we hold that the element of identity is intrinsically valuable to the parent–child 
relationship then the explanation for this seems quite straightforward. When a child is 
raised according to her parent’s values, beliefs and practices the child’s identity 
becomes interwoven with the parent’s identity in a powerful way. So if a child breaks 
away from her parent’s values and practices it affects that parent’s sense of 
interconnectedness and continuity. If the element of identity is valuable in itself it is 
understandable if parents want to influence their adult children’s life plan to ensure that 
this sense of continuity lasts (or, at least, it is understandable why they feel distressed 
when it is threatened).
57
 Claiming that the parents’ interest in their adult children’s life 
plans makes sense does not imply, however, that parents should have authority over 
                                                 
56
 The conjecture offered by Niko Kolodny for why biological parenthood matters fits quite nicely with my 
account of the element of identity and is worth quoting in some length here: “The view of egoistic 
concern (concern for persons who, in normal cases, are identical to oneself)... holds that a person at one 
time has reason for egoistic concern for a person... at another time only if the former is, or has, the same, 
or enough of the same, organism, or relevant organs, as the latter. And an organism, or organ, at one time 
is identical with an organism, or organ, at another time only if, or just when, the life, or functioning, of 
each is a stage of a continuous biological process, governed by the same genetic code. The same is true... 
of the relationship between genetic parent and genetic child. Both relationships consist in continuous 
biological processes, governed by the same genetic code. Needless to say, my relationship to my genetic 
child belongs to a different dimension of importance from my relationship to myself at other times. The 
former is a relationship to a separate and independent person; I do not literally live on through my 
genetic child, or have the sort of authority over him or her that I enjoy over myself. But, as we have just 
seen, there is a natural way to see them as counterparts. Again, both of these relationships consist in 
continuous biological processes, governed by the same genetic code... Perhaps what is reflected by the 
meaning that we attach to our relationships to our genetic children is the incipient sense of a kind of 
incoherence in attaching paramount importance to one’s biological continuity with this person – one’s 
later self – but none at all to one’s biological continuity with this other – one’s genetic child” (“Which 
Relationships Justify Partiality? The Case of Parents and Children,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 38 [2010]: 
37-75, at 70-1). 
57
 Even if it does not last, parents have presumably derived value from it in earlier stages. I am not 
suggesting here that for parents to derive value from the element of identity it has to last as long as they 
live; only that unlike the interest in playing a fiduciary role, the interest in experiencing the element of 
identity extends beyond the period of upbringing. 
111 
their adult children. The fiduciary-focused model is right in framing the issue of parental 
authority within the context of children not yet having developed their human 
capacities to a sufficient level. 
Finally, we come to the problem prompted by the considerable weight that 
proponents of the model give to developing and exercising the parents’ fiduciary-related 
capacities. We asked: If parenting is valued mainly because it allows adults to exercise 
those fiduciary-related capacities, why do people tend to reject the substitute of other 
fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary relationships for the parent–child relationship? Why do 
people who experience obstacles in having children fight to have them through fertility 
treatment, surrogacy and adoption and do not normally accept fiduciary roles for the 
elderly or for the children of others as a substitute for parenting?  
The fiduciary aspect of the parent–child relationship is not the distinctive element 
of that relationship. It is identity: the process whereby adults reproduce some of their 
characteristics in the children they raise and thus establish a powerful sense of 
interconnectedness and continuity with them. Usually this cannot be accomplished 
between adults since their identity has already been shaped. Thus the intimate 
relationship with children offered by the family context is an almost unique platform for 
developing this type of interpersonal bond. In a similar vein, the element of identity also 
explains why people such as nannies and other quasi-fiduciary figures with whom 
parents share their fiduciary role are not regarded as family even when they have an 
intimate relationship with the children. This is because nannies and similar others do not 
usually establish a sense of continuity with the children in their care through 
reproducing their own characteristics in them. While these relationships allow adults to 
develop and exercise fiduciary-related capacities they do not involve the element of 
identity. And that is what seems to distinguish them from the parent–child relationship. 
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5. Potential objections 
 
Before concluding I wish to preempt two potential objections to the alternative account 
suggested here. The first is that it is wrong in stressing the parents’ interest since this 
may justify parents treating their children as a mere means to an end rather than an end 
in themselves. According to this objection, parenting should be guided by the child’s 
interest and the alternative account obscures the obligations of parents in this regard. 
Now if this is meant to imply that the alternative account goes against the child’s 
interest then the objection is simply wrong since, as has already been stated, 
experiencing the element of identity is also in the interest of the child. If, alternatively, 
the objection is that the alternative account does not exclusively follow the child’s 
interest and allows some departure from the child’s best interest then, first, it is worth 
noting that it should not be specifically directed at the proposed alternative account, 
but at all accounts that suggest that the parents’ interest – regarding intimacy, fiduciary 
relations or identity – have some justificatory role with respect to parental authority. 
Therefore my model is no worse than the fiduciary-focused model which also goes 
beyond the child’s interest and, in accommodating the parents’ interest, to some extent 
tolerates compromising the child’s best interest. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how 
anyone considering the initial decision to bring a child into existence could hope to 
avoid this objection. One’s choice to have a child must be grounded, it seems, in an 
interest or consideration outside the child for the obvious reason that at that stage 
there is still no child to whom any interests or considerations may be attached. My main 
point, however, is that adopting a strictly child-centred perspective does not resolve the 
issue but represents it, only this time from the parents’ standpoint. A view of parents as 
a mere means to their children’s ends is also unacceptable and therefore even child-
centred accounts of upbringing usually hold that uninterested parties should not be 
forced into parenting.
58
 Adults’ interests in parenting do count, and this leaves us with 
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the challenge of identifying the interests of children and parents that justify the familial 
framework for raising children. It is in response to this challenge that I argue that the 
fiduciary-focused model overlooks the interest in an interpersonal bond which includes 
the element of identity; an interest that underlies the distinctive value of the parent–
child relationship from a parent-centred perspective. 
The second objection takes up the previous reply and questions whether the 
element of identity really does make the parent–child relationship different from other 
interpersonal relationships. After all, people share aspects of their identity with non-kin 
others such as compatriots and members of their cultural or religious group. Identity-
based relationships can also be found in clubs, workplaces and professional associations. 
How then can I cogently claim that the parent–child relationship is distinctive due to the 
element of identity? To understand how, recall the description of the element of 
identity. In the beginning of this section we suggested that this element refers to a 
process in which some of the parents’ characteristics are reproduced in their children 
and it is the fact that personal characteristics are also reproduced and not just the 
collective features of a particular group that makes the difference here. This difference 
arises because families are the site of intimate, to some extent private upbringing as 
opposed to more collective forms of upbringing. Thus in families people share their lives 
– not just this or that specific aspect of their lives – with particular others and form 
attachments not usually established in other interpersonal relationships.  
Some may suggest that if reproducing personal characteristics marks the 
uniqueness of the parent–child relationship there would be no harm in limiting parental 
conduct so that parents can only transmit their peculiar characteristics to children but 
have no say in regard to the more collective features to be transmitted.
59
 There is some 
basis for this argument as parents sometimes let others transmit certain values, beliefs 
and practices to their children without feeling particular loss. But two qualifications are 
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needed. As a rule no clear-cut distinction can be made between the collectively-shared 
and the more peculiar features of a person’s identity. Some personal characteristics are 
built on collective features such that without the latter the former would make no sense 
(or at least a very different sense from the original). Examples are special favourite 
dishes which are served on public festivals; certain interpretations of commonly-held 
values and beliefs; the precise ways of performing rituals and practices and the chosen 
places for holding them (this church, that synagogue). So, if we want to allow parents to 
bequeath (some of) their personal characteristics to their children we must also allow 
them to provide the relevant more general foundations for doing this. Secondly, some 
collectively-shared features may be so constitutive of a parent’s identity that no sense 
of interconnectedness and continuity could be established unless these were also 
shared with the child. Therefore, even if some personal characteristics pass on, the fact 
that more constitutive features are not shared may overshadow the relationship and 
might even bring it to an end. Although this depends on the specific identity structure of 
individuals, we should acknowledge that in some cases a successful parent–child 
relationship cannot be sustained without sharing particular beliefs, values or practices 
that are constitutive of the parent’s identity. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The fiduciary-focused model tries to account for “the distinctive and very important 
goods for which the family is indispensable.”
60
 I have argued that it misses out one such 
good for parents, namely the element of identity. This is a fundamental aspect of the 
parenting experience, and is responsible for its distinctive value. I have shown that by 
shifting the centre of gravity from the element of identity and placing it on fiduciary 
responsibility, the model takes us too far from our understanding of the parent–child 
relationship. It cannot maintain the biological dimension to be somewhat significant, it 
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overlooks the parents’ interest in their adult children’s lives, and most importantly it 
fails to explain how the relationship is essentially different from other fiduciary 
relationships. In making my argument and relocating the uniqueness of the parent–child 
relationship in the element of identity I do not deny its fiduciary dimension or intimate 
nature. What I have done is to argue that the element of identity is what makes it 
valuable in a unique way compared to other fiduciary intimate relationships. 
The implications of the argument for what justice requires of parents will become 
evident in the next chapter. But to conclude my discussion of Brighouse and Swift let me 
locate the prospective bearings that my disagreement with them has on what is morally 
permissible for parents to do with respect to their children. Brighouse and Swift 
maintain that their fiduciary-focused model justifies parental rights that are 
fundamental (i.e. justified by the benefit they bring to the right-holder rather than to 
others), limited in scope, and conditional on meeting the children’s interests to some 
threshold.
61
 Now, although the account advanced in this chapter regarding the value of 
the parent–child relationship substantially differs from the fiduciary-focused model, this 
does not necessarily mean that its translation to parental rights would differ in structure 
as it may also justify fundamental, limited and conditional rights. What I have disputed is 
the contention that a good parent should be able to establish and sustain a relationship 
with his child without relying on any particular set of values, beliefs and practices. My 
argument suggests the reverse: the fact that a parent transmits his own moral and 
cultural horizons along with more idiosyncratic features to his child is what makes the 
parent–child relationship distinctive from other adult–child relationships. As a result, 
parental rights derived from my account are likely to have a wider scope than those 
derived from Brighouse and Swift’s, so that the parents’ own values, beliefs and 
practices are privileged not only in fact but also in principle. However, this does not 
mean that parents can do whatever they want to their children, and the account offered 
here should not be taken as a charter for parents’ all-encompassing or unconditional 
rights over them. 
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Chapter 4 
A Principle of Family Justice 
 
To undertake this responsibility – to bestow a life which may be either a curse or a 
blessing – unless the being to whom it is to be bestowed will have at least the 
ordinary chances of a desirable existence, is a crime against that being. 
(John Stuart Mill)
1
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The contextualist approach we are here adopting tells us first to interpret the context of 
distribution and then, in light of that interpretation, to determine what principle of 
justice is appropriate in that context.
2
 The previous chapter pursued the first phase of 
this approach, and interpreted the parent–child relationship as an intimate form of 
upbringing which features the element of identity, a strong sense of interconnectedness 
and continuity between the identities of carer and child. This chapter asks what justice 
requires in this specific context; the challenge, as Miller puts it, is to show “why a certain 
mode of social relationship makes the corresponding principle of justice the appropriate 
one to use.”
3
 
A good place to start is the concept of upbringing. We may consider it as the 
process of providing children with what they need. Jeffrey Blustein suggests that those 
responsible for children’s upbringing must conform to the norms or standards that are 
laid down by needs-statements of the form ‘a child needs x’ and points out that these 
statements are in many respects quite different from those concerning adults.
4
 One 
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such difference is that children have both immediate needs as children, and 
developmental needs as future adults. More generally, when we say that someone – a 
child, in our case – needs X we mean that it is necessary for that person to have X if he 
or she is not to be harmed.
5
 
Thinking about upbringing in terms of meeting children’s needs, points towards a 
sufficiency principle of justice. Such a principle would specify what to distribute to 
children and up to what level to avoid them being harmed. The intuitive appeal of the 
idea of sufficiency in this context can be observed through considering a priority view 
alternative of the form: Justice requires parents to improve their children’s position the 
best they can.
6
 In some cases meeting this principle would entail advancing the child’s 
position above and beyond meeting her needs, and thus would exceed the context of 
upbringing. Think of a child of a Bill Gates-like parent. It seems absurd to claim that the 
child would have a claim of justice against her parent if the latter didn’t improve the 
former’s position the best he could. Putting it differently, it does not seem plausible to 
contend that it is an injustice if the children of the super-rich turn out to be only mildly 
rich. The same consideration also holds against a strict equality principle between 
parent and child. Yet this leaves us with a wide range of sufficientarian candidates for 
the principle we seek, and is still far from being a conclusive defence of sufficiency. 
In this chapter I put forward and defend the following sufficiency principle for the 
context of the parent–child relationship: Justice requires parents to provide their 
children with the conditions to achieve a set of functionings up to the level which allows 
them to lead a decent life in terms of the parents’ social and cultural context. In Section 
2 I introduce the idea of ‘functioning’ and suggest a list of categories of functionings on 
which we should focus in the context of the parent–child relationship. Section 3 argues 
why ‘conditions for functioning’ is the appropriate metric of justice in this context. 
Sections 4 and 5 defend the threshold level of ‘allowing a decent life in terms of the 
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parents’ context’ as the one in which the demands of family justice are fully met. In 
Section 6 I consider and reject three main alternatives to the ‘conditions for functioning’ 
metric. Section 7 concludes the chapter. 
 
 
2. Children’s functionings: The focus of family justice 
 
What parents owe their children as a matter of justice is best understood, so I argue, in 
terms of functionings. This is a key term for the capability approach developed most 
prominently by Amartya Sen and (later) by Martha Nussbaum to offer a metric for 
interpersonal comparisons and, more specifically, justice judgments.
7
 Functionings are 
taken to be “parts of the state of a person – in particular the various things that he or 
she manages to do or be in leading a life.”
8
 In other words, a functioning of a person is a 
certain mode of human ‘doing’ or ‘being.’ Now the emphasis of the capability approach, 
as its name tells us, is not on the achieved functionings of the person but on her 
capability of achieving different sets of functionings. The motivation behind the shift 
from achieved functionings to capabilities of achieving functionings is to allow the 
person the freedom to choose her own way of life. The person as an autonomous agent 
should be free to choose which functionings she wants to achieve and to what degree 
                                                 
7
 The literature on the capability approach is voluminous. See, most notably, Amartya Sen, “Equality of 
What?” in S. M. McMurrin (ed.), The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, vol. 1 (Salt Lake City: University of 
Utah Press, 1980); “Rights and Capabilities,” in his Resources, Values and Development (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1984); “Well-Being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984,” Journal of 
Philosophy 82 (1985): 169-221; “Justice: Means versus Freedoms,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 19 
(1990): 111-21; Inequality Reexamined (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); Martha C. Nussbaum, 
Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000); Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2006); Nussbaum and Sen (eds.), The Quality of Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); 
and, most recently, Sen, The Idea of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), Part 3, and 
Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2011). 
8
 Amartya Sen, “Capability and Well-Being,” in Nussbaum and Sen, The Quality of Life, 31. For an 
important distinction between broad and narrow understandings of functionings in Sen’s writings, see    
G. A. Cohen, “Equality of What? On Welfare, Goods, and Capabilities,” in Nussbaum and Sen, The Quality 
of Life, 21-3. In what follows I always assume the broad understanding that includes not only the person’s 
actions but also her states of being. 
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she wants to develop them, and so justice ought to be concerned with her capability of 
achieving different sets of functionings rather than with her actual achievement of a 
particular set. In what follows I will argue that, with respect to children, an emphasis on 
capabilities is misplaced and we should instead focus on achieved functionings. But first 
let us try to single out the functionings most relevant to the context of the parent–child 
relationship. 
Our starting point is Martha Nussbaum’s list of “central human functional 
capabilities,” which was reviewed and extended through qualitative empirical research 
by Jonathan Wolff and Avner de-Shalit.
9
 We should first note that there is some 
difference between Nussbaum’s project and that of Wolff and de-Shalit in terms of the 
supposed purpose of the list. Nussbaum is interested in forming a list of human 
capabilities that should be, as a matter of justice, the object of universal concern, 
whereas Wolff and de-Shalit use the list to specify different components of advantage 
but avoid taking a stand on whether and to what extent the achievement or loss of 
these are a matter of justice.
10
 My project does not accord with either of these as it is 
concerned with the matter of justice in the specific context of the parent–child 
relationship. Nonetheless I do not regard this as an obstacle for using the list as a rich 
source for identifying relevant categories of human functioning.  
Nussbaum’s original list included ten categories to which, in view of their empirical 
findings, Wolff and de-Shalit added four. As Nussbaum’s list, albeit universal in scope, 
was formed with special attention to developing countries (and more specifically to the 
political and social context of India), and as Wolff and de-Shalit’s research was 
conducted in the UK and Israel – both developed yet very different countries – the 
extended list does enjoy some cross-cultural credibility. But which categories are the 
relevant ones to the parent–child context? While every category may be important in 
one stage or another of a person’s life, here we wish to identify those relevant to our 
                                                 
9
 For Nussbaum’s list, see her Women and Human Development, 78-80. For Wolff and de-Shalit’s findings, 
see their Disadvantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), especially at 36-62, 103-7.  
10
 See Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, 4-11; Wolff and de-Shalit, Disadvantage, 194n. 
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specific context. When doing this, we need to ensure that the chosen categories satisfy 
the following conditions: (I) they are relevant to the period of childhood; (II) they are 
relevant to the sphere of the family, i.e. it is reasonable to hold parents responsible for 
their children’s functioning in those categories;
11
 (III) they can accommodate a wide 
social and cultural diversity;
12
 and (IV) they are of such importance as to generate claims 
of justice.
13
 Bearing these four conditions in mind I wish to suggest that justice in the 
family is concerned with the following categories of functioning.
14
 
(I) Life. Not die prematurely, or before one’s life is so reduced as to be not worth 
living.  
(II) Bodily health. Have good health, including reproductive health; be adequately 
nourished; have adequate shelter. 
(III) Bodily integrity. Have one’s bodily boundaries treated as sovereign, i.e. be secure 
against assault, including sexual assault and abuse, and domestic violence. 
(IV) Sense, imagination and thought. Use the senses, imagine, think and reason – and 
do these things in a way informed and cultivated by an adequate education. Use 
imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and producing self-
expressive works and events. Have pleasurable experiences and avoid non-
necessary pain.  
(V) Emotions. Have attachments to things and people outside ourselves; love those 
who love and care for us, grieve at their absence; in general, love, grieve, 
experience longing, gratitude and justified anger. Not having one’s emotional 
                                                 
11
 This does not necessarily imply exclusive responsibility. In the following section I explain what the 
parental responsibility amounts to.  
12
 This condition is important in view of our characterization of the family context as an intimate form of 
upbringing in which the element of identity is established. I elaborate on this point in Section 4 below. 
13
 This can be thought of as a condition of urgency. On the relation between justice and urgency, see T. M. 
Scanlon, “Preference and Urgency,” Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975): 655-69. Another way of thinking 
about this condition is through the aforementioned notions of need and the avoidance of harm, in which 
children’s functionings are not a matter of mere advantage or benefit but of necessity. 
14
 The phrasing is borrowed from Nussbaum’s original list and adjusted as explained in the text that 
follows.  
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development blighted by overwhelming fear and anxiety, or by traumatic events 
of abuse and neglect.  
(VI) Affiliation. (i) Live with and toward others, recognize and show concern for other 
human beings, engage in various forms of social interaction; have the capability 
for both justice and friendship. (ii) Have the bases of self-respect and non-
humiliation; be treated as a dignified being. 
(VII) Play. Laugh, play and enjoy recreational activities. 
Some further explanatory and justificatory remarks are now in order. First, the 
purpose of the suggested list is more illustrative than argumentative. I do not pretend to 
make a conclusive case for the listed categories and specific functionings, but aim 
merely to make more concrete the discussion of the proposed principle of justice 
through suggesting a set of functionings to which the principle may plausibly refer.  
Second, for reasons that will be discussed in the following section, the terminology 
of the list is one of functionings rather than of capabilities. Thus, for example, what 
matters from the point of view of family justice is that children are adequately 
nourished and have adequate shelter; not merely that they are able to be adequately 
nourished and can be adequately sheltered.  
Third, seven of the extended list’s entries are omitted here,
15
 as well as some of 
the elaborating notes within the included categories. They are excluded because they do 
not satisfy one or more of the four conditions stated above. Thus, control over one’s 
environment – in terms of Nussbaum’s political and economic conception – is only of 
limited relevance to children;
16
 understanding the law is not something that parents can 
always be held responsible for (as in cases of immigrants who are not familiar with the 
local law themselves); and practical reason seems to be too embedded in a specific 
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 These are practical reason; relatedness to other species; control over one’s environment; doing good to 
others; living in a law-abiding fashion; understanding the law; understanding and speaking the local 
language.  
16
 To be sure, children’s upbringing needs to allow them to have this capability as adults and this involves 
their achieving during childhood a set of relevant functionings, mostly related to the categories of sense, 
imagination and thought and affiliation. But control over one’s environment is not itself a capability (and 
surely not an achieved functioning) that they should (or even, in early childhood, can) have as children. 
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liberal tradition.
17
 Other categories are omitted because they do not seem to be of such 
importance as to generate a justice requirement of parents. This, I believe, is the case of 
the relatedness to other species and the doing good to others functionings. 
Fourth, those omissions might create an impression of arbitrariness in forming the 
current list. How, the reader may ask, is the functioning of relatedness to other species 
less crucial than play? Notice, however, that this list corresponds quite well with a 
shorter list of six “most important” or “high-weight” functionings that emerged from 
Wolff and de-Shalit’s research.
18
 Five categories of functionings appear in both lists. The 
only entry appearing in Wolff and de-Shalit’s shortlist but not included here is control 
over one’s environment which, as already mentioned, does not seem to have much 
relevance to the phase of childhood (at least in its earlier stages). The two categories 
that are included here but were not shortlisted in the research, namely emotions and 
play, are ones that are specifically important in the context of upbringing (both as 
immediate and developmental needs of children) but may be regarded as less important 
in other contexts such as citizenship.
19
 I think that the considerable convergence 
between my suggested list and Wolff and de-Shalit’s shortlist, and the fact that the 
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 In Nussbaum’s account, this category means to be able “to form a conception of the good and to 
engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s life” (Women and Human Development, 79; 
emphasis added). Referring to their interviewees’ responses to this category, Wolff and de-Shalit write: 
“Here, more than elsewhere, the suspicion of the philosophers’ intellectualist bias raised its head. Some 
interviewees were bemused about how this could be considered an important functioning when so few 
people appear able to achieve it. Another pointed out that what seems to be at stake here is an idea of 
self-determination, yet that need not take the form of second order critical reflection” (Disadvantage,   
53-4). 
18
 The shortlisted categories of functionings were life; bodily health; bodily integrity; sense, imagination 
and thought; affiliation; control over one’s environment.  
19
 I initially thought that play could be regarded as part of sense, imagination and thought. But after 
further reflection on how a child’s life would look without the functioning of play I am now inclined to list 
play as a discrete category. Consider, for example, the description of John Stuart Mill’s upbringing in his 
Autobiography (London: Penguin, 1989), especially Chapter 1; and Nussbaum’s description of the 
childhood experience of girls in some cultures in Women and Human Development, 90-1.  
A deeper relation between play and childhood is offered in Tamar Schapiro’s Kantian account of 
childhood: “By engaging in play children more or less deliberately ‘try on’ selves to be and worlds to be in. 
This is because the only way a child can ‘have’ a self is by trying it on… [Thus] play serves an essential 
function in children’s lives which it doesn’t serve in the lives of either animals or adults. Play is children’s 
form of work, for their job is to become themselves” (“What Is a Child?” Ethics 109 [1999]: 715-38, at 
732). 
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deviations from it are explained by the specific context to which my suggested list is 
meant to apply, gives it further credibility and reduces the sense of arbitrariness that 
might initially arise.  
Lastly, I should make clear that I do not regard this list as exhaustive. While 
regarding the functionings under those categories to be the subject matter of justice 
between parents and children I do not wish to rule out the possibility that other 
categories might be found relevant. However I consider it to be a merit of the list that it 
is relatively short and concise. No doubt there are many other functionings that, 
although advantageous, do not appear on the list (e.g. knowing how to swim or cycle, 
commanding a foreign language). But before extending the list by adding (some of) 
them we should make sure they satisfy all the four conditions specified above. 
Before turning to discuss the actual demands of family justice with regard to those 
functionings it is worth following Wolff and de-Shalit one step further in emphasizing 
that the listed functionings are meant to be secure functionings. An achieved 
functioning becomes insecure when there is “a threat to the continuous enjoyment of 
the functioning.”
20
 What matters is not only that certain functionings are being achieved 
and sustained but also that they are not being unduly exposed to threats. Thus, a child 
with adequate shelter can still have a claim of justice against her parent who seriously 
threatens to throw her out of the house. This is in part because living under such a 
threat may reduce her emotions functioning by undermining her attachments to the 
people around her. But the claim of justice is first and foremost due to the direct effect 
of the threat on her functioning of having shelter (as part of the wider category of bodily 
health), that is, by dint of it not being secure. For simplicity I make use of the notion of 
functioning but it is important to keep in mind that I am, in fact, referring to secure 
functioning. 
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 Wolff and de-Shalit, Disadvantage, 68. See also their third chapter for the analysis of risk which leads 
them to the concept of secure functioning.  
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3. Conditions for functioning: The metric of family justice 
 
In the previous section I identified seven categories of functionings as being most 
relevant from the point of view of family justice. But what does this imply? What does 
justice actually require of parents with respect to those functionings? It is to this 
question I now turn. The capability approach, as originally developed by Sen, puts a 
great deal of emphasis on the ability of a person to achieve certain valuable functionings 
and is less concerned with their actual achievement. Its primary focus is on the person’s 
opportunities
21
 or freedoms to function and so it does not regard as problematic a 
person choosing not to achieve or sustain this or that functioning. But this focus on 
opportunities and choice instead of achieved functionings seems inadequate when 
dealing with children. This will become clear by addressing the two types of needs 
children have: immediate and developmental. 
With respect to children’s immediate needs the notion of opportunity or freedom 
seems entirely misplaced. As Colin Macleod puts it, we “should not focus on whether 
children can choose to have a secure and loving family but on whether children have a 
secure and loving family,” and similarly, “what matters for children is not the 
opportunity to achieve health or being able to have emotional attachments but being 
healthy and having emotional attachments.”
22
 In fact it is not at all clear that ‘providing 
an opportunity to achieve a functioning’ can have any substantive meaning when it 
comes to children. Take, for example, ‘opportunity to achieve health’ which may be 
interpreted as including one or more of the following directives: 
                                                 
21
 As Sen makes clear, capabilities are something like real or substantive opportunities and therefore 
should not be understood in more restricted terms as availability of some particular means or non-
applicability of some specific barriers or constraints (Inequality Reexamined, 7). Richard Arneson similarly 
defines opportunity as “a chance of getting the good if one seeks it,” in his “Equality and Equal 
Opportunity for Welfare,” in Louis P. Pojman and Robert Westmoreland (eds.), Equality: Selected Readings 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 233. For simplicity, in the text I keep to the notion of 
opportunity; but see note 27 below for further comment on these distinctions.  
22
 Colin M. Macleod, “Primary Goods, Capabilities, and Children,” in Harry Brighouse and Ingrid Robeyns 
(eds.), Measuring Justice: Primary Goods and Capabilities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 
185. 
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- A parent ought to take his child to see the doctor if the child wants to go. 
- A parent ought to buy a necessary medication for his child if the child asks him to.  
- A parent ought to provide adequate nutrition for his child unless the child favours 
an unhealthy diet. 
- A parent ought to provide warm clothing for his child unless the child prefers going 
naked. 
But the first clause in each of these sentences seems unconditionally valid. These are 
situations in which – to follow Cohen’s critique of Sen – “what matters most is the level 
of functioning (for which certain goods need to be provided) rather than having a 
capability that can be exercised or not.”
23
 So although “babies can sometimes be 
amazingly cogent, choosy and insistent,”
24
 and surely older children can be much more 
so, this does not seem to justify shifting all the way from ‘achieved functioning’ to 
‘opportunity for functioning’.
25
 
We now turn to consider children’s developmental needs. Even if we agree with 
Sen that with regard to adults their capabilities matter more to justice than achieved 
functionings, developing those capabilities would still require them to actually practise 
the functionings throughout childhood. As Nussbaum recognizes, 
exercising a function in childhood is frequently necessary to produce a mature 
adult capability. Thus it seems perfectly legitimate to require primary and 
secondary education, given the role this plays in all the later choices of an adult 
life. Similarly it seems legitimate to insist on health, emotional well-being, bodily 
integrity and dignity of children in a way that does not take their choices into 
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 Cohen, “Equality of What?” 20. On this point, see also the discussion in Richard J. Arneson, 
“Perfectionism and Politics,” Ethics 111 (2000): 37-63, at 59-63. 
24
 Sen, “Capability and Well-Being,” 44. 
25
 In an earlier paper, Sen seems to share this view (at least with respect to young children). “When the 
requirement of careful assessment [of aims, objectives, allegiances, etc.] cannot be fulfilled (e.g., in the 
case of young children, or with persons mentally ill in ways that rule out such assessment), the agency 
aspect will be, obviously less important… This would not, of course, in any way compromise the 
importance of their well-being aspect. Indeed in the absence of the relevance of their agency aspect, it is 
their well-being achievement that would uniquely command attention” (“Well-Being, Agency and 
Freedom,” 204; emphasis in original). 
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account… Again: functioning in childhood is necessary for capability in 
adulthood.
26
 
Thus, focusing on the developmental needs of children as future adults also indicates 
that children’s actual achievement of functionings matters, not merely their having 
opportunities for functionings. 
These considerations suggest that simply providing children with functioning 
opportunities does not exhaust the demands of family justice. But neither should we 
rush to conclude that what justice requires of parents is that their children achieve 
certain functionings. This would be excessive; after all, it is the child’s functioning, and 
only the child may achieve it. Even if parents provide their children with food for 
adequate nutrition the child might still refuse to eat it. Despite being offered a secure 
shelter a child might keep running away from home. A child can be asked to play but still 
be withdrawn and emotionally remote. But in these situations and others like them, 
parents are required to take action and they are required to do so as a matter of justice. 
It is not enough to provide an opportunity for functioning, so parents need to orient 
themselves towards their children’s actual achievement of functionings and actively 
help their children when they face obstacles to that attainment.  
I therefore think what justice requires of parents is best understood in terms of 
conditions for functioning. This seems to indicate more accurately the space in which the 
demands of family justice are located, as parents are required to do more than provide 
their children with opportunities for functionings and to be engaged with their actual 
achievement, but are not to be held responsible for the achievement itself.
27
 Some of 
these conditions are nicely captured by Macleod’s idea of “various forms of creative 
stimulation of distinctive human faculties,” exposing the children to “circumstances in 
which they can experience and give expression to their faculties and face challenges 
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 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, 90. 
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 In a very basic sense, ‘opportunities,’ ‘capabilities’ and ‘conditions for functioning’ are all concerned 
with making a certain ‘doing’ or ‘being’ possible for A, rather than with A’s actually achieving it. But they 
signify different degrees of possibility, becoming more and more oriented towards A’s actual 
achievement. My claim is that, in the context of upbringing, the capabilities metric is still insufficiently 
oriented towards actual achievement due to its agential focus.  
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involved in using these faculties.”
28
 With some children this would be all that it takes for 
them to achieve functionings. However with others it would also require proactive 
encouragement, guidance and support. I take the conditions for functioning to comprise 
all these dimensions. What justice requires of parents, then, is that they provide their 
children with the conditions for achieving the above-listed functionings. In the following 
section I tackle the issue of the level of achieved functionings up to which parents are 
required to provide conditions for. 
 
 
4. A threshold of achieved functionings: The purview of family justice 
 
I now wish to defend a certain threshold of achieved functionings up to which parents 
are required to provide conditions for their children. The threshold is meant to mark the 
purview of family justice, that is, the reach of children’s claims of justice from their 
parents. To be explicit, I make a strong claim with regards to the threshold: not only that 
below the threshold the demands of family justice are yet to be met, but also that it 
indicates the point at which they are fully met.
29
 
Nussbaum’s theory offers surprisingly little help in attempting to determine a 
threshold. She claims that the threshold is the level enabling a person to live in a way 
“truly human, that is, worthy of a human being,”
30
 and believes we could reach a cross-
cultural consensus on what a “truly human” life requires.
31
 But what “truly human” 
actually means is far from clear and whether it enjoys a cross-cultural consensus is even 
less so. In some cultures chastity would be included under this heading; others would 
emphasize critical reflection; still others would single out religious observance, and so 
on. For this reason I wish to draw on a suggestion made by David Miller and argue that 
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 Macleod, “Primary Goods, Capabilities, and Children,” 187. 
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 Cf. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, 12, 75, where she remains agnostic about what 
justice requires above her proposed threshold. 
30
 Ibid., 73. 
31
 Ibid., 74. 
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the threshold is the level of achieved functionings which allows the child to lead a decent 
life in terms of the parents’ social and cultural context.
32
 
According to this formula, the social and cultural context of the child’s parents 
serves to determine both the specific content of each category of functionings and the 
standards of achievement that constitute decent life. Examples of the former would 
include different religions requiring involvement in specific practices for their followers 
to become affiliated; thus, a Christian context would probably involve baptism and, 
perhaps, going to church on Sundays, whereas a Jewish context would often require 
circumcising the male child and holding a bar-mitzvah ceremony at the age of thirteen. 
Adequate nourishment would take different forms under various dietary restrictions, 
such as halal, kosher or vegan. Adequate shelter would be very different for Bedouins 
and New Yorkers. In some societies the functioning of imagination and thought would 
be defined mainly in terms of mastering holy scriptures; in others, in terms of scientific 
training or artistic skills.  
But even when the functionings are understood in roughly the same way, the 
standards constituting decent life may vary across social and cultural contexts. Taking 
just one example, even if family gatherings are central to the understanding of 
affiliation, in two different social contexts the extent of achieved affiliation that is 
required for decent life may vastly differ; in one context, gathering once a year to 
celebrate a specific holiday together may be the standard, while in the other meeting 
less often than every weekend would be considered as not having enough affiliation. So 
the social and cultural context in which the upbringing of the child is taking place has a 
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 Cf. Miller, Principles of Social Justice, 27, 206-13. There are some important differences between 
Miller’s suggestion and the way in which I state the threshold here. First, Miller does not specifically refer 
to children and families but to the wider context of (political) community. Second, like Sen’s his focus is on 
capabilities rather than achieved functionings. Third, he suggests we understand what constitutes decent 
life in terms of the person’s community while I argue that it is more specifically by way of the social and 
cultural context of the child’s parents. My argument for this threshold is also different from his and builds 
on my earlier characterization of the parent–child context. 
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crucial role in determining the actual content in each category of functionings, as well as 
the threshold of achieved functionings that is necessary for decent life.
33
  
Objections may be raised with respect to the specific threshold level or to the idea 
of a threshold more generally. I defend the threshold against the former in this section, 
and against the latter in the section that follows. My refutation of the objections holding 
the threshold level to be either too high or too low will be primarily based on how the 
parent–child relationship was characterized in the previous chapter.  
 
A. The objection from conscience 
 
The first objection holds that the threshold may be too demanding of parents, 
depending on their values and beliefs. If we insist on the threshold of decent life 
prospects, circumstances might be such that meeting the threshold would conflict with 
the parents’ cultural context and require them to act against their conscience. In other 
words, it might be the case that there is no available way for parents to meet the 
threshold while remaining faithful to their values and beliefs. An example often given in 
this context is the rejection of blood transfusions by Jehovah’s Witnesses. In a case 
where a Jehovah’s Witness child is in need of a blood transfusion for sustaining the 
functionings of life and bodily health, meeting this need stands in conflict with her 
parents’ practice.
34
 Here, requiring parents to provide the conditions for these 
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 Like Will Kymlicka’s understanding of “societal cultures” I take the social and cultural context to provide 
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A Theory of Diversity and Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 77-85.  
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 Jehovah’s Witnesses argue that blood transfusions are not as necessary as is generally assumed since 
they may involve considerable risks and effective alternatives are available; see The Watchtower, “How 
Can Blood Save your Life?” (www.watchtower.org/e/hb/index.htm?article=article_00.htm). It is not my 
intention here to take issue with this argument but to address a possible case where blood transfusion is 
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functionings would thus go against their religion and show disrespect to their values and 
beliefs.  
The problem with this objection is that it neglects the fundamental element of 
upbringing in the parent–child relationship. While it is legitimate for the upbringing to 
take shape according to the parents’ values, beliefs and practices, and thus to establish 
the element of identity between parents and child, this is only because the parents have 
taken the task of bringing up the child upon themselves in the first place. If they are not 
willing to go ahead with this task (in this case, because it implies acting against their 
conscience) they also lose their authority over the child. Another way of putting it is that 
parental rights over children are not extensions of the parents’ rights over themselves,
35
 
as the sense of interconnectedness and continuity between the identities of parent and 
child does not imply an identity between the chooser and the chosen-for. The child is a 
distinct human being with a moral status separate from the parents and this limits what 
parents are morally permitted to do to their children. 
To clarify this point, consider the mass suicide at Masada which took place in       
AD 73 and marked the end of the failed Jewish revolt against Rome.
36
 Three years after 
the fall of Jerusalem, the last pocket of resistance was holding out in the mountaintop 
fortress of Masada. At the end of a lengthy siege, when the Romans were just about to 
gain control, the rebels inhabiting the fortress committed suicide en masse to avoid 
surrender. The act, which included 960 men, women and children, was carried out by 
the men who first killed their wives and children and then killed one another, with the 
last man killing himself. Now, granting that the rebels wholeheartedly believed that 
surrendering to the Romans was morally condemnable, I still contend that they were 
                                                                                                                                                 
medically required. In such a case, Jehovah’s Witnesses would still be committed to reject the transfusion, 
notwithstanding the above argument.  
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 Cf. Charles Fried, Right and Wrong, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), 152; William A. 
Galston, Liberal Pluralism: The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), Chapter 8. 
36
 See Josephus, The Jewish War, trans. G. A. Williamson (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1959), 357-67. 
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not morally permitted to take this decision on behalf of their children and thus force 
them to become martyrs.
37
 
The cases of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Masada rebels are undeniably 
different in many ways.
38
 Nevertheless in both cases the parents are led by their values 
and beliefs to prevent their children from leading a decent life, thus violating the 
separate moral status of the children. What is important here is that while it is no longer 
possible for the children to lead a decent life according to the terms of their parents’ 
context, a decent life with different contextual terms is available.
39
 In those cases it is 
morally wrong for parents to withhold the conditions for their children to lead a life that 
does not conform to their own terms of decency.
40
 It is only as long as parents do 
provide decent life prospects in their own terms that these terms (are allowed to) 
matter. 
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eventually murder. (Indeed, that was one of the arguments employed by Eleazar, the rebels’ leader.) 
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rebels throughout was, in Eleazar’s words, “to serve neither the Romans nor anyone else but only God... 
even when it brought no danger with it” (Josephus, The Jewish War, 360; emphasis added).  
A relevantly similar case in the modern era was the Badung Puputan, the mass suicide of a thousand 
Balinese, including women and children, in response to the Dutch intervention in Bali in 1906. It is 
interesting to note that both cases are commonly glorified in the respective cultures as acts of resistance. 
That our principle of justice condemns them (insofar as involving children) demonstrates the critical force 
it may have despite the considerable leeway given in the name of cultural diversity. 
40
 This does not mean they have to be the ones directly providing those conditions. Alternatively, they can 
let someone else provide them for the children. 
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We should distinguish the cases discussed above from unfavourable circumstances 
which by themselves make it impossible for parents to provide their child with decent 
life prospects. Those circumstances might be related to the child (as in cases where the 
child suffers from a physical or cognitive impairment); or they might be social (e.g. when 
facing racial discrimination), political (e.g. when the family finds itself living in the midst 
of a war zone), or natural (e.g. in cases of drought or an earthquake). Considering them 
does not imply that meeting the proposed threshold is not a demand of justice, only 
that there are times at which this demand cannot be met. By contrast, the point of the 
objection, which we rejected, was to present a case where it can be met but need not 
be. The issue of unfavourable circumstances is addressed in subsequent parts of the 
thesis.
41
 Here it is mentioned only to be distinguished from the objection from 
conscience and to make clear that it does not raise a problem for the proposed 
threshold itself.   
 
B. The open future objection 
 
Moving now to the second objection, it may be argued against the suggested threshold 
that by limiting it to the social and cultural terms of the parents it is set too low. The 
objection maintains that parents have a duty to provide their children with an open 
future and thus cannot limit the conditions they provide for their children to their own 
social and cultural context. This threshold is too low, so it is claimed, because it does not 
respect the child as a prospective autonomous adult, unnecessarily narrows the 
available life-plans from which to choose, and therefore lowers the child’s chances to 
achieve self-fulfilment. Joel Feinberg has stated the case for the open future objection 
most prominently: 
When sophisticated autonomy rights are attributed to children who are clearly not 
yet capable of exercising them, their names refer to rights that are to be saved for 
the child until he is an adult, but which can be violated ‘in advance,’ so to speak, 
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before the child is even in a position to exercise them. The violating conduct 
guarantees now that when the child is an autonomous adult, certain key options 
will already be closed to him. His right while he is still a child is to have these 
future options kept open until he is a fully informed, self-determining adult 
capable of deciding among them.
42
 
Notable cases of not conforming to this line of thought are the Old Order Amish 
who do not educate their children past the eighth grade,
43
 or the ultra-Orthodox Jews in 
Israel who are exempted from teaching mathematics beyond basic arithmetic, biology 
and foreign languages in their schools. The objection raised against these cases is not 
that the parents do not provide their children with the required conditions for leading a 
decent life but that they unduly limit those conditions to their own cultural context. It is 
worthwhile to note that while these cases are taken from the sphere of education the 
objection is by no means limited to this realm. Thus, it is quite common for parents in 
Israel to try to obtain foreign passports for their children to make available 
opportunities beyond their own social context.
44
 How can a threshold that allows 
parents to deliberately ‘close’ the future of their child and deprive her of some 
otherwise-available opportunities be justified? 
In response we should first be clear on what the threshold does not demand. It is 
not intended to restrict parents to the terms of their own social and cultural context. 
What it does infer is that parents are not required, as a matter of justice, to provide 
their children with conditions for them to lead a decent life in a different social and 
cultural context. So the threshold does not condemn Israeli parents who seek foreign 
passports for their children but only indicates that doing so is to go beyond what justice 
requires. In the same way the threshold implies that when Israeli parents do not obtain 
foreign passports for their children the latter do not have a claim of justice against the 
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 Joel Feinberg, “The Child’s Right to an Open Future,” in his Freedom and Fulfillment: Philosophical 
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former (though the children may still be deeply disappointed or even resent their 
parents for not doing so). 
Second, the threshold still keeps the future of the child open in an important 
sense as it does not allow parents to prevent the child from leading a decent life in 
terms different from their own.
45
 Old Order Amish parents are not required to provide 
children with education past the eighth grade and ultra-Orthodox Jewish parents are 
exempted from teaching their children biology. But if the children actively seek this 
education their parents cannot prevent them from obtaining it. Not requiring parents to 
provide their children with conditions for functionings that do not conform to their own 
contextual terms does not amount to giving them a right to prevent their children from 
trying to obtain those conditions themselves (although they may still make it very 
costly).
46
 
Third, in another no less important sense it is not possible to keep the future of 
the child ‘open’ because by doing so, valuable options are closed off. This point is made 
by Claudia Mills, specifically with respect to the child’s religious affiliation. One plausible 
interpretation of what an open future means in Feinberg’s argument is that parents 
should not intentionally isolate their children from other ways of life and should ensure 
they learn of the variety of religious and nonreligious lifestyles. This can take the form of 
visiting different religious services and reading about the various beliefs held by each 
religious group, thereby offering the child a range of available religions to choose from. 
However, Mills argues that this way of upbringing does not in fact leave the 
opportunities open for the child since it deprives her of the experience of belonging to a 
religion. 
[F]or most people who are involved in most religions today, creeds themselves are 
not central to their religious experience. What is central is community. I have 
religiously observant Jewish friends for whom this is all that matters to their being 
                                                 
45
 This is a stronger claim than the one I made in response to the objection from conscience, as it is not 
dependent on the parents not being able to provide conditions for decent life prospects in terms of their 
own context. 
46
 I discuss this further in my treatment of children’s right to exit in Chapter 5, Section 5. 
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Jewish: being part of community, a culture, a tradition, a history… Even in my own 
religion, Christianity, most church members (myself included) have only a vague 
notion of the various points of theology to which we supposedly subscribe... What 
is important is to live in a ‘church family,’ to be part of a community of faith, 
having potluck dinners together, bringing casseroles to the sick, carolling to shut-
ins. It takes a long time to become part of a spiritual community, maybe a whole 
lifetime. Maybe you only really understand what it is to be a part of a spiritual 
community when you die in its arms.
47
 
If Mills is right then the ideal of an open future for the child is an illusion, at least with 
respect to religion, since opening one door often entails closing another. 
But lastly, even if Mills is wrong and an open future for the child is achievable I 
contend that the significance of the element of identity in the parent–child relationship 
implies that parents are not required as a matter of justice to provide an open future for 
their children. To recall, the element of identity refers to a strong sense of 
interconnectedness and continuity between the identities of parent and child, 
established during childhood through the reproduction of some of the parents’ social, 
cultural and more idiosyncratic characteristics in their children. This element, I argued in 
the previous chapter, is a fundamental aspect of the parent–child relationship and 
underlies a distinctive value of the relationship. It now follows from this that parents 
should be allowed to perform the task of upbringing in a way that conforms to their 
social and cultural context and is conducive to establishing the element of identity in 
their relationship with their children. If we accept that principles of justice correspond 
to the specific nature of the relationships to which they apply, and if we further accept 
that a fundamental aspect of the parent–child relationship is the element of identity, 
then a principle of family justice needs to adequately accommodate this element. Thus, 
justice does not require Old Order Amish and ultra-Orthodox Jews to provide their 
children with conditions for leading a decent life in contexts other than their own. They 
can, of course, do so – as in the case of Israelis who provide conditions for their children 
to lead a decent life in a non-Israeli context. But this is left to their discretion. What 
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justice requires is that children are brought up so they are able to lead a decent life and 
this can be limited to the parents’ contextual terms to assist in the establishment of the 
element of identity.  
 
 
5. A cluster of threshold-generated concerns 
 
At the beginning of this chapter I suggested that thinking about upbringing in terms of 
meeting children’s needs points towards a sufficiency principle of justice for this 
context. Yet the idea of a threshold that is meant to exhaust the demands of justice 
gives rise to egalitarian concerns as it allows for a range of intuitively troubling 
inequalities. The suggested threshold may seem plausible as long as we consider the 
child’s position in isolation from others, so says the concerned egalitarian, but it fails to 
address the potentially disadvantaged position of the child compared to (some) others. 
In this section I wish to consider several cases which may give rise to this concern. My 
aim is to show that to the extent that they are troubling they can be addressed, and to 
the extent that they are allowed they are not that troubling. 
Consider first the case of the Bill Gates-like parent mentioned in the introduction 
to the chapter. I said there that it does not seem plausible to hold that it is an injustice if 
the children of the super-rich turn out to be only mildly rich and not as rich as their 
parents (or as their parents can make them). The threshold accords with our intuitive 
acceptance of this non-troubling inequality. However, the threshold also implies that 
every inequality above it, no matter its magnitude, is not unjust. So it seems to allow for 
a case in which a super-rich parent insisted on keeping his child only slightly above the 
threshold level of decent life prospects, still leaving him quite poor.
48
 Unlike the 
                                                 
48
 This worry echoes Paula Casal’s argument against Roger Crisp’s anti-prioritarian Beverly Hills case. See, 
respectively, Paula Casal, “Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough,” Ethics 117 (2007): 296-326, at 312; and Roger 
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137 
inequality between a super-rich parent and his mildly rich child, an inequality between a 
super-rich parent and his mildly poor child does upset our intuitions. 
An initial response to this case might be that although it is not strictly speaking an 
injustice – the child is still provided with decent life prospects – we find it troubling 
because of features other than justice that we expect to find in the parent–child 
relationship. If a super-rich parent allows only mildly poor life prospects for her child 
this might indicate a lack of altruistic feelings of the sort we also expect the parent–child 
relationship to display. The shortfall, therefore, might not be one of justice. This 
response may account, I believe, for our uneasiness with respect to some inequalities 
between parents and children, but I wish to argue that gross inequalities, such as in this 
case, are not, in fact, permitted by the suggested principle of family justice.  
To see this we need to remind ourselves of the pluralistic nature of the family 
justice metric. Parents are required to provide conditions for achieving a set of 
functionings and it is with respect to each of the functionings that the standards 
constituting the level of decent life need to be met. In light of this we may go back to 
our case and ask what arriving at such a gross inequality would involve. It seems that the 
only way in which a parent can be situated way above the threshold while keeping his 
child only slightly above it, is through systematically isolating the child from his own life. 
The child will need to be provided with a substantially different level of nutrition, health 
care and education, and also shelter, social interaction and pleasurable experiences, 
from that of her parent. Now even if all that were possible – the story of Cinderella may 
give an idea how it might be – we can now see why it would be unjust. This is because 
such treatment, contrary to what we initially assumed, is most likely to deprive the child 
of secure emotional attachments, harm her sense of self-worth and her self-respect and 
result, in turn, in her emotions and affiliation functionings falling below the threshold of 
decent life. If this is right then the threshold does rule out such an inequality because it 
cannot be sustained while keeping all functionings above the decent life level. This also 
serves to emphasize an important point, namely that the achievements of the various 
functionings are, though non-substitutable, deeply interrelated. Providing the conditions 
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to achieve some functionings means, at times, providing conditions to achieve certain 
others. Providing a child with a decent life prospect is a task which is pluralistic but also 
holistic. Each functioning counts and this implies that their interrelations must count as 
well. 
Consider next the inequalities between siblings. The threshold implies that, as long 
as parents meet the threshold with respect to each of the siblings, inequalities between 
them are not unjust. But aren’t parents required to treat their children equally? Can 
justice allow them to benefit their children differently? Here again some inequalities 
seem more troubling than others. Take first the inequality between two siblings that 
might flow from the mere fact that sibling S1 has a closer relationship with parent P 
than sibling S2 has. As it happens, P and S1 very much enjoy each other’s company and 
find themselves spending more time together but this, in turn, generates an inequality 
between S1 and S2. While S2’s achieved functionings are above the threshold level, the 
closer relationship S1 has with P does provide conditions for S1 to achieve the 
functionings of emotions and affiliation at a higher level than that of S2. Yet this 
inequality is not concerning, but quite natural. What the parent should ensure in this 
case is that the closer relationship with S1 does not harm S2 emotionally or otherwise. 
The intuition that what matters here is that S2 is being provided with enough conditions 
(but not necessarily equal to S1) is in agreement with what the threshold implies. 
However this seems too easy a case mainly, perhaps, because the inequality here 
is not caused deliberately but arises spontaneously. It is a natural and, to some extent, 
inevitable consequence of different people having different personalities and more 
affinity with some than with others. So what about inequalities that are deliberately 
generated by parents? Some inequalities are the result of parents relating and being 
committed to one of their children’s projects more than to others. They are more 
invested in cultivating this child’s talent for the violin or in that child building a military 
career or sponsoring another child’s humanitarian initiative. Again, as long as they are 
meeting the threshold with respect to their other children such inequalities seem 
permissible. (Remember my claim above that the threshold requirement referring to all 
139 
relevant functionings does constrain the size of inequalities between family members.) 
It may have been better if such inequalities did not exist but they fall within the freedom 
of parents to determine the use of their own resources.
49
 
Perhaps the most troubling kind of potential inequalities between siblings are 
those based on gender. Can parental conduct which results in siblings having different 
life prospects based on their gender, be just? Here we need to distinguish between two 
contextual scenarios, possible in theory if not in practice.  
In the first, the social and cultural context presents different conceptions of decent 
life for men and women through specifying different contents for various categories of 
functionings or different standards of achievement. The application of these different 
conceptions within the family results in inequalities between male and female siblings. 
Now, in my view, if the life prospects of both are considered decent, albeit different, 
then the parental conduct here is not unjust. Let me elaborate. Both genders’ life 
prospects need to be considered decent by the men and women who share that 
context. It is an injustice if fathers provide life prospects for their girls that they consider 
(or claim to consider) decent but are experienced by the latter (and the women they 
become) as degrading, humiliating and shameful; or if fathers provide life prospects for 
their girls that they consider degrading, humiliating and shameful but are experienced 
by the latter (and the women they become) as decent.
50
 What I do not require is that 
we, who do not share their context, will also consider those life prospects decent.
51
  
Moreover, it might be unjust not to conform to this gendered background. 
Consider gender-blind parents who provide training to both their son and daughter 
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according to the standards of ‘decent life for men,’ which substantially differ from those 
applying to the parallel ‘decent life for women’ conception. But the daughter, now an 
adult, can neither translate her skills into a decent living (as the relevant jobs are open 
only to men), nor find a husband to support her since girls who receive boys’ education 
are considered indecent. If parents’ equal upbringing of their son and daughter results 
in the daughter’s life prospects falling below the threshold of decent life (because of 
their falling below the threshold of ‘decent life for women’) then I am inclined to view 
this case as an injustice, no matter my own contextual (and personal) agreement with 
gender equality. 
In the second contextual scenario, we find that the contents and standards that 
constitute decent life are roughly the same for men and women but they apply 
unequally to male and female children, leaving the children of one sex – most commonly 
the female – with a lower level of achieved functionings. It is clear by now, I hope, that 
the threshold easily rules out the kind of anti-female bias in health care and nutrition 
that has led, according to Amartya Sen, to tens of millions of women ‘missing’ from the 
world’s population.
52
 It also rules out humiliating attitudes towards female children, 
anti-female bias in education and training, or any other unequal treatment that results 
in women not being able to lead a decent life in their social and cultural context.
53
 True, 
the threshold does allow for some inequalities between siblings to remain even if they 
are somehow based on or influenced by gender. Thus, parents may have a closer 
relationship with a child of the same (or opposite!) sex, or relate more to certain 
projects of their children that are associated with their gender. But in line with the 
earlier discussion, such inequalities are permitted as long as all relevant functionings of 
all the children in the family meet the threshold level. I have argued that this 
requirement constrains the size of inequalities within the family and, in light of the issue 
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of gender, we may now add that it also constrains their frequency. This is because 
inequalities, even if relatively minor, which systematically favour one or some children – 
the male, the first-born, the last-born, the one that resembles the parent most, and so 
forth – over others, are most likely to result in some of the functionings of the less-
favoured children falling below the threshold (by way of the same dynamic explained 
above). 
So far I have only considered inequalities from the perspective of the worse-off 
party. But the better-off members of the family may also raise an objection against the 
threshold which is worth considering. According to our principle, providing conditions to 
achieve functionings up to the level of decent life prospects is a demand of justice, but 
no such demand holds above that level. But what if the child whose level of functionings 
falls below the threshold, is a very poor functionings-achiever? His functionings level can 
approach the threshold, but an enormous infusion of resources is required in order to 
provide him with the conditions for very limited achievements. This child thus becomes 
a “basin of attraction” for family resources, even if he cannot be brought to the 
threshold level and no matter how high the level of functionings his siblings, already 
meeting the threshold, could alternatively achieve. Is such a situation unacceptable, as 
Richard Arneson suggests?
54
  
I do not think so. Arneson is right to point out that “preventing lethal diseases that 
strike only above-threshold individuals could be morally more cost-effective than 
achieving tiny pleasures for below-threshold individuals.”
55
 But it is wrong to think that 
this serves as a counterexample to our principle (or to any plausible principle of 
sufficiency for that matter). Attending to this matter should surely have priority, 
something our principle actually confirms through its requirement to provide conditions 
for decent life prospects. A lethal disease, by definition, will cause the currently-above-
threshold children to fall not only below that threshold but also below their 
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permanently-below-threshold sibling as they will have no life, literally speaking.
56
 A 
relevant counterexample will be one in which the better-off children remain above the 
threshold of decent life prospects, and are dramatically benefited further at the cost of 
the non-provision of a small benefit to their sibling whose functionings cannot reach 
that threshold level. But it is no longer clear that such an example will be compelling. 
Consider two siblings, one of whom enjoys a normal level of functionings whereas the 
other suffers from severe autism. Their parents provide decent life prospects for their 
normal child but focus most of their resources (time, attention, money, etc.) on their 
autistic child in an attempt to establish minimal communication. Say that the 
investment of the same amount of resources could either result in the normal child 
going to Harvard and leading an incredibly successful life, or in their autistic child 
starting to make eye contact with people around him. Is it unjust to give such priority to 
their autistic child? Does the normal child have a claim of justice against the parents in 
this case? It seems that quite the opposite holds. In light of the huge gap which already 
obtains between the siblings, I cannot see anything problematic in the parents devoting 
most of their available resources to improve (even slightly) their autistic child’s 
situation. 
I wish to end my defence of the threshold by addressing one final type of 
inequality, namely that between children of different families. Even if the principle 
reflects a satisfying state of affairs within families, it still allows for enormous 
inequalities between children across society. Paula Casal makes the claim that “[e]ven 
when everyone has enough, it still seems deeply unfair that merely in virtue of being 
born into a wealthy family some should have at their disposal all sorts of advantages, 
contacts, and opportunities, while others inherit little more than a name.”
57
 We may 
quibble that if having enough is understood in our context as having decent life 
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prospects, then children are to be provided with rather more than merely a name. Yet 
the substantive point remains that having decent life prospects is compatible with 
having much lower prospects in comparison to others or, in other words, with not 
having (fair) equality of opportunity. This may suggest that the threshold level should be 
defined in comparative terms, say, as some fraction of the average level in society. 
In response we should first note that the threshold of decent life prospects is 
indirectly comparative, as the level of decent life is to be understood in terms of the 
relevant social and cultural context. If the general standards of living in society are 
steadily rising then the standards constituting decent life are likely to rise as well, even if 
more slowly and to a lesser extent. On the other hand, a directly comparative threshold 
seems to face a severe problem. If the prevalent standards of living in society sharply fall 
– due to a plague, for example – then the alternative threshold implies that parents who 
are still able to provide decent life prospects for their children (say, they can gain access 
to vaccination) might not be required to do so.
58
 But this seems implausible.  
Perhaps we can combine the two suggestions and argue that the threshold level 
should be some fraction of the average level in society provided it does not fall below 
the decent life level. Yet I cannot see how such a comparative level can be determined 
non-arbitrarily. The average level has statistical significance, not moral. And even if this 
could be done, it would not serve as a solution. No matter how the threshold is defined, 
it allows inequalities above it. To address the issue of the relative disadvantage of 
children, we need to constrain inequalities across society not only from below but also 
from above. This might create, in turn, inequalities within families between parents and 
children of the sort we already concluded to be unacceptable. Super-rich parents will 
now be required to systematically isolate their children from their own environment to 
avoid comparatively disadvantaging other children. This is not meant as a defence of the 
super-rich but to indicate where the root of the problem lies. If society allows for large 
inequalities between its adult members it also allows, as a consequence, for large 
inequalities between their children. But the relations between members of society are 
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the subject matter of social justice, not family justice. Equality of opportunity is not a 
demand of family justice, then, yet family justice is not the end of the story. Social 
justice and family justice have a complex interplay with respect to children, to be 
explored in the next chapter. 
 
 
6. Rejecting metric alternatives 
 
So far I have put forward an account for a specific metric of family justice – conditions 
for achieved functionings – and defended a threshold up to which parents are required 
as a matter of justice to provide this metric for their children – the level allowing the 
child to lead a decent life in terms of the parents’ social and cultural context. I have yet 
to show, however, that the adopted metric is the most appropriate in the parent–child 
context. For this purpose I turn in this section to argue against three prominent 
alternatives to our metric – welfare, primary goods, and Dworkin’s metric of resources. 
When originally suggested by Sen, the functionings–capabilities metric was meant to 
designate a middle ground between welfare and resources.
59
 In what follows I contend 
that in the parent–child context we should not slide back in either direction but hold to 
this middle ground. 
 
A. Welfare 
 
The debate on the welfarist metric has shifted from attained welfare to opportunity for 
welfare in order to meet forceful objections against the former made primarily by John 
Rawls and Ronald Dworkin.
60
 I do not intend to follow this debate here in trying to 
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fathom the exact formulation that best captures a welfarist metric, be it attained 
welfare, opportunity for welfare or – drawing on the discussion in Section 3 above – 
something like conditions for welfare. I will instead examine the possibility that family 
justice should be concerned primarily with a welfarist metric rather than with 
functionings. As far as I can glean, no one has yet attempted a defence of the welfarist 
metric as being most suitable for the context of the parent–child relationship.
61
 It is 
worthwhile exploring why taking this route does not seem plausible. 
There are differing interpretations of what is meant by the term ‘welfare’. Here I 
wish to limit my discussion to two main alternatives: pleasure, and preference-
satisfaction. Pleasure, so I claim, does matter but it neither exhausts the metric of family 
justice, nor encompasses its most important dimensions. The fact that pleasure is 
included in the aforementioned list of functionings proves its importance. The category 
of sense, imagination and thought includes the functioning of having pleasurable 
experiences and avoiding non-necessary pain. The category of play goes further and 
points out more specific experiences of pleasure (laughing, playing, enjoying 
recreational activities). But the richness of the list of functionings also implies that many 
other valuable states of doing and being are not reducible to mere pleasure and may 
even be at odds with it. Children should be well nourished by their parents even if they 
could gain more pleasure by substantially limiting their diet to sweets. They should go to 
school even if spending all week at the beach is more pleasurable. Consider children 
that go through some painful operation in order to allow them more functionings – an 
orthopaedic procedure to correct a club foot, or an aesthetic orthodontic treatment that 
would improve their self-confidence. In all those cases it seems implausible to hold that 
the pleasure-guided interpretation captures what justice requires of the parent or, to 
put it differently, that opting for the alternative is a case of injustice. To repeat, having 
                                                                                                                                                 
Chapter 1. For the metric of opportunity for welfare, see most notably Arneson, “Equality and Equal 
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pleasurable experiences is valuable and pain ought to be avoided when unnecessary. 
Yet the fact that some parental conduct inflicts some pain on the child or frustrates the 
child’s attainment of pleasure does not in itself indicate its being unjust. 
What about understanding welfare as preference-satisfaction?
62
 An initial reply 
may be that requiring parents to satisfy their children’s preferences (or to provide them 
with conditions or opportunities for satisfying their preferences) is too demanding. 
While one child may have a limited and stable set of preferences that could be met in 
large part by, say, buying her the canonical texts of Western political thought, another 
may have a capricious and changeable set that could barely be met by providing her 
with a surfing board and then piano lessons and then karate training and so on. It is 
simply unfair, the reply goes, to demand of parents that they meet such a never-ending 
set of preferences. In my opinion, this response is wrong. First, the claim that this metric 
might be too demanding could be raised against the functionings metric as well. But the 
fact that some parents face great difficulty in meeting the demands of justice does not 
seem to serve as an argument for no longer considering them as demands of justice. 
Second, opting for a welfarist metric does not mean that it should be incorporated into 
a maximizing principle. Alternatively, we could maintain that preference-satisfaction is 
what ultimately matters for family justice, yet incorporate it into a sufficiency principle 
so that it matters only up to a certain threshold. 
In fact what seems most objectionable about the preference-satisfaction metric is 
in a way the opposite problem, namely that it is not demanding enough. Let me explain. 
An important feature of preferences is their being responsive to circumstances.
63
 This 
implies that if preference-satisfaction was adopted, parents could discharge their 
obligations to their children simply by shaping their preferences in light of the 
conditions they provide. This fact about preferences makes them inadequate to serve as 
a metric of family justice. To see this more clearly, imagine two identical twins, T1 and 
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T2, born and raised in the same house. At every point in time they enjoy exactly the 
same level of preference-satisfaction (or are provided with conditions or opportunities 
for the same level of preference-satisfaction). The ‘only’ difference is this: from day one, 
T1 is raised according to the standards of her parents’ social and cultural context (say, a 
contemporary liberal context) while T2 is confined to and brought up in the basement, 
and apart from interacting with her parents she is kept in total isolation. Some very 
unpleasant pictures may spring to mind so let me be clear. The parents devotedly take 
care of T2’s nourishment and health and do not violate her bodily integrity in any way. 
They make sure that she properly develops – physically, emotionally and cognitively – 
and, as I stated, that her preferences are being satisfied (or are given the opportunities 
or conditions to be satisfied) to a level equivalent to that of T1. Unsurprisingly, T2 does 
not have a very complex set of preferences. In particular, she does not have any 
preference for leaving the basement for she was told from the earliest age that the 
world beyond the basement is a very dangerous one. Now, is there any way to conceive 
of the parents’ treatment of the basement twin as meeting the demands of justice in 
the same way as their treatment of her sister does? I contend that the answer is 
unequivocally ‘no’. If I am right then this scenario demonstrates that preference-
satisfaction is not a plausible alternative to functionings as a metric of family justice. 
But perhaps this is a too-hasty conclusion, which ignores a way round this 
impasse. It might be argued that in this scenario, what is really at stake is the illegitimate 
way in which the preferences of the basement twin were shaped by her parents. Thus, 
the scenario would only illuminate how wrong some ways of shaping preferences are; 
not that we should reject preference-satisfaction as a metric. Yet what is it that leads us 
to view this conduct as unjust? After all, children’s preferences are shaped in response 
to their parents’ conduct all the time. Having the preferences we do is in a large part 
due to the circumstances we are exposed to and the experiences we go through. The 
absence of bear-hunting on my preferred list of leisure activities probably has to do with 
the fact that I have lived all my life in a bear-free environment where hunting in general 
is rare. (I also regard hunting as leisure activity to be wrong, but I might have regarded it 
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differently had it been part of my upbringing.) So in this respect there is no difference 
between the way the basement twin’s preferences have been shaped, and any other 
way of shaping preferences. It seems to me that what brings us to view the basement 
upbringing as wrongful is the fact that it prevents the twin from leading a life that can 
be considered decent in her social and cultural context. Had her context been such that 
everyone were living in basements and rarely went out, the parents’ conduct would not 
have been regarded as wrongful.
64
 In other words, what is morally problematic here is 
the level of her conditions for functioning, not her preference-satisfaction. If this is 
indeed the case, then we are led once again to the conclusion that the metric of 
functionings is superior to that of preference-satisfaction in the parent–child context. In 
addition, this demonstrates why the standards of upbringing cannot be determined 
merely by the parents’ preferences or by some idiosyncratic understanding of what 
constitutes decent life, but must be constrained by social and cultural contextual terms. 
 
B. Primary goods 
 
From the other direction are resourcist metric alternatives, one of which is the Rawlsian 
metric of primary goods. Before examining this metric it is important to observe that 
Rawls’s own understanding of it has gone through major transformations since its first 
inception in A Theory of Justice. As he has reformulated his theory to be narrowly 
political (rather than comprehensive) Rawls has made clear that the metric of primary 
goods is preferable in the specific context of a political conception of justice applying to 
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the basic structure of society.
65
 Thus he writes that “given the political conception of 
citizens, primary goods specify what their needs are – part of what their good is as 
citizens – when questions of justice arise.”
66
 The idea of needs here is “relative to a 
political conception of the person, and to their role and status” and so “the 
requirements or needs of citizens as free and equal persons are different from the 
needs of patients or students, say.”
67
 So it should not come as a surprise that primary 
goods are also different from the needs of children, specifically in the context of family 
upbringing. Indeed, as it stands, Rawls’s list of primary goods
68
 – including basic rights 
and liberties, occupational opportunities, powers and prerogatives of office, income and 
wealth, and the social bases of self-respect – seems largely irrelevant to children.
69
 
However, Rawls’s own interpretation of his theory as political liberalism, does not 
preclude the possibility of utilizing the earlier account of the primary goods metric and 
examining its relevance to justice in the family.
70
 In A Theory of Justice primary goods 
are defined as “things which it is supposed a rational man wants whatever else he 
wants,” since by having more of these things “men can generally be assured of greater 
success in carrying out their intentions and in advancing their ends, whatever these ends 
may be.”
71
 Following this we could try to construct a child-focused list by asking what 
are the primary goods “that adults would choose to have had provided to them as 
children.”
72
 Both Gutmann and Blustein suggest that such a list would most importantly 
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include adequate nutrition, health care, housing, familial affection and education.
73
 No 
doubt this overlaps to a large extent with my suggestion of focusing on the conditions 
for achieving the functionings of bodily health, emotions and sense, imagination and 
thought. But even if we can extend the list of goods to correspond to the other 
functionings, I contend that we have no reason to focus primarily on goods rather than 
on functionings.
74
 To see this we need to go back to Rawls’s main motivations for 
choosing this metric. 
Although, as has already been stated, the idea of primary goods has been 
reinterpreted throughout the years, two main motivations for adopting this metric 
remain roughly unchanged; namely, to satisfy requirements of publicity and of 
neutrality between conflicting conceptions of the good. These motivations are 
encapsulated by Rawls’s following statement: 
The thought behind the introduction of primary goods is to find a practicable 
public basis of interpersonal comparisons based on objective features of citizens’ 
social circumstances open to view, all this given the background of reasonable 
pluralism.
75
 
The idea behind the requirement of publicity is a much complex one related to issues of 
legitimacy and stability.
76
 But the main claim relevant to our discussion is quite 
straightforward, that the primary goods metric (in contrast to functionings–capabilities) 
provides us with a publicly observable and verifiable informational basis for evaluating 
the validity of claims of justice and the extent to which different institutions satisfy 
                                                 
73
 Ibid.; Blustein, Parents and Children, 126-30. Such a list goes beyond Rawls’s original suggestion by 
referring also to the natural primary goods of health and intelligence (through health care and education) 
alongside the social primary goods. In Nussbaum’s terms, we should aim at providing the social bases of 
these natural goods (Women and Human Development, 89). 
74
 To be fair, both Gutmann and Blustein had opted for the primary goods metric before the functionings–
capabilities metric was fully developed. (Sen first suggested it in his 1979 Tanner Lecture, published the 
following year.)  
75
 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 181; emphasis added. 
76
 On the publicity requirement, see Rawls, Political Liberalism, 66-71. For arguments for and against it 
being a requirement of justice, see, respectively, Andrew Williams, “Incentives, Inequality, and Publicity,” 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 27 (1998): 225-47; G. A. Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 323-30, 344-72. 
151 
them.
77
 To use Pogge’s example, figuring out everyone’s metabolic rates to determine 
their capability to be well nourished is not workable or, at least, much less workable 
than observing how much money they have to buy food. But this argument in favour of 
primary goods loses much of its strength when we move from the macro-level of social 
(or even global) justice to the micro-level of family justice. Here it is much easier for the 
functionings–capabilities metric to satisfy the publicity requirement, and insisting on the 
primary goods metric seems unnecessary, if not unjust. As long as we can focus on what 
recipients really need, we should not settle on approximations to their needs. If a child 
suffers from a metabolic disorder we do not usually think parents are doing enough by 
keeping on providing her with the same portion of food; they should take her to see a 
dietician or a doctor. Focusing on resources, rather than on functionings, amounts to 
neglect in this case. Similarly if one child needs more help with his homework than his 
sister, it is not very difficult to explain to her why he gets more attention in this respect 
(although it may still be difficult to get her approval). So the publicity requirement does 
not give us a reason for moving, in the family context, from functionings to resources. In 
fact, quite the opposite holds true. Since in this context it is relatively easy to satisfy the 
publicity requirement in terms of actual functionings it is wrong not to address them 
directly. 
Rawls’s second motivation for adopting the primary good metric was that it does 
not rely on any controversial conception of the good. Since primary goods are defined 
(in Rawls’s earlier texts) as all-purpose means, we can assume people want them while 
remaining neutral between conflicting conceptions of the good.
78
 In order to examine 
the metric of functionings in light of this requirement we need to distinguish between 
supra- and intra-family levels. At the supra-family level the neutrality motivation seems 
well grounded as different families operate in very different cultural and social contexts 
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according to various and often conflicting conceptions of the good. This was precisely 
the reason for insisting in Section 2 that for inclusion on the list, any category of 
functionings would have to meet the condition of accommodating a wide cultural and 
social diversity. We can regard the list therefore as one of ‘all-purpose’ functionings 
which every human being needs to achieve in order to lead a decent life. If a certain 
category is found to be drawing on a particular cultural or social context or, more 
specifically, on a controversial conception of the good, then it cannot remain on the list.  
However, this stipulation does not pertain to the intra-family level. There, as I 
have stated, we should rely on the social and cultural context of the parents to 
determine both the specific content in each category of functionings and the standards 
of achievement which constitute decent life. I have already argued that in view of the 
nature of the parent–child relationship this should be the case. Demanding that parents 
refrain from ‘comprehensive’ considerations in the process of raising their children 
undermines a distinctive value of this relationship. Another way in which the neutrality 
requirement is not appropriate for the intra-family context has to do with the fact that, 
apart from being parents and having interests as such – captured to some extent by the 
argument just mentioned – people also have self-regarding interests which may conflict 
with the neutrality requirement. Consider for example what it would mean to require 
parents to remain neutral with respect to their children’s nutrition. Let’s say the child is 
old enough to buy and cook her own food and so her parents are required only to 
provide her with the resources (money) for being well nourished. The child has grown to 
love pork chops but the parents are observant Muslims/Orthodox Jews/vegetarians. 
Requiring the parents to stay neutral with respect to the child’s conversion of resources 
into functionings seems implausible here. In the case of the Jewish parents at least, it 
would mean that they could no longer use their own kitchen.
79
 Since parents, unlike 
institutions, have interests of their own, we need to take them into consideration when 
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we move from the supra-family to the intra-family level. So while the categories of 
functionings as they appear on the list meet the neutrality requirement, at the level of 
its implementation within families a departure from neutrality is not something to 
apologize for. As with the publicity motivation, the motivation provided by neutrality for 
adopting the primary goods metric in the political context helps to highlight its 
inadequacy in the context of the parent–child relationship. 
 
C. Dworkinian resources 
 
There remains another resourcist alternative advanced by Ronald Dworkin.
80
 The main 
difference from Rawls’s metric of primary goods is that Dworkin includes under his 
metric both impersonal and personal resources.
81
 “[A] person’s resources,” he writes, 
“include personal resources such as health and physical capacity as well as impersonal 
or transferable resources such as money.”
82
 By including personal resources in his 
distributive metric Dworkin comes close to Sen, since justice is now concerned not only 
with people’s possessions of (impersonal) resources but also with what they can do with 
them as a function of their (personal resources of) health, talent and so on. This has led 
Dworkin to suggest the possibility that his equality of resources and Sen’s equality of 
capabilities are not real alternatives to each other but “only the same ideal set out in a 
different vocabulary.”
83
 Yet to the extent that they are alternatives,
84
 I now wish to 
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briefly point out why I think that in the parent–child context the functionings–
capabilities metric is superior to that of Dworkin. 
First, lying at the heart of Dworkin’s view is the crucial distinction between choice 
and circumstance.
85
 Dworkin’s aim is to equalize (or mitigate) people’s circumstances 
and so to equally allow them to make choices according to their own life plans. This 
parallels Sen’s emphasis on freedoms or real opportunities for functionings. However, as 
we observed in Section 3, when we focus on children what seems most important is 
their achieved functionings. This has led us to formulate the family justice principle in 
terms of conditions for functionings. In contrast, Dworkin’s rather strict resourcist 
terminology (which serves his purposes very well) does not allow us to make the 
necessary shift of emphasis from means to outcomes which is crucial with respect to 
children. 
Closely related to this point is the significance Dworkin places on neutrality with 
regard to conflicting conceptions of the good.
86
 Dworkin’s theory, like that of Rawls, is 
intended to apply to the level of the state. He argues that for the state to treat its 
citizens with equal concern and respect it needs to remain neutral and this in turn is 
made possible only by a metric of resources. But we have already seen that the 
neutrality requirement, while relevant at the state level, becomes very problematic at 
the intra-family level and thus undermines the applicability of the Dworkinian metric to 
the latter. 
Third, Dworkin’s metric tends towards monism. Despite the distinction between 
impersonal and personal categories of resources and the fact that both contain different 
kinds of resources, Dworkin often treats them as commensurable and to some extent 
substitutable with each other. This is made most explicit in Dworkin’s argument that 
equality of resources – his conception of distributional equality – “presupposes an 
economic market of some form, mainly as an analytical device but also, to a certain 
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extent, as an actual political institution.”
87
 Dworkin’s point is that a market mechanism 
is needed for setting prices for the vast variety of goods and services to be distributed, 
and at the heart of his argument is the construction of an imaginary auction on a desert 
island, where each distinct item on the island is labelled with its price reckoned in 
clamshells.
88
 It is true that only impersonal resources are concerned here, but the 
hypothetical insurance auction for illness and physical handicaps presented later in the 
text aims, in Dworkin’s words, at “increasing the impersonal resources of those whose 
personal resources are in different ways impaired.”
89
 Thus, Dworkin’s metric is far more 
monistic than functionings but also less pluralistic than Rawls’s primary goods. Again 
this is particularly significant in the case of children as it is highly unlikely that what their 
parents owe them could all be discharged using the same type of resources. Parents 
cannot substitute love, joy, a sense of belonging, and so on, with giving more money to 
their children. The pluralistic nature of the functionings metric highlights the fact that 
parents have obligations of different kinds towards their children which cannot be 
converted into one currency.
90
 
Lastly, and following from this point, is the issue of compensation. As we saw, for 
Dworkin a deficiency of personal resources may generate a valid claim for compensation 
in the form of additional impersonal resources. This follows on from his suggestion to 
think of the responsibilities of the state in terms of a hypothetical insurance scheme 
against bad brute luck. But does this picture correspond to the way we think of families? 
If it were the case that through no fault of his parents a child could not reach the 
threshold of some achieved functioning, would they still be required to compensate him 
by enhancing his other functionings? It seems hard to say because, as we saw earlier, 
the achievements of different functionings are deeply interrelated. Thus, if a child 
happens to score low on bodily health (because he suffers from some physical handicap) 
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it might lead to a lower level of affiliation (being stigmatized and thus having fewer 
friends). To prevent this, a parent could try to provide more conditions for emotions and 
play to mitigate the potential negative effect of bodily health on affiliation. But here the 
‘compensation’ is meant to prevent the corrosive effect of some ‘malfunctioning’ on 
related functionings. I am inclined to think that if the child happened to reach the 
threshold in all categories of functionings but one, and there was nothing to be done to 
raise the level of that single functioning, parents would not be required to compensate 
for that shortfall.
91
  
These reservations about the Dworkinian resources metric conclude my discussion 
of the metric alternatives to functionings. Although none have been found to be 
superior to the functionings metric, I wish to emphasize that the discussion and the 
conclusions I draw from it are strictly limited to the parent–child context. I have not 
tried to claim nor do I wish to imply that the considerations about opting for this metric 
apply in other contexts.  
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
I have argued in this chapter that family justice is concerned with children’s 
achievement of certain functionings and consequently requires parents to provide the 
conditions necessary for their children to achieve those functionings. I also argued that 
the purview of justice reaches only a certain threshold level of achieved functionings, 
namely that allowing children to lead a decent life in terms of the parents’ social and 
cultural context. This requirement corresponds to the nature of the parent–child 
relationship as an intimate form of upbringing which features the element of identity. 
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While this account draws heavily on the capability approach, specifically on its 
development by Martha Nussbaum, it differs from it in several crucial aspects. The first 
concerns the starting point of each account. Nussbaum starts with human beings as 
such, identifies a list of valuable human functionings, and proceeds to evaluate the 
justness of social institutions in view of their contribution to human beings’ capability to 
achieve those functionings. In contrast I start with a specific human relationship – that 
of the parent–child – and ask what the focus of justice is in this context. I find the 
functionings metric (although not all the functionings listed by Nussbaum) to be the 
most relevant, yet I do not claim that it can be generalized to all distributive contexts. 
Second, while both Nussbaum’s and my accounts specify a threshold level whether of 
achieved functionings or capabilities, it is a very different threshold; for Nussbaum it is 
independent and cross-cultural whereas mine is culture-dependent.
92
 Third, the 
threshold has a different role in both accounts. Nussbaum remains agnostic with respect 
to what justice requires above the threshold and so her account is only of a “partial 
theory of justice.” In my account the threshold aims to exhaust what justice requires of 
parents and thus to offer a complete theory of justice in this specific context. 
To conclude this chapter I wish to summarize some of the implications of my 
account. First, the list of functionings demonstrates that the demands justice makes on 
parents are irreducibly plural in nature. Letting one or more of the functionings drop 
below the threshold is unjust no matter how high the other functionings score above it. 
More specifically, in this account money loses much of its importance. To be sure, in 
order to provide the conditions for some of the functionings money is required, but it is 
not money as such that parents owe their children. Where the required money should 
come from is here left open. (It might be the case that society should provide parents 
with at least part of the resources required for them to provide their children with the 
necessary conditions for functioning.) 
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I also argued that justice does not require parents to provide their children with 
more than what is necessary to lead a decent life in the former’s social and cultural 
context. This does not imply that parents are prevented from providing more to their 
children – conditions for more-than-decent life, conditions for decent life in more than 
one context, or a combination of the two – only that it is permissible for them not to do 
so. It also implies that if parents provide their children with more than what is required, 
it is not a violation of justice to do so in an unequal manner. As already emphasized, this 
is true as long as all the relevant functionings of all children are above the threshold. If 
the unequal treatment causes the functionings of the worse-off children to fall below 
the threshold (e.g. because it harms their self-respect as they have a reason to believe 
they are no longer treated as dignified beings) then it is an injustice. 
On the other hand, what justice requires of parents is not (directly) linked with 
their children’s reciprocation in taking care of the parents’ needs in old age (or 
beforehand if they become needy). This is because according to the interpretation 
followed here, the parent–child relationship in its pure form is an upbringing-relation, 
not a community or a cooperative scheme for mutual advantage. This does not mean 
that we would not find other obligations present in families, but if and when we do, it is 
because in real life family members (as with many other associations) very often display 
a complex assortment of relationships with each other. Thus, a mother and daughter 
who run a business together would have further obligations to each other, but they are 
accidental to their parent–child relationship. 
 
 
8. Appendix: Justice and nature 
 
The principle argued for in this chapter is meant to encapsulate what parents owe their 
children as a matter of justice. Meeting the specified threshold with respect to each of 
the relevant functionings exhausts the claims of justice in this context. Yet to complete 
my account I want to make explicit in this appendix why it might be the case that not 
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meeting the threshold is not an injustice. To do this I need to attend to the conceptual 
matter of what ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ can be predicates of. 
As I understand it the concept of justice applies to human conduct (of individuals 
and collectives) and the states of affairs that result from it or that can be altered by it. 
According to this understanding the predicates ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ may
93
 apply to: 
(I) Human conduct. 
(II) States of affairs that result from human conduct whether (i) they can be altered by 
human conduct, or (ii) not. 
(III) States of affairs that do not (initially) result from human conduct but can be 
altered by it. 
And may not apply to: 
(IV) States of affairs that do not result from human conduct and cannot be altered by 
it. 
I take the inclusion of (I) and (II) within the potential scope of justice to be a matter of 
consensus and the inclusion of (III) and exclusion of (IV) as controversial. To see why (I) 
and (II) are not controversial, simply think of an act of murder. Attempting murder is 
unjust, irrespective of whether it happens to be successful or not. This justifies the 
inclusion of (I). In case the attempt is successful, the irreversible state of affairs in which 
the victim is dead is unjust and thus including (II-ii) is justified. Now consider a failed 
murder attempt. The wounded victim is treated in hospital and eventually completely 
recovers. Still, the victim’s recovery does not make his past injury less unjust and this is 
why including (II-i) within the potential scope of justice is also justified. Let us move to 
the harder cases, focusing mainly on (IV). 
Some hold that (IV) may also fall within the scope of justice.
94
 I cannot provide an 
argument proving the contrary, but we can call into question the plausibility of that view 
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 I do not claim that the following first three categories are necessarily either just or unjust. They may be 
neither just nor unjust, such as is the human act of writing a PhD thesis. The aim of what follows is to 
support a much weaker claim about what has the potential of being just or unjust. 
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by rejecting two lines of thought that may lead to holding it. The first line of thought 
concerns motivation for action. When we say that some state of affairs is unjust we take 
it to be bad but we also imply that an action to eliminate this bad is in order. Pointing 
out an injustice is also a call for action.
95
 And since it is not always possible to know for 
certain whether an action is possible we may think it better to treat it as if it were 
possible. In other words, we opt for playing it safe. We take the risk of mistakenly 
characterizing certain misfortunes as injustices in order to minimize the alternative risk 
that certain injustices will go unnoticed.  
The problem with following this line of thought is that we are likely to end up 
achieving the opposite of what we intended. By crying ‘injustice’ every time we face a 
misfortune we cause an inflation of injustice – in a world that is sated with injustice 
already – and a devaluation of the ‘currency’ of justice. By not willing to take the risk of 
overlooking any injustice, we are likely to lower our sensitivity to injustice and the moral 
urgency we ascribe to addressing it. Notice, moreover, that this line of thought does not 
dispute my contention that (IV) is excluded from the potential scope of justice. All it says 
is that we should treat certain cases of (IV) as if justice applied to them. 
A different variation of the action-oriented motivation does not involve an 
uncertainty about our ability to address some state of affairs, but instead a desire to 
classify it as a case which, if it were possible, we should do something about.
96
 However, 
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 For example, G. A. Cohen, “Luck and Equality: A Reply to Hurley,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 72 (2006): 439-46, at 440: “All innate and otherwise (in the broadest possible sense) inherited 
differences of advantage are… unjust”; and Larry S. Temkin, Inequality (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1993), 12-13: “[U]ndeserved inequality is always objectionable; whether or not it is unavoidable, any one 
is responsible for it, there is anyone for whom it is worse, or it involves different people, societies, places, 
or times… I maintain it is a natural injustice that some are born blind whereas others are not.” 
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 Judith N. Shklar, The Faces of Injustice (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990), 2: “[T]he 
difference between misfortune and injustice frequently involves our willingness and our capacity to act or 
not to act on behalf of the victims, to blame or to absolve, to help, mitigate, and compensate, or to just 
turn away.” Notice that this holds also for (II-ii) cases where states of affairs that result from human 
conduct cannot be altered. In these cases it is a call for pre-emptive action.  
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 Temkin, Inequality, 14: “Even if one wants to say... that an injustice has been suffered only where there 
is a perpetrator of the injustice, one can still recognize that a situation is such that if someone had 
deliberately brought it about, she would have been perpetrating an injustice. This tells us something 
about the situation. It tells us that if the situation were such that we could do something to improve it, we 
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this does not provide a reason for labelling such a case as unjust. It only reaffirms our 
initial contention that it would be unjust if we could do something about it and did not.  
While the first line of thought is more about the tactics of eliminating injustice, the 
second is more fundamental. It may start with reasoning such as the following:  
We talk of just men, just actions and just states of affairs. But the last of these 
uses must be regarded as the primary one for when we describe a man as just we 
mean that he usually attempts to act in such a way that a just state of affairs 
results...If we did not have independent criteria for assessing the justice of states 
of affairs, we could not describe men as just or unjust.
97
 
This makes a great deal of sense. We can describe a state of affairs as just or unjust 
irrespective of the justness of the action that led to it or of the people who performed 
the actions. If the best-qualified candidate got the job it may still be a just state of affairs 
even if the act of appointing that candidate was motivated by racist or sexist reasons 
and was therefore unjust. So as far as justice is concerned we may assess the resultant 
state of affairs in a way independent of our normative assessment of the human conduct 
that led to it. This in turn may lead us to the mistaken inference that the normative 
assessment of the former may be entirely independent of the latter.
98
 If we can tell the 
justness of state of affairs S1 irrespective of the justness of the human conduct C1 that 
led to it, what difference can it make if we now learn that S1 actually resulted not from 
C1 but instead from the purely natural cause C2? If the justness of S1 is not derived from 
the justness of its cause then shouldn’t its justness remain the same whatever its cause 
is?
99
 Before answering these questions, we can readily observe how this line of thought 
leads to the inclusion of (IV) within the potential scope of justice. If the normative 
                                                                                                                                                 
should or, more accurately, there would at least be some (prima facie) reason to do so” (emphasis in 
original). 
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 David Miller, Social Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 17-18. 
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 Let me be clear that Miller does not make this mistaken inference. Quite the contrary, he stresses that 
for a state of affairs to be properly described as just or unjust it must be one “which has resulted from the 
actions of sentient beings, or at least capable of being changed by such actions” (ibid., 18). 
99
 Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, 332: “[C]onsider for a moment justice as a property not of persons 
but of distributions... whatever the circumstances, such justice might at the very least, happen to be 
there, if only by accident” (emphasis in original). I am not suggesting that Cohen has committed the false 
inference but he does hold the view that the justness of states of affairs is independent of their causes. 
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assessment of a state of affairs is independent of its causes then justice applies in the 
same way to the same S1 whether it falls under (II-ii) (because it resulted from human 
conduct) or under (IV) (because it did not). The potential scope of justice should 
therefore include (II-ii) as well as (IV). 
To see why this inference is wrong we can make use of the structure of an 
argument made by Cohen in which he distinguishes between causal and normative 
fundamentality.
100
 According to my understanding of justice, human conduct is just (or 
unjust) in view of its tendency to produce just (or unjust) states of affairs. The state of 
affairs is the one that is normatively fundamental and in view of which human conduct is 
normatively assessed. But the state of affairs is just (or unjust) because it results from 
certain causes, namely certain kinds of human conduct. And so, human conduct is 
causally fundamental for just (or unjust) states of affairs to result. Paraphrasing Cohen, a 
state of affairs is just (or unjust) because of the nature of its cause, a certain human 
conduct, and this human conduct counts as just (or unjust) because what it causes is 
unjust. To illustrate, let us return for a moment to the issue of family justice. We can say 
the following (by paraphrasing Cohen once more): 
(I) The child C is neglected by the parent P, since C’s level of functioning does not meet 
a certain threshold by virtue of P depriving C of the required conditions, and where 
that causes C’s level of functioning to not meet a certain threshold, that level of 
functioning is unjust.  
(II) The deprivation of certain conditions from C by P is unjust because it causes the 
unjustly low level of functioning described in (I). 
So it is unjust when children’s functioning falls below a threshold level because it 
reflects an unjust parental conduct (neglect) which is unjust because it tends to produce 
precisely such a fall in functioning level. We can now see why the inference from 
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 The original argument, which concerned the injustice of exploitation in Marx, appears in G. A Cohen, 
Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 197-200. As the 
previous quotes from Cohen indicate, he does not share the substantive view in support of which I employ 
the structure of his argument here.  
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normative independence to causal independence is flawed. It is plausible to hold that a 
certain conduct is just (or unjust) because of the state of affairs it produces (or tends to 
produce) and that this state of affairs is just (or unjust) only because it results (or is 
sustained) through that conduct. The fact that a state of affairs is normatively 
independent of the normative status of its cause does not entail that it is normatively 
independent of the nature of the cause.  
As I said in the beginning of the discussion of (IV), all this does not prove its 
inclusion within the potential scope of justice to be wrong. The conviction of those 
insisting that justice may apply to natural happenstances, about which there is nothing 
to be done, need not follow from the two lines of thought rejected here. It may, for 
example, be a foundational conviction about what justice means. If some define justice 
as an inequality in brute misfortune then none of what I have said proves them wrong. 
Yet I have tried to show that two prima facie reasons for approving it are unjustified. I 
hope this shifts at least some of the burden of proof from my camp to theirs. 
Before concluding, it is left to briefly explain why it is justified to include (III) within 
the potential scope of justice. We said that the normative assessment of states of affairs 
is dependent on their cause, and so it seems to follow that if we exclude (IV) from the 
scope of justice then we should also exclude (III) as they both share the same kind of 
cause, namely a natural one. Yet we should be careful here. It is true that the initial 
state of affairs that results from nature is neither just nor unjust. Justice does not apply 
to it as it does not apply to states of affairs of the (IV) kind. But if some human conduct 
can alter this state of affairs then its continuation does fall within the potential scope of 
justice. Thus the (initial) state of affairs in which a person suffers from some bacterial 
infection is neither just nor unjust. But the fact that he is not provided with an available 
treatment may turn this (continuing) state of affairs into being unjust. If indeed there is 
an injustice here, it includes not only the prevention of the treatment but also the 
continuing bacterial infection. The fact that a state of affairs initially resulted from 
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nature does not matter if it can now be altered by human conduct.
101
 In such a case, the 
continuation of this state of affairs does result from human conduct (or abstention of 
human conduct, which is also human conduct) and so it may be scrutinized by justice.
102
 
The result of this discussion is that a state of affairs in which a child’s level of 
functioning does not reach the threshold is not necessarily unjust. Justice does require 
parents to provide the conditions for their children to meet the threshold level of 
functioning but this may, at times, be out of the parents’ reach. Not meeting the 
threshold level will always be unfortunate, perhaps even tragic, but in itself does not 
imply an injustice.  
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 Shklar, Faces of Injustice, 81: “It is not the origin of the injury, but the possibility of preventing and 
reducing its costs, that allows us to judge whether there was or was not unjustifiable passivity in the face 
of disaster.” 
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 Again, although necessary, this fact alone is not sufficient for making a naturally-caused state of affairs 
either just or unjust. The state of affairs that there is a fly in my study is neither just nor unjust 
irrespective of whether or not this can now be altered by my actions.  
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Chapter 5 
Justice, Family and Polity 
 
The duke of Sheh informed Confucius, saying, “Among us here there are those 
who may be styled upright in their conduct. If their father have stolen a sheep, 
they will bear witness to the fact.” Confucius said, “Among us, in our part of the 
country, those who are upright are different from this. The father conceals the 
misconduct of the son, and the son conceals the misconduct of the father. 
Uprightness is to be found in this.” 
 (Analects of Confucius)
1
  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The family is the primary site of upbringing. According to the principle of family justice 
put forward in the previous chapter, it is where children are to be provided with the 
conditions to achieve the functioning level of decent life prospects. Yet a theory of 
family justice cannot end here, for the achievement of justice in the family is heavily 
influenced by the social and political setting; and its implications, in turn, go beyond the 
family and may have profound effects on its surroundings. Children grow in families but 
they grow into community members and citizens. The trivial fact that the children of 
today are the citizens of tomorrow makes inevitable some overlap of family and state 
concerns. However if the political domain is that of citizens publicly interacting with 
each other and with the state as their shared government, then the family is not strictly 
political. The particularity and privacy of the parent–child relationship makes it different 
from being a simple extension of the citizenship mode of relationship.  
This ambivalent relation between the familial and the political is nicely captured 
by the early modern picture of the family as a ‘little state’ 
                                                 
1
 Confucius, Confucian Analects, The Great Learning, and The Doctrine of the Mean, trans. James Legge 
(New York: Dover Publications, 1971), 270. 
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within which children are taught the virtues of obedience and prepared for 
citizenship (or, more often, subjection) in the larger state, the political community 
as a whole. This looks like a formula of integration, but it also had another 
purpose. If the family was a little state, then the father was a little king, and the 
realm over which he ruled was a realm the king himself could not invade. The little 
states bounded and contained the larger one of which they were also the parts.
2
 
As I hope will become clear towards the end of this chapter, I do not adhere to the view 
that the realm of the ‘little state’ is off-limits to the state. But I do wish to develop the 
idea suggested above that the family as the primary site of upbringing contains formulae 
of both integration and separation. Familial upbringing is not political, yet it has bearings 
on the political. And while the polity has interests in the upbringing of its future citizens 
it leaves the primary responsibility for this in the hands of private individuals. In this 
chapter I examine this complex dynamic and show how the demands of justice that arise 
along the axis of citizens–parents–children reflect an inherent structural tension, which 
is the result of the conflicting yet coexisting formulae of integration and separation of 
family and polity. 
Crudely put, we can say that a society or family is just when it is organized to meet 
the demands of justice and its members comply with those demands. As both society 
and family can be either just or unjust, we can distinguish between interactions of family 
and polity in light of four general situations depicted in Figure 1 below.  
 
 
Fig. 1 
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 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 
232. This should not be confused with the contemporary ‘little state’ picture of the family (see 
Introduction, note 6 and accompanying text), which fails to capture the tension between family and state. 
               Society 
Family 
Just Unjust 
Just (I) (II) 
Unjust (III) (IV) 
167 
Of course this simplifies matters unrealistically. I here bracket the enormous range of 
intermediate associations and affiliations lying between the levels of family and 
citizenship (some of which are considered in the discussion that follows). I also ignore 
contexts wider than the polity that may be relevant to the issues at hand.
3
 This is not to 
imply they are of no significance but to constructively narrow the discussion to this 
particular interaction. I start with situation (I) in which both society and family are just. 
Section 2 discusses the formula of integration and Section 3, the formula of separation. 
The discussion reveals that the tension between family and polity is present even when 
both comply with the demands of justice. Whether and to what extent this tension 
compromises justice depends on the specific circumstances that obtain. Section 4 
addresses situation (II) and considers what justice requires of parents in the face of 
unjust social circumstances. In light of the possibility of situation (III) I discuss in Section 
5 the issue of state action in pursuit of family justice. Situation (IV) is an unhappy 
combination of situations (II) and (III). Its normative implications are fact-dependent on 
which situation out of (II) and (III) it is closer to. Accordingly, the following discussion 
does not give it separate treatment, although it does consider what I hope to be 
relevant guidelines for thinking about real-life situations of this type.  
 
 
2. Formula of integration 
 
Children are both (potentially full) citizens of their political society and members of 
particular families within society.
4
 Much of the relation between the demands of justice 
stemming from these two contexts depends, of course, on the way in which we 
understand the context of citizenship. Is political society a ‘society of societies’ 
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 See the discussion in Colin M. Macleod, “Parental Responsibilities in an Unjust World,” in David Archard 
and David Benatar (eds.), Procreation and Parenthood: The Ethics of Bearing and Rearing Children (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010). 
4
 Unfortunately, not all children; some are refugees, some do not have families. I do not address these 
cases here. 
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guaranteeing only the terms of their mutually indifferent coexistence? Can we go 
beyond this to view it as a system of cooperation for mutual advantage over time? Or 
perhaps go far as thinking of political society in terms of community, its members 
sharing a common identity and enjoying strong bonds of solidarity with each other? 
Taking a stand on these questions would require writing a treatise on social justice and 
is clearly outside the scope of this project. Yet we can still offer (what I hope to be) a 
relatively uncontroversial observation that modern citizenship has some notion of equal 
treatment as its operative principle. Whether this should be taken more as a procedural 
or as a substantive notion, would be disputed by libertarians, liberals and socialists 
depending on their underlying understanding of political society. But I think all can 
roughly agree that “justice always requires the equal treatment of citizens”
5
 while 
disagreeing what this entails. This should be sufficient to establish the source for both 
the formulae of integration and separation of family and polity.  
Postponing the discussion of the latter to the next section, the source for the 
formula of integration is the concern for the interests of children which both state and 
family ought to share, whether seeing them as (potentially full) citizens or family 
members. The citizens of tomorrow are brought up in families but, as David Archard 
observes, the care of children is never exclusively devolved.
6
 And even if care of children 
had been entirely devolved to families, some other interests of children would still 
remain the responsibility of the state. The formula of integration results in family and 
state complementing each other in meeting the interests of children. In what follows I 
explore some of the forms this formula may actually take. 
At a very abstract level, society and family would probably exercise different 
distributive principles. While the previous chapter concluded that the appropriate 
principle for the familial context is one of providing conditions for functionings up to the 
level of decent life prospects, there is no reason to assume that a similar principle would 
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 David Miller, “Two Ways to Think About Justice,” Politics, Philosophy and Economics 1 (2002): 5-28, at 
23. 
6
 David Archard, The Family: A Liberal Defence (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), xviii. 
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apply across the citizenry. The principle may present us with a different metric (such as 
opportunities or impersonal resources), a different pattern of distribution (strictly 
egalitarian, prioritarian, or a different threshold of sufficiency), or some combination of 
the two. Thus it may be the case that every child is provided by his or her family with 
conditions for functionings at least up to the required threshold while the state gives 
priority to improving the position (measured in capabilities) of the worst-off children. An 
alternative scenario could be one in which every child is provided with an equal share of 
impersonal resources pooled together by the state and, again, with more specific 
conditions for functionings by his or her family.
7
  
The complementary ways in which state and family may work can also be 
observed in the distribution of specific goods and burdens. In some instances the 
division of labour would be such that each context is responsible for a different good, 
the distribution of which has no bearing on the other. Take, for example, political rights 
that are distributed equally to all citizens (e.g. freedom of speech), and the conditions 
for achieving a decent life level of the functioning of emotions. The fact that justice 
requires different things in these two contexts does not pose a problem. There is a clear 
division of labour between the two spheres generated by the distinct mode of 
relationship in each.
8
 
Of course this is not always (or even often) the case. It is more likely that family 
and state distributions would not be completely independent of each other. Think of a 
good that is distributed in both contexts and according to the same pattern. Such a one 
is security, distributed by state and parents to meet a certain threshold, say, the level 
that allows leading a decent life. That both contexts distribute the same good according 
to the same pattern need not follow from the same fundamental principle of justice. 
While in the family context it is part of the conditions for the functionings of life and 
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 For policy-oriented studies of these two social targets, see, respectively, Wolff and de-Shalit, 
Disadvantage, especially Chapters 8-10; Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott, The Stakeholder Society (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999). 
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 It is a clear division as long as the two contexts operate properly. In cases of emotional neglect the state 
may have to intervene (see Section 5 below). This is another dimension of the formula of integration as 
the state does have an interest in children being brought up to be functioning citizens. 
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bodily integrity, in the political context it may stem from equal citizenship. What is 
important to notice, however, is that each context has its peculiar ways of delivering this 
good and that these ways are, in this case, complementary to each other. Thus, the 
polity would promote the security of its members through maintaining an army and a 
police force, while parents would guard their children from everyday dangers such as 
crossing the road and would be mindful of where and with whom their children 
socialize. Parents cannot build their own army (although some do supplement the police 
with a neighbourhood watch and other local initiatives), and the state cannot watch 
over the steps of every child. So while each context generates the same requirement to 
distribute a certain good according to a certain pattern, each carries out that 
requirement in a different way that is complementary to the other.
9
 
Exploring the demands of justice in each context can also help us to resolve what 
may initially appear as a conflict between the two. Here it is not the distributions 
themselves that are complementary but the considerations of what the distributive 
outcome should be. Recall the case discussed in the previous chapter of the Jehovah’s 
Witness parents who refuse, as a matter of conscience, to provide a lifesaving blood 
transfusion for their child. This scenario is often perceived as presenting a conflict 
between family and state. According to this view we are required to strike a balance 
between the rights of parents over their children and the state’s authority to protect 
them. But if the argument of the previous chapter is valid then the demands of justice in 
both contexts would point in the same direction. That is, social justice as well as family 
justice would require the provision of the blood transfusion to the child. Social justice 
would require it because the child is an equal member of society and therefore eligible 
for the same medical treatment that other citizens receive. Family justice would confirm 
the conclusion from its own perspective: parents are required to provide the conditions 
for their child to lead a decent life and the blood transfusion is such a necessary 
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 I do not wish to suggest that the same good and the same pattern being common to two different 
contexts always results in a complementary relation. It may alternatively lead to a competing relation 
between the two contexts, as I discuss in the following section. 
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condition.
 
Putting it in negative terms, parents cannot sacrifice their child’s life, but 
preventing the child from having a blood transfusion entails precisely that; therefore, 
parents cannot prevent their child from having a blood transfusion.
10
 So here we could 
say that the considerations of justice to which the two contexts give rise are 
complementary in the sense that they both point to the same distributive outcome. 
All the aforementioned complementary interactions between family and state are 
the result of principled considerations. We assumed certain distributive principles to 
apply independently to each context and then examined their combined outcome. Yet 
the formula of integration may go beyond this in view of what we can term strategic 
considerations.
11
 These come into play when we promote an outcome recommended by 
a principled consideration arising from one relational context, through acting in another 
relational context. Let me explain. The principled consideration of what goods and 
burdens to distribute and how, arises from the nature of the relationship that obtains 
between the parties. The distributive goals may be carried out through the choices and 
actions of individuals, institutions established for this cause, or some combination of the 
two. As Liam Murphy suggests, 
[w]e should not think of legal, political and other social institutions as together 
constituting a separate normative realm, requiring separate normative first 
principles, but rather primarily as the means that people employ the better to 
achieve their collective political/moral goals.
12
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 This line of reasoning may not be internal to the Jehovah’s Witness perspective but it is to the 
perspective of the parent–child relationship and the conception of justice attached to it. Thus, it is 
independent of the demands of social justice. Admittedly, the perspectives of family and social justice 
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collective ends. But then the question re-emerges: how should we meet the demands stemming from this 
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But this opens up the possibility that in certain circumstances the demands of justice 
stemming from one relational context would be better met through the distributive 
mechanisms that primarily belong to a different relational context. Therefore we could 
say that we distribute a certain good in a strategic rather than principled way. Here, 
“what is of importance is not through whom advantages are distributed, but rather to 
whom they are distributed.”
13
 
Returning now to the formula of integration of family and state we can observe 
that we sometimes choose to allocate certain goods or burdens through either of them 
according to strategic rather than principled considerations. Families are not, primarily, 
vehicles for promoting political ends, and the raison d’être of states is not to help 
parents in discharging their duties towards their children. But it may still be legitimate, 
based on strategic considerations, to entrust the state with meeting a demand of family 
justice, or to promote a social justice goal through the family sphere.
14
 While the 
relevant demand of justice remains attached to the original relational context, it is not 
necessarily unjust for the required distribution to be carried out through the allocation 
mechanisms of the other context. Let me illustrate how this can work in both directions. 
Take first the possibility of using functions of the state as a tool for discharging 
some of the demands of family justice. In the previous chapter I suggested play as a 
functioning of children which parents are required to provide conditions for. This means 
it is the parents’ responsibility to provide their children with means of play, make sure 
their children have available time for playing and actively encourage them to take part 
in various activities of this sort. But most parents do not have at their disposal enough 
resources (land, money, equipment) for erecting playgrounds for their children. Here, 
parents can turn to state or local council mechanisms and pursue (part of) their duties 
                                                                                                                                                 
altered relationship? And in answering it we can affirm the existing institutional framework or adapt it to 
better meet the current demands. 
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 Avner de-Shalit and Yonathan Reshef, review of Levelling the Playing Field by Andrew Mason, 
Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2009): 756-60, at 759.  
14
 The legitimacy of the decision would of course depend also on the fairness of procedure through which 
the decision was made. The fact that it would make the children’s lives better does not in itself make it 
legitimate to coerce childless individuals into shouldering some of the burdens of childrearing. 
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towards their children indirectly. It is plausible to argue that fellow citizens or 
community members are not required as a matter of justice to provide the children of 
others with conditions for play. So we may not have principled considerations to 
distribute play across society.
15
 The fact that the state or local council erects 
playgrounds does not necessarily mean that it is a demand of justice in the respective 
relational contexts. It may be an implementation of family justice through distributive 
mechanisms that primarily serve other relationships.
16
 
Strategic considerations can also work in the other direction, channelling certain 
social goods or burdens through the family. Take, for example, the care for the elderly. 
When society provides financial support to kinship carers it seems to imply that it 
regards this good (for the elderly; it is a burden for the carers) as falling at least in part 
under its remit. Yet it carries out this responsibility indirectly by providing (some of) the 
resources for delivering this good in a different relational context.  
Thus the formula of integration seems to have two dimensions, that is, principled 
and strategic. The principled integration stems from the fact that when parents bring up 
their children they also bring up the future citizens of the polity. Therefore it should not 
come as a surprise when the demands justice makes on parents with respect to their 
children are complementary to the demands made on the citizenry with respect to the 
next generation thereof. On top of this, however, there is also a strategic dimension for 
integration according to which the demands of justice in one context may be channelled 
through the distributive mechanisms of the other in order to be met. Under the formula 
of integration, strategic considerations do not seem illegitimate or unjust.
17
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174 
3. Formula of separation 
 
If the formula of integration originates in the family bringing up children who are also 
future citizens, the formula of separation comes to the fore because the family is not 
required to bring up children as future citizens. This can be observed in two ways. First, 
the principle of family justice implies that children are to be provided with conditions for 
decent life prospects within the parents’ social and cultural context. Thus stated, the 
principle of family justice does not refer to the strictly political context and the demands 
of citizenship. These demands are not necessarily incorporated within family justice – a 
view which I defend later.  
Yet there is a more fundamental sense in which the family is not required to bring 
up children as future citizens. This refers not to the demands of justice stemming from 
each of these contexts, but to the internal logic
18
 of these relational contexts – the 
different ways in which we relate to each other as family members and as fellow 
citizens. As I argued in Chapter 3, the distinctive feature of the parent–child relationship 
is its element of identity – that sense of continuity between parent and child. The family 
is thus an agent of particularity, through which the child obtains a biography of her own.  
It is through our parents that we first come to have a name, lineage, locality (and so 
much more). Our life story begins with them. From the perspective of citizenship, 
however, all this is sidelined. “A citizen of Rome,” Rousseau wrote, “was neither Caius 
nor Lucius; he was a Roman.”
19
 When entering the public realm, we are meant to set 
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(1984): 315-30. 
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aside these biographical particularities. “Our personal lives and commitments may be 
very different, but we are all equally citizens, and it is as citizens that we advance claims 
in the public realm and assess the claims made by others.”
20
 If the family fosters and 
reinforces particularity, citizenship pulls towards uniformity.
21
  
The tension between citizenship and family is inherent even in cases where a clear 
priority is given to one context over the other. To illustrate, consider Rousseau’s 
description of the ultimate “female citizen”: 
A Spartan woman had five sons in the army and was awaiting news of the battle. A 
Helot arrives; trembling, she asks him for the news. “Your five sons were killed.” 
“Base slave, did I ask you that?” “We won the victory.” The mother runs to the 
temple and gives thanks to the gods.
22
 
This Spartan mother did not openly show any sense of conflict between her familial and 
civic duties as the latter clearly had precedency over the former. Yet even in such an 
extreme case of acquiescence the tension between the two perspectives, and the 
conclusions drawn, remains: for the patriot, the result of the battle is victory; for the 
parent, personal tragedy. The tension results from the fact that the two perspectives 
are, to some degree, independent of one another. Even in Rousseau’s Sparta, the 
familial perspective is not entirely subsumed by that of citizenship, although it is set 
aside in favour of the latter. The ultimate citizen’s lack of interest in the first response of 
the Helot does not imply it was irrelevant.
23
  
The friction between family and citizenship is already present in the small and 
homogeneous polity of Rousseau’s Sparta. What diffuses the tension there is the fact 
that the demands of citizenship are an integral part of the parents’ social context within 
which they bring up their children. In Rousseau’s Sparta, being a community member 
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boils down to being a citizen and so the particularities of the family must eventually be 
set aside. If the value of the “civil man” is “determined by his relation to the whole, 
which is the social body,” then the ultimate task of his upbringing should be to 
“transport the I into the common unity, with the result that each individual believes 
himself no longer one but a part of the unity.”
24
 However, we do not live in Rousseau’s 
Sparta, as Rousseau himself was all too aware. In a multicultural world the tension 
between family and citizenship becomes more intense. It is not only our lineage that is 
bracketed by the perspective of citizenship, but also local traditions, ethnicity, religion, 
and perhaps even our mother tongue.  
I do not wish to exaggerate this tension. Many of us have responded to it by 
assuming what Michael Walzer calls hyphenated identities.
25
 Rather than Roman or 
Spartan we are now Catholic Italian-Americans or Muslim Indian-British or Israeli-
Yemenite Jews. As long as the different communities within which we are members are 
“pluralized from within,” some balance can probably be found since “the claims they 
make to reproduce themselves are already qualified by a recognition of similar (but 
different) claims made on behalf of some or even all of their own members.”
26
 In such 
cases there is no reason why parents will not be able to bring up their children according 
to these hyphenated identities and the divided loyalties that spring from them. They will 
provide their children with conditions to lead a decent life as citizens and as members of 
their religious and ethnic communities.  
I stated my wish not to exaggerate the tension between family and citizenship in a 
multicultural world as I think that in many circumstances hyphenated identities may 
offer a feasible response. But I do not wish to trivialize it either. Placing a hyphen 
between one’s different affiliations does not make the tension go away. The challenge is 
to offer an understanding of citizenship that could be shared by individuals belonging to 
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different communities. Yet by formulating such an understanding we are pulled in 
opposite directions, on the one hand, by inclusiveness, and on the other, social unity. 
Aiming for social unity as more than a prudentially-motivated modus vivendi will 
probably involve an idea of national community with shared history and public culture. 
David Miller has argued that only a relatively thick version of citizenship such as this can 
serve “both as a source of ethical standards and as a framework within which people 
will want to justify their decisions to one another by reference to criteria of justice.”
27
 
But if we also want to include all members of society then our understanding of 
citizenship must be rather thin. After all, the shared history and public culture of a 
Catholic African-Caribbean, an ultra-Orthodox Jew and a Protestant Scot – all holding UK 
passports – are quite limited. Thus the national identity underlying the understanding of 
citizenship must be thick enough to foster social cohesion yet sufficiently thin to 
accommodate social diversity. To achieve this delicate balance,  
[w]hat must happen in general is that existing national identities must be stripped 
of elements that are repugnant to the self-understanding of one or more 
component groups, while members of these groups must themselves be willing to 
embrace an inclusive nationality, and in the process to shed elements of their 
values which are at odds with its principles.
28
 
This is how we come to have hyphenated identities in which each component 
accommodates the others. Yet it is clear from this passage that even when possible this 
entails some loss and (what is perhaps less clear) that this loss will be unequally shared. 
Mutual accommodation will require more sacrifice from some than from others as the 
shared history and public culture will have a closer affinity with the history and culture 
of some communities than others. Even if all identities could be hyphenated they would 
still display varied relations between the two sides of their hyphen(s). From the 
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perspective of the family, some parents will require manoeuvring skills (which not all of 
them possess) to align their more communitarian values and practices with those of the 
polity. From the citizenship perspective, trying to equalize these burdens will lead away 
from simple forms of equal treatment and universal citizenship towards incorporating 
some elements of special treatment and differential citizenship.
29
 This makes social 
justice a very complex ideal, even if not an impossible one.  
The hyphenated-identities response is not without its shortcomings. This is 
realized once we observe that it is a distinctly liberal response, one which is not suitable 
for dealing with illiberal communities unwilling, and perhaps unable, to get hyphenated. 
Michael Walzer offers this charge on their behalf. 
“But if you mean to tolerate us,” they would say, “if you mean to recognize our 
right to live in our way and to raise our children to value and sustain that way, 
then you must allow us full control over their education. For our way is an integral 
whole, complete in itself, leaving no aspect of personal or social life without 
guidance and constraint. It can’t be compromised; it can’t be combined with a 
little bit of this and a little bit of that… In any case, we can’t compete for the 
allegiance of our children, for until we have taught them the value of our ways, 
the outside world is sure to look more exciting; its gratifications come more 
quickly; its responsibilities, for all your talk of citizenship, are much easier to live 
with than the responsibilities we impose – to God, to our ancestors, to one 
another. We simply can’t survive as a voluntary association of autonomous 
individuals…”
30
 
Such totalizing communities, as Walzer calls them, seem to pose an either/or dilemma 
as the demands of justice arising from family and citizenship come into conflict. Thus we 
either educate future citizens in mutual respect thereby exposing them to some 
alternative ways of life, or allow fundamentalist religious parents to authoritatively 
transmit their own values and practices to their children. Providing for the needs of 
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children as both future citizens and community members is not compatible in this 
instance. In other cases the incompatibility may exhibit itself through the different 
responsibilities attached to citizenship and membership in particular communities. Such 
is the long-lasting conflict in Israel between the ultra-Orthodox Jewish community and 
the general public with respect to the burden of military service. From the perspective 
of citizenship the exemption granted to able ultra-Orthodox Jewish men and women is 
viewed by many as unjust. Yet its purpose is to allow them to shoulder the specific 
burdens of their own community – for men, studying Torah, and for women, 
procreation.
31
 How should we decide then which context must enjoy primacy; which 
demand of justice must give way to the other? 
Two potential responses, both attempting to deny the conflict, need to be 
rejected. The first reasserts the primacy of citizenship. It calls for recognizing “the great 
values of the political against whatever values normally conflict with them.”
32
 These 
values of “equal political and civil liberty, fair equality of opportunity, and economic 
reciprocity as well as the social bases of citizens’ self-respect,” are “not easily 
overridden.”
33
 We should thus be citizens first and members second. The problem, 
however, is that members of totalizing communities do not share this argument. They 
do not necessarily ignore the political values embodied in a conception of social justice. 
But they eventually decide, even if not without difficulty, to override (some of) its 
demands in favour of the particular demands of their own community to which they 
ascribe yet greater value. Ultimately, they opt for being members first and citizens 
second, and the question re-emerges: how should we balance the perspectives of 
‘citizens first’ with that of ‘members first’? 
Some may insist that this is only a superficial distinction, or not one that arises 
from considerations of justice, for the requirements of citizenship are already included 
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within the perspective of family justice. Both perspectives, in fact, point in the same 
direction. Members of totalizing communities cannot do without citizenship for they 
would be “deprived of protection, lack civic and welfare rights, have no passport, and 
officially belong nowhere.”
34
 If citizenship is indeed “indispensable for the well-being of 
modern individuals,”
35
 then parents – required to provide their children with conditions 
for decent life prospects – are, inter alia, required to adapt their children to the terms of 
citizenship. Yet what this line of argument overlooks is that it is exactly the terms of 
citizenship which are here called into question. It is not that totalizing communities 
want to do entirely without citizenship; rather, they offer a different understanding of it 
that does not conform to the prevalent view of the polity. They would probably be 
willing to assume a minimal notion of citizenship yet not the thicker one that the 
majority of the polity shares. As Walzer diagnoses, “it’s democracy that makes the 
difficulty.” 
Democratic citizenship is an inclusive status, and it is an official status, a kind of 
political office that carries with it significant responsibilities… In a multinational or 
multireligious empire, where all the members of the different nations or religions 
are imperial subjects whose only responsibility is obedience, the emperor has little 
reason to interfere in the different projects for cultural reproduction carried on in 
communal schools… There is no communal life for which his subjects need to be 
trained… But democracy requires the common life of the public square, the 
assembly, the political arena, and certain understanding must be shared among 
the citizens if what goes on in those places is to issue in legitimate laws and 
policies.
36
 
Since democratic citizenship is not a necessary condition for having decent life prospects 
it is implausible to argue that justice inherently requires parents to enrol their children 
in democratic citizenship. The demands justice makes on parents and citizens do not 
necessarily conflict yet they are not inherently compatible. The open conflict is not 
conceptual but circumstantial: it results from totalizing communities finding themselves 
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in the midst of a liberal-democratic public culture; when we have, so to speak, bounded 
societies within bounded societies. In such circumstances we face the following 
dynamic: 
A liberal state dominated by a liberal theory of the good – by a particular 
conception of justice – will find itself pressed by those who dissent from the 
orthodoxy. To the extent that they are not suppressed, this will be because the 
principles of the liberal theory of justice are dishonoured or ignored. A liberal state 
dominated by the more minimal liberalism of the independent umpire will find 
itself pressured to inject greater substantive content into its determinations… 
[T]here is always a tendency towards centralization and standardization under the 
influence of the voice of the majority.
37
 
How should we respond to this? We can start by trying to demarcate the borders 
between societies in such a way that one is no longer bounded within the other. This is 
what we do when we follow a principle of political self-determination for national 
communities (which are totalizing communities of a sort).
38
 Yet not all totalizing 
communities have political aspirations. Some religious and aboriginal communities wish 
not to have a polity of their own but to be left alone by the polity. Demarcation here can 
take the form of “internal exile,” allowing for “small pockets of people who do not share 
in the national identity and are not in the full sense citizens,” within the borders of the 
state.
39
 This might be had only when communities are relatively very small in numbers 
and geographically concentrated; otherwise, it will require some segregationist policies 
undermining the integrity of the polity. 
In all other cases we do not seem to have any principled alternative to a 
contingent and untidy modus vivendi. If the demands of justice are generated by the 
nature of the relationships that exist between different parties, then the question of 
how to balance those relationships transcends the relationships themselves and ipso 
facto goes beyond the demands of justice. And the balancing will be an asymmetrical 
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process whereby liberal citizens compromise their own principles (of social justice) for 
principled reasons (e.g. toleration), while illiberal community members make 
concessions out of necessity as their own principles (of family justice) do not leave room 
for a more fundamental compromise.
40
 Walzer concludes that the best we can hope for 
is both sides coexisting antagonistically “for there are only compromises that have to be 
made and remade endlessly and that are sure to leave both democratic citizens and 
community members unhappy.”
41
 
Where there is no right solution, “no deduction from a set of principles,”
42
 
philosophers have little to say and are inclined to give way before politicians searching 
for practical arrangements. Yet philosophers are still left with something, even if not 
much, to say, and in the remainder of this section I want to suggest what that is. Recall 
the distinction made in the previous section between two types of distributive 
considerations, principled and strategic. Under the formula of integration it was not 
necessarily unjust to meet the demands stemming from one relational context through 
the mechanisms that primarily belong to another. The formula of integration, in other 
words, allowed for distributions according to strategic alongside principled 
considerations. This, I now claim, does not hold true for the formula of separation. In 
cases falling under its remit, it is an injustice to use the distributive mechanisms of one 
relational context to promote the conflicting demands of another, thereby turning the 
mechanisms of the original context against itself. When this is done we can say, 
borrowing from Walzer, that institutions stop being responsive to their own internal 
logic which is now “repressed by tyrannical force, crossing the lines, breaking through 
the walls established by the art of separation.”
43
 Using state mechanisms in a way that 
undermines social justice, or intervening in the family so legitimate parental conduct is 
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hindered, violates their “institutional integrity.” This amounts to committing an injustice 
and thus marks a boundary for modus vivendi compromises we should avoid crossing as 
much as possible. 
The moral significance of the distinction between compromising justice and 
committing injustice may become clearer if we test our intuitions against concrete 
cases. Consider first the example of Israel, where the state not only allows for but 
heavily funds ultra-Orthodox Jewish schools which include in their curriculum neither 
civic education nor any instruction in biology, contemporary history or foreign language. 
Allowing such a schooling system to go on compromises the values of social justice for it 
undermines those future citizens’ fair value of political liberties and fair equality of 
opportunity. Yet what seems particularly troubling here is that the state actively 
sponsors this arrangement. The grievance of the general public is not concerned with 
the adequacy of the training the ultra-Orthodox community offers to its children, but 
rather with the fact that it uses public funds for this purpose through interest-group 
politics. 
Conversely, a complementary case was the removal of aboriginal children from 
their parents by the Western Australian government in the early decades of the 
twentieth century. Some of the advocacy included assurances that the children were “to 
be trained to be ‘useful citizens’” and “that leaving them to be reared by their mothers 
was ‘wrong, unjust, and a disgrace to the State.’”
44
 Now, concerns for social justice were 
far from being the primary motivation behind this and others policies dealing with the 
aboriginal population. Underlying those policies were deep racial and cultural prejudices 
as well as powerful interests of various groups involved in local politics, none of which I 
wish to ignore when I claim that even an argument from social justice does not lend 
support for this grossly interventionist policy. Haebich points out that it “contrasted 
markedly with the stated aims of the 1907 State Children’s Act to provide for needy 
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children without undue interference in family relationships.”
45
 Indeed, the state could 
promote social justice by means that did not interfere directly with the parent–child 
relationship; for example, through state schooling, an option that aboriginal parents 
were much more willing to accept.
46
 Again, the problem is less with the fact that 
pursuing social justice would compromise family justice, than it is with violating the 
integrity of the family in that pursuit.  
If my analysis is right then modus vivendi compromises are not entirely 
unprincipled. Even if there is no one ‘correct’ compromise, some compromises are 
simply wrong. (One might say that what makes such cases wrong is precisely the fact 
that they are not genuine compromises; the principles of one side uncompromisingly 
override the principles of the other.) There are likely to be circumstances in which social 
justice and family justice are not (fully) compatible yet this is no reason to lose sight of 
their demands. Even when we have to compromise justice we can still aspire to 
minimize injustice. And this sets principled limits on the sort of compromises we should 
be aiming at – those retaining the internal logic of each relational context and its 
institutional integrity.  
 
 
4. Family justice in the face of social injustice 
 
The previous discussion explored the conflict that might arise in situations where society 
and family fully adhere to their respective principles of justice. Yet this is rarely, if ever, 
the case, for the conduct of many parents falls short of what justice requires, and no 
society is a perfectly just one. I consider in this section what justice requires of parents 
in the face of social injustice; and in the next, state action in pursuit of family justice.  
As a starting point for our discussion, let us take the following paragraph from 
Blustein: 
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[T]here are important moral differences between the case where the disabilities of 
prospective parents are due to personal qualities (e.g., temperament or 
immaturity) and the case where they are due in large measure to insufficient 
economic resources. By preventing the poor from having children, or by imposing 
limits on the number of children they may have without imposing comparable 
limits on more affluent parents, we increase the stigma and lack of self-respect 
already associated with being poor, and we deny the poor equality of opportunity 
for parenthood on the basis of characteristics in themselves irrelevant to 
psychological fitness for raising children. None of this however can justify allowing 
the poor to have children they cannot adequately provide for.
47
 
Not all cases of poverty are instances of social (or global) injustice but Blustein’s claim 
seems to refer to such cases as well.  This may give rise to some uneasiness. Instead of 
aiming at minimizing the disadvantages associated with being poor, the implications of 
Blustein’s claim are to the contrary. It furthers the disadvantages of the poor by 
withholding the experience of parenting from them, and this seems to increase rather 
than reduce injustice. Contrary to this initial impression, I argue in this section that 
Blustein is right. Justice may not allow people to parent children they cannot adequately 
provide for, even if it is by no fault of their own but due to an injustice inflicted upon 
them.
48
 To show why this is indeed the case we need to distinguish between two 
relevant perspectives from which parental conduct can be viewed, namely that of 
society and that of the child.
49
 
A society that inflicts injustice on some of its citizens and thereby prevents them 
from meeting the demands of family justice, is not in a position, morally speaking, to 
criticize their conduct or to prevent them from parenting. It would say more about 
society than about the parents, if it approached them with a straight face, saying: ‘It is 
wrong for you to keep parenting your children since you cannot adequately provide for 
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them.’ To this charge, the parents could easily reply: ‘We intend no wrong; hadn’t you 
committed injustice, we could have happily provided for our children all that justice 
requires of us.’ Now if society chooses to ignore its crucial role in generating this wrong, 
we may suspect its moral appraisal of the parents to be critically insincere, an act of 
hypocrisy.
50
 And this works primarily to undermine its own moral status, rather than the 
parents’. 
This holds true also for society’s moral capacity to remove children from their 
parents. If parents cannot meet the demands of family justice due to social injustice, 
then a society seeking to eliminate this wrongness should treat the disease rather than 
its symptom. It should aim first and foremost at reducing the injustice that prevents 
some of its members from adequately providing for their children, thereby enhancing 
their capacity to parent. It cannot just take their incompetence as a given since it is 
because of its own injustice that they are thus incompetent.  
To illustrate, consider the following argument justifying new placements for 
children away from their parents: 
(I) It is wrong when people parent children they cannot adequately provide for. 
(II) Certain members of this society cannot adequately provide for their children (due 
to social injustice). 
Therefore, 
(III) It is wrong when these members parent their children. 
The argument is morally troubling (although valid) when it is put forward by the same 
society which generates the injustice preventing adequate care. If society is interested 
in moral action then it cannot take the conclusion of the argument as its starting point 
while it is due to its own conduct that the minor premise becomes true. It should rather 
aim at undermining the truth of this premise by adopting policies to reduce the relevant 
injustice and enhance its members’ capacity to parent. When society ignores this course 
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of action and takes the conclusion of the argument as given, we get the sense of 
increased injustice pointed out above.  
But all this is of much less relevance when we approach the issue from the child’s 
perspective. From this perspective the minor premise of the above argument is indeed 
given, and so a child may have a claim of justice against a person who insists on 
parenting her despite lacking the necessary means. I say ‘may have’ because it is not 
always the case – indeed it is often not the case – that there is a better parental 
alternative available for the child. If the parent, given the unjust social circumstances, 
provides the child with what he can and there is no parental alternative available that 
can better provide for the child, then we cannot say an injustice is inflicted on the child 
by the parent.
51
 Yet there are times when others are available to better meet the 
demands of family justice and in these cases it is unjust if parents insist on keeping their 
children while preventing them from the possibility of reaching (or getting nearer) the 
threshold level of functioning. This holds even when placing the children elsewhere 
actually plays into the hands of the perpetrators of the initial social injustice.  
To make this point more vivid, and perhaps more controversial, consider the 
horribly unjust situation that Jewish parents faced during the Holocaust: 
[T]he closer the instruments of the ‘Final Solution’ drew, the more evident it 
became that the dangers of starvation, disease and deportation were too 
imminent and serious to ignore and that the chances of the children surviving if 
they stayed with their parents were close to nil. Acknowledging this terrible 
reality, some parents looked for shelters in which to place their children in an 
attempt to avert their otherwise inevitable fate. Often they turned to non-Jewish 
friends and asked them to take care of the child. At times they simply left the child 
– if young enough – on the doorstep of a monastery or a non-Jewish family, or 
sent him or her out of the ghetto with no definite address in the hope the child 
would find some mercy and humanity. At other times, the Gentile caretakers were 
approached by third parties or themselves volunteered to risk their lives and the 
lives of their families to shelter one or more Jewish children. Needless to say, such 
options of rescue were extremely rare and were available to a very limited 
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number of Jews... For the million and a half Jewish children who perished in the 
Holocaust no shelter was found, no solace from suffering, no escape from cruelty 
and murder.
52
 
The Holocaust was an historical situation in which the social injustices of racial 
discrimination, persecution and then extermination prevented most parents belonging 
to a specific minority group in society from providing their children with conditions for 
decent life prospects in their own contextual terms. But some of these parents faced an 
alternative; to give away their children to members of other non-persecuted groups in 
society, and thus further the chances for their children to gain decent life prospects, 
albeit in contextual terms different from their own. This would imply bringing the 
children up according to a different faith, religion, culture, perhaps even language, and 
in turn would most likely shatter any substantial sense of continuity between them and 
their original parents. This course of action may have been regarded as indirectly 
collaborating with the perpetrators’ aims or as ‘giving up’. Nonetheless, I contend – 
without understating the tragedy of the parents’ decision – that this is what justice 
required of them in such unjust circumstances. Indeed, that was part of the way they 
were wronged by their perpetrators and part of their tragedy.
53
 
While I argued that it would be hypocritical for an unjust society to take action 
against parents who cannot adequately provide for their children due to the very 
injustice it perpetrates, this is not pertinent to the issue of whether their children have a 
claim of justice against them. As we stated earlier, it is only for as long as parents do 
provide decent life prospects in their own contextual terms that these terms (are 
allowed to) matter. Parents who cannot provide decent life prospects in their own 
contextual terms may not legitimately sacrifice their children’s interests by withholding 
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decent life prospects in other contextual terms even if these come into sharp conflict 
with their own.  
The case discussed here has parallels with the Jehovah’s Witnesses example from 
the previous chapter. In both, parents could have provided the conditions for decent life 
prospects in accordance with their own contextual terms had the circumstances been 
normal. However the actual circumstances, whether natural or social, are such that the 
children cannot be provided with decent life prospects which accord with their parents’ 
contextual terms but can be provided with such prospects according to conflicting 
contextual terms. The causes generating these unfavourable circumstances, while very 
different, do not undermine the claim of justice their children may have in both cases:  
‘It is wrong for you to parent me if you do not adequately provide for me.’ And in both 
cases the parents could not reply by saying: ‘Well, I don’t have any choice. The 
unfavourable circumstances preventing me from adequately providing for you are out of 
my control.’ They could not respond in this way because they did in fact have a choice, 
namely, to let some others provide for their children. The child could rightly claim 
against the parent: ‘You have no right to sacrifice my life by insisting on keeping me 
while not being able to adequately provide for me.’
54
 It is worth stressing again that this 
course of action was not available to most Jewish parents during the Holocaust as they 
“had no non-Jewish friends or connections, or, at any rate, had no practical way of 
getting to them.”
55
 In these much more common occasions, such a claim of justice could 
not be made.
56
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The distinction between family justice and social justice and, more generally, 
between different relational contexts, is not a futile labelling game. In cases of injustice 
labelling them correctly will indicate the focus of the required moral action. Consider, 
for example, the practice of female genital cutting, which is so troubling as it threatens 
women’s functionings of bodily integrity and sense, imagination and thought (which 
includes having pleasurable experiences and avoiding non-necessary pain) and may also 
risk the functionings of bodily health and life. Yet if Gerry Mackie’s convention theory of 
this practice is correct, parents who perform this practice on their daughters are not 
necessarily committing a family injustice. In societies where female genital cutting is 
maintained as a conventional sign of marriageability, parents seem to follow this 
practice as part of providing the best conditions for functionings available for their 
daughters.
57
 If this is right then treating it as family injustice misreads the situation and 
would probably do no good. Following Mackie, we may suggest that this case presents 
us with just parents (usually mothers) trying to discharge their duties towards their 
daughters in face of social injustice (or a bad, even if not unjust social practice). In this 
case, labelling this practice correctly will not only mark the target for moral 
condemnation but also the site for moral action, here in the form of solving a collective 
action problem of shifting from an existing inferior equilibrium to a superior one in 
which the convention is abandoned by everyone.
58
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But labelling an injustice as a social one does not exempt parents from moral 
responsibility. It still leaves open the complex question of how parents should react to 
the injustice inflicted on them and their families. I argued above that when parents 
cannot meet the demands of family justice and there are others available who can, the 
parents are not justified in keeping their children. I concede that this claim may be 
repugnant as it seems to further the social injustice originally inflicted, but the 
alternative is no better and, according to my argument, morally wrong. (As I said, it does 
not, in fact, further the original injustice but is another aspect of it.) If children enjoy a 
distinct moral status then parents cannot sacrifice them while fighting for their cause. 
The tragedy of their situation should not blur the constraints that justice imposes on 
their conduct.   
 
 
5. State action in pursuit of family justice 
 
The remaining issue to which I now turn is how a just society should act in the face of 
(the possibility of) family injustice. As I mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, 
the interplay between an unjust society and unjust families will not be discussed and so I 
assume throughout this section that we are concerned with a society which is just on 
the whole but within the purview of which instances of family injustice occasionally 
occur. The issue here is the policy implications of our account of family justice for the 
just society.  
If justice is the first virtue of the family, then an unjust family must be reformed or 
abolished. Parental conduct must conform to the demands of justice. This is addressed, 
first and foremost, to the parents themselves. It does not imply that it is for the state to 
ensure that parental conduct entirely conforms to family justice or that every unjust 
family is reformed or abolished. In this section I start with a more general discussion of 
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the constraints the state faces in pursuing family justice and then move to explore some 
specific policies. 
Three types of constraints are of specific relevance to policies concerned with 
family justice: epistemic, structural and principled.
59
 I explain each of them in turn. 
The epistemic constraint arises because it is unclear what the principle of family 
justice precisely requires. Although we can roughly tell what it requires of parents we 
cannot usually pinpoint the exact stage at which the demands of family justice are fully 
met. Recall the formulation of the principle of family justice: Justice requires parents to 
provide their children with the conditions to achieve a set of functionings up to the level 
which allows them to lead a decent life in terms of the parents’ social and cultural 
context. In this formulation three components make it quite impossible to determine 
precisely when the principle is fully met. First, there is the concept of decent life: While 
in most cases we can tell with confidence whether a person enjoys decent life or not, it 
is extremely hard if not impossible to tell exactly where the border between life which is 
decent and life which is not lies. Second, we cannot specify the accurate level in which 
the conditions for functionings are sufficient: We can tell that some conditions are 
necessary but the level to which these are sufficiently provided varies from one child to 
another. Moreover, in borderline cases where the child’s functionings are just below the 
threshold level we will often not be in a position to tell whether it is due to conditions 
not being provided or to other factors attributed to the child himself. Third, social and 
cultural contextual terms are (in varying degrees) open for interpretation, dispute and 
change. Contextual terms are neither monolithic nor static and this may make it hard to 
determine what they recommend (although it may be easier to determine what they do 
not recommend).  
The epistemic constraint applies to the parents as well as to the state.
60
 But its 
implications for the just parents and the just polity are opposed. The just parents will 
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aim higher than the threshold level to make sure they fully meet the demands of justice. 
By contrast, the state might do far more damage than good, especially with regard to 
the children involved, if it mistakes a just family for an unjust one. The just polity will 
want to make sure it addresses actual (rather than apparent) injustice and will therefore 
focus its attention on parental conduct which clearly falls below the threshold level. 
The second constraint is structural. We asserted in earlier chapters that part of 
what characterizes the family is that it forms a somewhat private sphere of intimacy. To 
have a state regulating and monitoring parental conduct to ensure that justice is met to 
the highest possible extent, would inevitably transfigure the family as we know and 
value it.
61
 Society therefore needs to find some balance between the enforcement of 
family justice and the privacy and intimacy of the family. We can think of this again in 
terms of the integration and separation of family and state. Since what justice requires 
of the state and of parents with respect to children is to some extent integrated, the 
polity has a responsibility to enforce family justice. Yet the demands of family justice 
arise from the specifics of the parent–child relationship and are not initially tailored to 
state enforcement.
62
 So it should not come as a surprise that the state is unable to fully 
enforce family justice without transforming the family in the process. 
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The separation of family and state also accounts for the third, principled 
constraint. As we saw in Section 3, some of the demands stemming from family and 
citizenship may not be compatible. I argued that in such cases it is wrong to use the 
distributive mechanism of one relational context to promote the conflicting demands of 
another, thereby turning the mechanisms of the original context against itself. It would 
violate the state’s institutional integrity if we used its mechanisms to pursue demands of 
family justice that conflict with social justice.
63
 So even where the two previous 
constraints do not hold, we may still have a principled reason not to enforce some of 
the demands of family justice.  
The three constraints work together to narrow the scope of state action in pursuit 
of family justice and focus the state’s attention on only a subset of demands of family 
justice. However, it would be misleading to characterize the failure to meet this subset’s 
demands as constituting abuse and neglect. This is because not meeting the principle of 
family justice with respect to any of its demands harms the child by depriving him of or 
not providing him with what he needs, and may thus be regarded as abuse or neglect.  
Alternatively, it may be better to think of this subset as being the core demands of 
family justice. Not meeting them brings down the child’s functioning substantially below 
the threshold level and thus significantly harms the child.
64
 Focusing on such demands is 
recommended by the first two aspects of the epistemic constraint and by the structural 
constraint. But granting that harm, albeit significant, may still be specific to a particular 
cultural context (e.g. not meeting some necessary requirements for securing the child’s 
affiliation with his cultural community), the state should focus only on the demands that 
are (likely to be) common to the different cultural contexts across society.
65
 This is 
recommended by the third aspect of the epistemic constraint as well as by the 
principled constraint. Thus, the relevant subset of demands can be regarded as the core 
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of family justice since not meeting it commonly constitutes significant harm. The core 
demands will include those concerned with basic developmental needs – physical, 
emotional and cognitive – as well as the prevention of child sexual abuse. 
(Notwithstanding my reservation in the previous paragraph, in the rest of this section I 
narrowly employ the terms ‘abuse’, ‘neglect’, and ‘child maltreatment’ to refer to the 
violation of such demands.) Thus the subset of core demands is likely to be substantially 
narrower than the original set, yet this does not make its pursuit any less crucial.
66
 
With these general considerations in mind, I would now like to explore some 
specific policies in pursuit of family justice. My focus here is on policies that directly 
pursue family justice but let me first say something about the indirect effect policies 
may have on family justice. Child maltreatment is commonly approached as having 
neither a single cause nor any sufficient or necessary causes.
67
 Nonetheless, there is a 
particularly close association between child maltreatment, especially neglect, and 
deprivation: “[P]overty and community disadvantage are the most consistent and 
strongest statistical predictors of having an open child protection case and particularly 
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of having a child placed in out-of-home care.”
68
 More specifically, it has been 
consistently found that low-income and poor families have increased probabilities of 
actual child maltreatment.
69
 It is important to bear this in mind when we consider the 
constraints and difficulties the state faces in directly pursuing family justice.  Generous 
welfare policies, albeit not directly motivated to pursue family justice, seem to have the 
potential to reduce the risk of child maltreatment. If this is indeed the case then our 
concern with family justice lends support to such policies. 
In light of the crucial impact family (in)justice has on children’s lives, we need to 
consider possible policies that aim to pursue family justice ex ante, that is, before family 
injustice occurs. One often-mentioned policy of this sort is that of parenting classes. 
Matthew Liao’s suggestion seems particularly relevant here as his parenting education 
scheme is “about helping one to acquire the knowledge and skills to be able to carry out 
the task of helping a child to become an adequately functioning individual.”
70
 The 
scheme would be focused on the basic scientific knowledge about child development 
and refrain from teaching “more value-laden types of parenting skills such as empathy 
and caring.”
71
 It would thus provide a ‘non-comprehensive’ scheme that allows for 
pluralism in parenting. Mandating such a scheme in schools, Liao argues, would provide 
the knowledge necessary for good parenting before abuse and neglect take place. 
Offering parenting classes based on curricula of this sort can promote family 
justice to some extent. We may doubt, however, whether they should target high- 
school students and whether the classes should be mandatory. It is true that if 
addressed to high-school students, such classes are most likely to precede child 
maltreatment. But they are also least likely to be effective, for most high-school 
students are still experiencing their own childhood and the prospects of parenting seem 
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too distant. My point is not that adolescents cannot be interested in issues concerning 
parenting; surely some of them are. It is that in order to be effective such classes need 
to have a practical rather than an academic nature and relate to an actual (or 
anticipated) experience of parenting. Such a format can be a source of basic information 
and support for many parents in much the same way that antenatal classes are for many 
pregnant couples, and we certainly need not wait until parents become abusive or 
neglectful to offer them such classes. But I am sceptical that parenting education can 
remain effective if detached from actual parenting. I also doubt whether making such 
classes mandatory would pursue family justice more effectively. As I said, parenting 
classes may serve for some as a good source of basic information and support. Others 
will turn to alternative sources such as family members, friends, services run by their 
community, internet forums and guidebooks. But it seems right to point out that “child 
maltreatment is usually not an intellectual mistake.”
72
 Those most at risk of becoming 
unjust parents – due to, say, apathy, social isolation or lack of responsibility – are also 
likely not to be affected by these (mandatory) classes.
73
 
Following from this, some have suggested a policy of licensing parents. In its 
limited form, we would set minimal requirements for a licence, then create incentives 
for people to seek it – say, in the form of a tax credit – rather than punish those without 
it.
74
 This is meant to actively encourage people to improve their knowledge and skills 
before becoming parents. However, as this programme ultimately leaves the getting of a 
licence to the discretion of parents, some of whom may not be affected by the 
incentives offered, it still risks allowing severe abuse and neglect to happen. More 
interesting is the rigorous version of that policy. It builds on the idea that while we 
cannot give accurate criteria for being a good parent, we should aim at designing a test 
to identify “the prospectively very worst parents, those extremely likely to abuse or 
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neglect their children.”
75
 Such persons will be legally prohibited from parenting and if a 
child is born to them, the child will be put up for adoption. It seems that a theoretical 
case in favour of such a policy can be made. Family justice does not allow people to 
parent children for whom they do not adequately provide. If we can identify those 
people in advance, we may be justified in not allowing them to parent in light of the 
foreseeable significant harm to their children. Moreover, the costs of running a licensing 
system are not necessarily higher than those incurred by society in dealing with actual 
child maltreatment and the long-term effects it has.
76
  
However, the implementation of the policy faces great feasibility problems. 
It is unclear how many people would not bear children simply because they did 
not possess a license... many people might evade the law and rear children 
without licenses. Penalizing such parents would negatively affect their children, 
the children that need help in the first place... Ultimately, some prospective 
parents might seek to evade the system by having their child outside a hospital. 
This not only poses a danger to the health of women who give birth in such 
situations, but it also poses a health risk to children. These families would 
thereafter have to evade the detection of the state.
77
 
This leads Michael McFall to conclude that the only way we could effectively implement 
a licensing policy is through a system of universal reversible sterilization. 
With such technology, though not available yet, all children (male and female) 
would be sterilized at birth. When such children grow up and wish to have 
children, if they received a license to parent, they would be provided with the 
reverse sterilization procedure.
78
 
For most people this will conclude the matter. If universal sterilization is what it takes to 
effectively implement it, then surely we should forsake the idea of licensing parents. 
McFall anticipates this reaction and argues that considering the reversibility of the 
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procedure and the similarities with a constitutionally permissible case of coerced 
vaccination, we should nonetheless take it seriously.
79
 I do not find his argument 
convincing, primarily because it fails to address the risk of the state misusing its power. 
(Think of the unbearable ease with which genocide could be executed.) But what is 
perhaps most important is that even such an extreme precaution cannot suffice since, 
as David Archard rightly points out, “a licenser of parents would have to be assured that 
even licensed parents were still fit to care for their children.”
80
 As much as those who 
were once found unfit to parent could retake the test and qualify – a possibility the 
advocates of licensing allow – those with a licence could later become incompetent. To 
illustrate, one of the conditions for a licence according to McFall is not having an illness 
or disability that would reasonably endanger a child. But one might become ill or 
disabled after obtaining the licence. A universal licensing scheme does not take away 
the need for monitoring actual parenting.  
What may we conclude from all this? First, while universal licensing does not seem 
a viable policy we may still want to consider selective licensing. Even without testing all 
prospective parents, society is likely to be aware of potential highest-risk parents, such 
as those with past convictions of sexual assault, rape or specifically child-related 
offences. It may be justified to not allow people falling under this category to parent, or 
at least shift the burden of proof so it is up to them to disprove society’s concerns by, 
say, signing up for a comprehensive testing process of the sort McFall suggests and an 
extensive monitoring scheme once approved. This brings us to the second point, which 
concerns the general necessity of some monitoring of parenting. Indeed, not only is it 
required for detecting family injustice but may effectively prevent it from occurring in 
the first place by offering supportive care and watching for potential problems. For 
example, the Nurse Family Partnership (NFP) scheme, which provides long-term in-
home support and services by trained nurses to first-time young mothers, has been 
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found, remarkably, to reduce subsequent maltreatment by up to 50 per cent.
81
 Home-
visiting programmes such as this may be a most effective way to pursue family justice ex 
ante. 
Unfortunately, not all instances of family injustice can be prevented beforehand. 
How then should the state pursue family justice ex post? We declared that unjust 
families must be reformed or abolished and that with respect to families which fail to 
meet the core demands of justice this is also the business of the state. But we also saw 
that the state cannot simply step into the parents’ shoes since epistemic, structural and 
principled constrains prevent it from meeting the full demands of family justice. This 
tells in favour of giving priority to (some ways of) reforming the family rather than 
(completely) abolishing it; to pursuing family justice through mechanisms internal to the 
family and its context rather than external to them. Here I want to present two 
practised policies that are compatible with this line of reasoning. They both give a key 
role to the extended family in pursuing family justice; the first, in the decision-making 
process, the second, as providers of alternative placement for the child.  
Family group conferencing (FGC) is a practice that develops a plan for the care and 
protection of children through a meeting of the children’s extended family, which may 
include relatives as well as fictive kin. The referral to FGC is usually done by a social 
worker, but an independent coordinator prepares the conference together with the 
family. The FGC itself consists of three main stages. First, service providers share 
information with the family about their concerns and the services they can offer. Then 
the family meets privately to develop its plan regarding the care and protection of the 
child. Finally, the family, service providers and the coordinator meet again and the plan 
is formally approved.
82
 FGC originally developed in New Zealand to meet concerns of 
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the indigenous Maori population about the child welfare system’s disregard of Maori 
children’s cultural and family context.  
Rather than marginalising the family circle’s expertise, the conferencing 
philosophy acknowledges that the family circle’s experience and input is critical if 
an effective plan is to be developed for the child’s future… it is affirmed that 
cultural knowledge is amongst the knowledges families bring to the table.
83
  
Now being practised also in other Anglo-American and European countries, FGC is 
regarded as capable of generating “culturally competent, contextual and appropriate 
responses to the family crises.”
84
 
This approach may not be applicable to all families. For example, it seems to 
assume an extended family the members of which all share the same history and 
culture, as in the case of Maori hapu community. In less communitarian contexts, 
however, the extended family may itself be divided about the values and traditions that 
should shape the care plan for the child. More prosaic interpersonal tensions and 
rivalries if present may also undermine the potential effectiveness of such an approach. 
So holding FGC automatically once child protection concerns have been identified might 
not be an adequate requirement.
85
 There are also concerns about whether the 
operation of FGC releases the state from its own responsibility towards the well-being of 
children. If families and wider communities are not provided with the necessary support 
and resources, FGC may increase the burden being shouldered by families and their 
wider communities and further disadvantage the children in their care. Notwithstanding 
these important issues, FGC, if adequately operated, does have the potential to 
somewhat bridge the divide between family and state. 
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The second policy is to give priority, where alternative placement for children is 
required, to kinship placement.
86
 The working assumption underlying this policy is that 
placing a child with members of her extended family or social network is an important 
alternative route to providing “a sense of security, continuity, commitment and identity” 
when the birth family fails to do so.
87
 More specifically, it is valued as giving the children 
a sense of belonging and enabling children “to develop their identity within a context of 
a known history, particularly important where a placement needed to be culturally and 
religiously appropriate.”
88
 This is not to say that kinship care always offers the best 
alternative placement for children. Indeed it may involve quite distinctive challenges. 
Kinship carers are more likely than non-kin foster carers to face difficulties in setting 
clear boundaries with biological parents in cases of child risk. Moreover, they are not 
trained beforehand, as non-kin foster carers are, to handle the heightened care needs of 
maltreated children. Managing financially is another major issue for many kinship 
carers, who usually did not expect to find themselves in this role. This is exacerbated by 
the legal assumption that kin are both naturally inclined and morally obliged to assume 
such care, which appears to result in children being placed with kin receiving less 
support, fewer services and being monitored less closely by agency staff.
89
 Also, kinship 
carers tend to be older on average than non-kin foster carers – in the US more than half 
of kinship carers are older than 50, half of all kinship placements being with maternal 
grandmother and up to a third with aunts – and are more likely to suffer from health 
issues.
90
 The upshot of all this is “a not insubstantial minority [of kinship placements] 
which raise serious quality issues.”
91
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The policy of giving priority to kinship placements should not ignore these 
concerns. But where a good-enough kinship placement is available it has the potential 
to overcome the constraints imposed on the state and its agents thereby minimizing the 
loss the child incurred when removed from his parents. This recommends placing the 
child as close to his family context as is possible without compromising the core 
demands of justice. While “placement with relatives is among the oldest traditions in 
child rearing,” Rebecca Hegar observes, it is “the newest phenomena in formal child 
placement practice.”
92
 Indeed, it stands in stark contrast to some early- and mid-
twentieth-century policies of removing children not only from their families but away 
from their cultural and even social context. Most (in)famous are the removal of 
Australian Aboriginal children of mixed decent from their families to be raised in white-
run institutions (the ‘Stolen Generation’), and the migration scheme of sending poor or 
orphaned children from the UK to former British colonies (the ‘Home Children’). 
The last policy implication I wish to address before concluding concerns the child’s 
right to exit the parent–child relationship. Here I am referring to the right to exit not a 
malfunctioning relationship of the sort I have been discussing to this point, but a 
relationship that may fully satisfy the demands of family justice. This right to exit is a 
thorny issue, since it is relevant only during a limited period between childhood and 
adulthood. Young children, that is, do not have such a right. My baby girl is not entitled 
to exit her relationship with me even if she is strongly displeased with the sleep-training 
programme I am trying to follow. And when children reach the formal age of maturity, 
from the state’s perspective they automatically exit the relationship and parental 
authority ceases to have legal effect. But adulthood is not all-or-nothing, and so we may 
have to recognize the right of sufficiently competent children to exit the relationship 
with their parents.  
This may become particularly relevant where children do not come to conform to 
their parents’ contextual terms. Examples may include gay children of homophobic 
parents, children of devotedly religious parents who become secular, and those not 
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willing to comply with traditional practices such as arranged marriage. In most cases it 
would surely be better for children and parents if they could negotiate their terms, so to 
speak, and come up with a way of maintaining their relationship. Such is the pattern of 
hijab-wearing of young Muslim girls in France who do so at their parents’ insistence but 
thereby buy the freedom to go out by themselves, attend college or continue their 
education.
93
 But at times this might be too painful or not really possible. These are not 
necessarily cases of unjust parents. They may be more than willing to provide their 
children with decent life prospects according to their own contextual terms, but cannot 
conscientiously deviate from them.
94
 Still, they are not allowed to prevent their 
(competent) children from exiting and it should be the state’s policy to enforce this.
95
 
Three points are in order here. First, in accordance with our principle of family 
justice this should be interpreted primarily as enforcing the negative right children have 
to exit the relationship with their parents. Parents are not required by this principle to 
ensure that exiting is a viable option. If society wants to make it more viable – say, by 
making the children aware of that option beforehand or by allowing them access to 
public funds after they exit – then it is not as part of pursuing family justice but from the 
perspective of citizenship that it does so. To the extent that this may conflict with the 
family perspective, this issue falls within the scope of the earlier discussion of the 
formula of separation. 
Second, for most exiting children the state will still be required to arrange some 
alternative placement. After all, in order for the right to exit to make sense, children 
need to have somewhere to exit to. Notice however that our recommended policy of 
placing the child as close to his family context as possible is not likely to work if the exit 
is motivated by contextual (rather than interpersonal) incompatibility. Well-run 
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children’s homes might offer a reasonable solution here.
96
 Alternatively, the state could 
direct children to voluntary organizations which may offer placement better-tailored to 
address their particular situation. 
Third, all this is not to underplay the fact that exiting is still likely to be an 
extremely costly choice for children, especially emotionally.
97
 Presumably parents desire 
their children to comply with their terms, not to cut off their relationship. So making exit 
more real an option might motivate them to become more flexible in setting the terms. 
But it might also have the opposite effect where parents’ terms become even more rigid 
in an attempt to counter the reduced costs of exit. Ending a parent–child relationship 
involves great loss for both sides, particularly for the child. Enforcing the child’s right to 
exit does not deny this. Yet it does indicate scepticism as to whether coercing parents to 
accommodate a dissenting child is a justifiable – and if so, a more promising – route to 
follow. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The principle of family justice gives rise to a complex interplay between family and state. 
Children grow into citizens yet they are not primarily brought up as such by their 
families. Thus we are faced at the same time with formulae of both integration and 
separation of family and polity. Conceptually the demands of justice stemming from 
family and citizenship are complementary as well as competing. The relative strength of 
these opposite formulae is determined by the actual circumstances. In Rousseau’s 
Sparta it was the formula of integration that enjoyed nearly absolute primacy. In the 
case of illiberal minority groups within liberal societies it is the formula of separation 
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which quite dramatically comes to the fore. When circumstances do give rise to conflict 
between the two perspectives, the compromise of justice is inevitable. Yet we can still 
minimize injustice if we respect the internal logic of each relational context and the 
institutional integrity of its distributive mechanisms.  
Since the family is both separated from and integrated in the polity, social injustice 
does not necessarily entail family injustice although it might have detrimental effects on 
family life. On the other hand, a just society has responsibility for taking action against 
family injustice. Despite significant limits for social action in this respect, a just society 
retains a crucial role in furthering the prospects of children to lead and enjoy decent 
lives.  
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Conclusion 
Liberalism and the Family 
 
In all governments, there is a perpetual intestine struggle, open or secret, 
between AUTHORITY and LIBERTY; and neither of them can ever absolutely prevail 
in the contest… [I]t must be owned, that liberty is the perfection of civil society; 
but still authority must be acknowledged essential to its very existence: and in 
those contests, which so often take place between the one and the other, the 
latter may, on that account, challenge the preference. Unless perhaps one may say 
(and it may be said with some reason) that a circumstance, which is essential to 
the existence of civil society, must always support itself, and needs be guarded 
with less jealousy, than one that contributes only to its perfection, which the 
indolence of men is so apt to neglect, or their ignorance to overlook.  
(David Hume)
1
  
 
The main aim of this thesis was to provide an account of what parents owe their 
children as a matter of justice. There is no shortage in the literature dealing with either 
justice or parenthood, yet discussion of the one in light of the other is quite rare. We do 
not tend to think of parenting primarily in terms of justice. Neither do we hurry to 
examine theories of justice by way of their implications for parenting. It is at this 
juncture that the thesis attempts to make its own particular contribution: to better our 
understanding of justice through the prism of parenthood, and our understanding of 
parenthood through the prism of justice. 
Asking about justice in the family gave rise to the more fundamental question of 
how we should think about justice. This work offered some support for the view that 
this is best done contextually. I argued that neither starting with children as abstract 
recipients nor with the family as part of society’s basic institutional structure, coheres 
with the way we normally think about the parent–child relationship and about the 
obligations attached to it. Rather than deriving the demands of justice from a 
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perspective external to the relationship, it seemed more promising to try to formulate 
an account of justice in terms of the relationship’s characteristic features.  
Pursuing a contextualist approach to justice required an account of the parent–
child relationship. The view advanced was that it is an intimate fiduciary relationship 
distinctively characterized by its element of identity, a sense of interconnectedness and 
continuity generated through the transmission of beliefs, practices and more 
idiosyncratic features from parent to child. A conception of family justice will have to 
incorporate this feature. Applying this understanding of the parent–child context to the 
prevalent alternative patterns and metrics of distributive justice has led to the following 
principle: parents are required to provide their children with the conditions to achieve a 
set of functionings up to the level which allows them to lead a decent life in terms of the 
parents’ social and cultural context. 
Yet this account of justice in the family is expected to leave many dissatisfied. 
Some will hold that it compromises children’s individuality and autonomy, while others 
will be concerned by its undermining effect on the social ideal of equality. Both camps 
are likely to think the principle grants parents too much leeway vis-à-vis either their 
children or the wider society. Indeed, they may turn away from the contextualist 
approach altogether, reasserting children's abstract entitlements or society's political 
goals. If this is the principle of justice corresponding to our understanding of the family, 
they will say, then we are better to revise that understanding and thereby make it more 
politically focused or, alternatively, autonomy-oriented.  
To conclude this work, I want to deepen the link between the family as the 
primary site of upbringing and my account of justice in the family by reflecting on two 
models of upbringing alternative to the family. This serves to suggest that implicitly 
assuming one of these alternative models may be the source of potential dissatisfaction 
with the account offered. It might be the case that those unhappy with the account are 
expecting the family to produce outcomes it is not, in fact, suitable for. We may 
nonetheless have good reason to favour the family over the alternative models. The 
closing section, interpreting the family as a particularly liberal model of upbringing, 
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suggests that it reflects the tension between the individual and society rather than 
trying to resolve it in favour of either side. 
 
 
1. Two alternative models 
 
We may deepen our understanding of the family and our normative expectations of it 
by reflecting on what the family is not good for. Drawing on Plato and Rousseau we can 
construct two theoretical models of upbringing alternative to the family. The 
construction of the models by no means captures the full range of the thinkers’ 
arguments. They are rather meant to absorb certain elements present in their theories 
to illuminate, by way of contrast, our understanding of the family.  
 
A. Plato’s guardians: Politically-focused upbringing 
 
Plato’s model is very familiar. It is a crucial component of the communal life prescribed 
for the guardians, the ruling elite in the imagined perfectly just city. What underlies this 
way of life is a concern with the guardians’ allegiance. “When shepherds are breeding 
dogs as protectors of their flocks, the worst possible disaster and disgrace,” Plato tells 
us, is when the dogs “try to attack the sheep themselves, and start behaving like wolves 
instead of dogs.”
2
 By analogy, we must take all necessary measures against the 
possibility of the guardians turning against society.  
One such measure according to Plato must be the abolition of private property, for 
[o]nce they start acquiring their own land, houses, and money, they will have 
become householders and farmers instead of guardians. From being the allies of 
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the other citizens they will turn into hostile masters. They will spend their whole 
lives hating and being hated, plotting and being plotted against.
3
 
Private property, according to Plato, creates private ends and private ends are bound to 
conflict. Thus to secure peace among the guardians and between them and the rest of 
society private property must be prohibited. “In this way they will be kept safe, and they 
will keep the city safe.”
4
 
However, the abolition of private property, while necessary, is not a sufficient 
condition for securing the guardians’ allegiance to the city. For even if the guardians are 
not divided into different households but live communally, they may still establish 
family ties – get married, have children – thereby allowing partiality of interests to re-
emerge. Aiming at undivided loyalty of the guardians and uncompromised allegiance to 
the city thus leads Plato to the following logical conclusions: “That all these women shall 
be wives in common for all these men. That none of them shall live as individuals with 
any of the men. That children in turn shall belong to all of them. That no parent shall 
know its own child, no child its own parent.”
5
 The abolition of the private family is also 
required. 
The upbringing that results is a strictly collective one. The children are to be 
removed from their parents “by the officials responsible” and “transferred to the 
nursing-pen, where there will be special nurses living separately, in a special part of the 
city.”
6
 From this moment on, any traces of kinship are to be concealed. Although 
mothers will be allowed into the nursing-pen for the purpose of breastfeeding, the 
officers, “using every means they can think of,” are to “prevent any of them recognizing 
her own child.”
7
 Thus, the community of the guardians is to become one big – and, Plato 
argues, also happy – family. “When a man takes part in a marriage, he will regard as his 
children all those born in the tenth – or indeed the seventh – month from the day of the 
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festival.”
8
 He will call them his sons and daughters while they all call him father and 
those roughly the same age as their own, brothers and sisters. As all come to regard 
themselves as related, anything that happens to one of them is taken to affect all the 
others. Be it pleasure or pain, success or failure, the guardians “hold one and the same 
thing – which they will call ‘mine’ – in common.”
9
  
This model of upbringing is one of ultimate socialization. Strictly speaking, it was 
meant by Plato to apply only to society’s ruling class, but we can imagine a state 
applying it to the entire citizenry. The desired outcome of such a model is undivided 
loyalty and uncompromised compliance with the polity’s demands thereby creating the 
ultimate citizens for the perfectly just polity. Rather than denying the distinctive 
characteristic of the family – the element of identity – this is achieved through its 
extension to encompass all fellow citizens. Now all are equally interconnected sharing 
the same sense of continuity between each and all others. To establish a Callipolis, the 
private family is thus abolished. 
 
B. Rousseau’s Emile: Autonomy-oriented upbringing 
 
“Do you want to get an idea of public education? Read Plato’s Republic,” Rousseau tells 
his reader.
10
 In contrast to this politically-focused model is the one Rousseau offers in 
his Emile. The latter is an “individual and domestic” form of instruction, an “education of 
nature” concerned with making a natural man.
11
 This seems self-contradictory. How can 
one make something natural? How can something be an artefact yet retain its 
naturalness? However, the setting of the upbringing is not the state of nature but 
modern society and therefore much must be done “to prevent anything from being 
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done.”
12
 Since “all our wisdom consists in servile prejudices” and “all our practices are 
only subjection, impediment and constraint,”
13
 the education of nature must involve 
constant manipulation of the child’s immediate environment shielding him from 
society’s pervasive influence. The aim is to bring up a self-sufficient individual who 
chooses and lives for himself, unconstrained by habit, uncorrupted by opinion. It is thus 
an upbringing oriented towards autonomy. 
To this purpose the upbringing must be as far as possible independent of society, 
with the child considered an “abstract man,”
14
 disregarding all his background 
contingencies. Hence it is far from being a mere coincidence that the first – and, for a 
substantial period of time, the only – book Emile will be reading is Robinson Crusoe. 
Crusoe’s solitary life on a desert island remains the ideal even when Emile becomes a 
member of society. “[I]t is on the basis of this very state that he ought to appraise all the 
others,” for putting oneself “in the place of an isolated man” is “the surest means of 
raising oneself above prejudices and ordering one’s judgments about the true relations 
of things.”
15
 
Who should be in charge of upbringing according to this model? Here Rousseau 
seems unable to offer a clear-cut answer. On the one hand, he explicitly states that it 
should be the task of parents. From the outset Rousseau addresses himself to the 
“tender and foresighted mother,” maintains that “the true nurse is the mother, the true 
preceptor is the father,” and reasserts that “to make a man, one must be either a father 
or more than a man oneself.”
16
 This is linked to his more general view of the family 
being indispensable for fostering altruistic feelings, thereby serving as the cornerstone 
of society.
17
 Nonetheless, Rousseau chooses as his model’s paradigm the upbringing of 
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an orphan by a tutor,
18
 and there are some good reasons to favour this choice. First, in 
Rousseau’s account “education becomes an art” requiring one “to direct the speeches 
and the deeds of all those surrounding a child.”
19
 This is beyond anyone’s full control yet 
it seems much more likely that a skilful master will come closer to its achievement than 
would an ordinary parent. The problem is not solved by Rousseau’s insistence that “zeal 
will make up for talent better than talent for zeal,”
20
 for now absolute devotion is also 
required. “The same man,” Rousseau says, “can only give one education.”
21
 Yet if the 
upbringing takes place in a family, the attention of parents cannot all be given to one 
child. At least one parent will have to work to provide for the family, and in the case of 
there being more than one child then undivided attention simply becomes impossible. 
This consideration again favours tutors over parents. Furthermore, Rousseau points out 
that “to be well led the child should only follow a single guide.”
22
 This follows quite 
naturally from having a single tutor whereas it requires full coordination from parents if 
performed in the family. Lastly, the family – characterized by interdependence – is 
unlikely to provide the most suitable site for bringing up independent, self-sufficient 
individuals. As Blustein observes, “in the family, dependency is, if anything, more 
difficult to overcome than in the one-to-one tutor–pupil relationship.”
23
 We may 
conclude then that Rousseau’s ideal of family life does not square with his model of 
upbringing as described in Emile, a fact of which Rousseau was probably well aware 
when he chose to present the model through a relationship of tutor and pupil. 
If the politically-focused model creates ultimate citizens by extending the element 
of identity to encompass the polity as a whole, the autonomy-oriented model curtails 
the element of identity as far as possible to create the ultimate individual. It is no 
accident that we are not told anything about the tutor’s biography for it plays no role 
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whatsoever in the upbringing of the pupil. This upbringing is intended as a shield not 
only from social prejudice and injustice but also from the opinions of parents and tutors. 
They cannot be allowed to influence Emile’s identity for he is to choose his life 
autonomously. This is especially apparent regarding Emile’s religion and citizenship. 
Contrary to the parent–child relationship where “a child has to be raised in his father’s 
religion,” we “who want to teach nothing to our Emile which he could not learn by 
himself in every country,… shall join him to neither this one nor that one, but we shall 
put him in a position to choose the one to which the best use of his reason ought to lead 
him.”
24
 And although we have to be born into some country or other, when we attain 
maturity and become our own masters we also become masters of renouncing our 
fatherland.
25
 Emile, who knows “no other happiness than living in independence” with 
the one he loves, wants “only a little farm in some corner of the world.”
26
 Not 
particularly attached to his fatherland, he becomes a cosmopolitan traveller knowing 
“all the places where he can live” and choosing “where he can live most comfortably.”
27
 
Emile has been brought up as if he were Robinson Crusoe, and yet he is not to 
remain isolated. He is shown the way to society – ideally, that of Rousseau’s Social 
Contract – through marriage, settling down and raising a family. This model of 
upbringing is not meant to prepare one for a life of solitude but for a life of freedom 
within society. Nevertheless, we may remain sceptical about family (and social) life 
being possible if we adopt this model, just as we may doubt that the model could be 
implemented within families. Rousseau’s incomplete sequel Emile and Sophie seems to 
reveal his own doubts on this issue. There Emile’s marriage to Sophie falls apart and as a 
consequence he goes into self-imposed exile. Describing his decision, Emile says: “In 
breaking the bonds that attached me to my country I extended it over the whole earth; 
                                                 
24
 Rousseau, Emile or On Education, 260; see also at 313-14. 
25
 Ibid., 455. 
26
 Ibid., 457. 
27
 Ibid., 454. 
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and in ceasing to be a citizen I became all the more a man.”
28
 This should not come as a 
surprise. After all, this was what he was brought up to be. At the end of the day, so it 
seems, the result of an upbringing modelled after Robinson Crusoe is much more likely 
to bring the child to a desert island, metaphorically if not literally speaking.
29
 
 
 
2. The liberal family: Necessary compromise or principled model? 
 
The family as a site of upbringing occupies a middle ground between the two models. As 
beliefs and practices are transmitted from parents to children, the family is a vehicle of 
socialization. Children in families are raised to become members of community, not to 
leave it the moment they are able to do so. From an autonomy-oriented perspective, 
the family thus constrains the horizons of choice. However, the family is a private form 
of socialization given in the hands of voluntarily associated individuals, thereby leaving 
open the possibility of it not conforming to the requirements of the polity as a whole. If 
children are raised as future members of a community, they are not necessarily raised 
as future members of the political community. From a politically-focused perspective 
the family is an agent of particularity. Upbringing in families is neither autonomy-
oriented, nor politically focused. Is it, however, a model in its own right? 
Both Plato and Rousseau are well aware that their models give rise to grave 
feasibility concerns. In both cases, the very first realization of the model already seems 
to rely on its successful implementation. Who will adequately rear the guardians if not 
already-adequately-reared guardians?
30
 Similarly, to shield a pupil from social prejudice 
the tutor would have had to be shielded from social prejudice himself.
31
 Yet even if we 
                                                 
28
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Emile and Sophie; or, The Solitaries,” trans. Christopher Kelly, in Christopher 
Kelly and Eve Grace (eds.), Rousseau on Women, Love, and Family (Hanover, NH: Dartmouth College 
Press, 2009), 296. 
29
 It is telling that Rousseau intended “Emile and Sophie” to end in Emile’s eventual settlement on a desert 
island. See the editors’ note in Rousseau, “Emile and Sophie,” 306. 
30
 The feasibility issue is repeatedly mooted in Book 5 of The Republic and concluded in Book 6; see at 207. 
31
 See Rousseau, Emile or On Education, 50. 
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had the resources to realize either model, our prospects of success would remain 
extremely dubious. Their objectives seem to stand beyond human possibility. We just 
cannot avoid forming some particular attachments – to our parents, siblings, nannies or 
tutors – if not as followers then as dissenters, and we cannot remain untouched by our 
unchosen social setting. Recognizing this, one might interpret the family as a necessary 
compromise, the result of not being able to go all the way towards either social 
cohesion or individual autonomy. If that were the case, however, we could still push 
towards the desired end; indeed, some have done precisely that. The more collectivist 
upbringing that used to be exercised in the Israeli kibbutzim is an example of 
approaching social cohesion; advocates of cosmopolitan education are an example of a 
drive towards autonomy.  
Yet a different interpretation is also available according to which the family is a 
particularly liberal model of upbringing, not merely a practical solution, second-best at 
most.
32
 Liberalism as a political theory (rather than a comprehensive philosophy) can be 
characterized by its multiplication and separation of authorities. As Michael Walzer 
describes it, 
[t]he old, preliberal map [of the social and political world] showed a largely 
undifferentiated land mass, with rivers and mountains, cities and towns, but no 
borders… Society was conceived as an organic and integrated whole… Confronting 
this world, liberal theorists preached and practiced an art of separation. They 
drew lines, marked off different realm, and created the sociopolitical map with 
which we are still familiar… Liberalism is a world of walls, and each one creates a 
new liberty[.]
33
 
To be sure, the art of separation is institutional. “We do not separate individuals; we 
separate institutions, practices, relationships of different sorts. The lines we draw 
                                                 
32
 This is not to suggest it is the only interpretation available from within the liberal tradition. In fact, the 
autonomy-oriented model, with its perspective of the family as only a compromise, is no less associated 
with liberalism.  
33
 Michael Walzer, “Liberalism and the Art of Separation,” Political Theory 12 (1984): 315-30, at 315. 
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encircle churches and schools and markets and families, not you and me.”
34
 Chandran 
Kukathas similarly observes that “liberal thought and particularly liberal constitutional 
thought has persistently recognized the merits of dividing authority”
35
: 
[T]his involves the familiar doctrine of the separation of powers… In a liberal 
polity, however, there are more ways still of dividing and separating authority: for 
authority may be held by a host of other institutions, associations, and 
communities, none of which is completely subordinate to any other single power, 
or compelled to abide by a single, common standard of justice.
36
 
The liberal society is not a solidified whole nor is it an aggregation of atomized 
individuals. It is rather a society of societies. Now liberals will greatly differ about their 
favoured image of society. Some will prefer Rawls’s moderately integrated “social union 
of social unions,” while others lean towards an “archipelago of societies” indifferently 
coexisting alongside each other.
37
 Yet a society cannot be regarded as liberal if it does 
not exercise the principle of separation to some degree, and cannot be regarded a 
society if it displays no integration at all.
38
 A liberal society must, therefore, incorporate 
formulae of both separation and integration.  
Interpreted in this light the family appears as that society’s principled model of 
upbringing, also incorporating formulae of integration and separation, and thereby 
reflecting rather than resolving the tension between the individual and society. If 
liberalism is a self-subverting political doctrine,
39
 then the family model of upbringing is 
                                                 
34
 Ibid., 325. Cf. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 221: “It is 
incorrect to say that liberalism focuses solely on the right of individuals; rather, the rights it recognizes are 
to protect associations, smaller groups, and individuals, all from one another in an appropriate balance 
specified by its guiding principles of justice.” 
35
 Chandran Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 39. 
36
 Ibid., 265. The reference to justice here seems to stand in stark opposition to the liberal-egalitarian 
preoccupation with social justice. However, recall my discussion in Chapter 3 of the room Rawls leaves for 
different conceptions of justice to regulate the various elements of society. 
37
 For description of these images, see, respectively, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1999), Section 79; Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago, especially 19-31. 
38
 Walzer, “Liberalism and the Art of Separation,” 327: “The art of separation works to isolate social 
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39
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one of self-subverting socialization. It produces neither unconstrained individuals nor a 
harmonized society but diversely contextualized individuals. As a principled alternative 
to a state of individuals and a family state, we thus arrive at a state of families.
40
 
Starting from the autonomy-oriented model, we might imagine the family as a 
castle with high towers and thick walls protecting the vulnerable child from society’s 
influence. Yet in the family castle you can still see the surrounding valleys from the 
towers; a drawbridge spans the moat and travellers and merchants come and go. 
Following the politically-focused model, on the other hand, we might pursue an image 
of families as cells of a living organism – the political community – though from this 
perspective, some families are likely to be considered as tumours, whether benign or 
malignant. In contrast with these two pictures, the account of family justice advanced in 
this thesis offers to evaluate the family on its own terms which are – as was suggested 
above – particularly liberal. Pursuing this account of justice thus assumes an 
understanding of the family that is more adequate but no less principled. To accompany 
this understanding, I suggest replacing the images of fortified castle and organic cells 
with that of an atoll, a coral reef enclosing a lagoon.
41
 
Our most fundamental expectations of the family are a matter of justice, but we 
usually expect family members to go beyond justice, to feel love and act altruistically. 
Analogously, an atoll often consists of more than an enclosed lagoon. Around the rim of 
the reef we may usually find low flat islands or more continuous strips of low, flat land. 
Now think of the interplay between family justice and social justice in terms of the coral 
lagoon and the surrounding open sea. The lagoon is an area of relatively shallow, quiet 
water situated in a coastal environment. It has access to the sea but is separated from 
the open marine conditions by a coral reef barrier. Seawater moves in and out through 
passes in the barrier, yet being sheltered, the lagoon waters support distinctive flora 
                                                 
40
 I borrow the titles from Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1987), Chapter 1, to denote my own interpretation of the models not hers. Specifically, in Gutmann the 
state of families is one in which families have exclusive responsibility for children’s education. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, my account does not imply this. 
41
 The following paragraph draws upon the Britannica Online Encyclopaedia (www.britannica.com). 
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and fauna. The distribution of coral lagoons is also instructive. They are restricted to 
tropical open seas which provide the conditions necessary for coral growth. When the 
sea level rises too fast a barrier may be drowned and its lagoon will cease to exist. Coral 
lagoons are of great importance to many island communities in the Pacific, particularly 
where they provide the only quiet water for use as harbours. 
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